Iran Sanctions

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Summary

International sanctions on Iran’s key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran’s economy and arguably contributed to Iran’s acceptance of restrictions on expanding its nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA) has been in effect since January 20, 2014, and extended twice (until June 30, 2015) to allow time to translate it into a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The economic pressure caused:

- Iran’s crude oil exports to fall to about 1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) at the end of 2013, from about 2.5 million barrels per day Iran in 2011. The crude oil exports are capped at the 1.1 mbd level by the JPA.
- Iran’s economy to shrink by about 5% in 2013 as Iran’s private sector reduced operations. The economy has rebounded only modestly since the JPA sanctions relief went into effect.

Sanctions have constricted Iran’s ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry, but have not halted Iran’s provision of arms to the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government, and to pro-Iranian factions such as Lebanese Hezbollah or Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sanctions have not altered Iran’s repression of domestic dissent.

Under the JPA, Iran has obtained sanctions relief through presidential waivers of several U.S. sanctions laws and authority under several executive orders. The core of the sanctions relief is $700 million per month in access to hard currency from oil sales, plus about $65 million per month in additional hard currency provided to educational institutions for Iranians studying abroad. The JPA caps Iran’s crude oil exports at the pre-JPA level of about 1.1 mbd. The JPA also suspends sanctions on Iran’s auto manufacturing sector and on its sales of petrochemicals. The fall in oil prices since June 2014 has additionally harmed Iran’s economy, perhaps introducing an additional incentive for Iranian leaders to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear deal.

According to an April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive nuclear accord, a finalized nuclear deal will entail—upon certification that Iran has implemented its nuclear program commitments— easing of U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran’s energy exports and foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector. Sanctions will also be eased on Iran’s financial, shipping, automotive, and other industrial sectors. U.S. sanctions that apply only to U.S. companies and those imposed because of Iran’s support for terrorism or for human rights abuses will not be altered as a consequence of a finalized deal. The Administration has asserted that, in the event of an agreement, it will act on its own authority to suspend most sanctions on Iran and, after testing Iran’s compliance over an unspecified period of time, would request that Congress provide long-term sanctions relief. Legislation in the 114th Congress would impose additional sanctions that would go into effect immediately if diplomacy fails. One bill, S. 615, would prevent the President from suspending U.S. sanctions on Iran pending congressional review of a finalized nuclear deal. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack; and CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Overview and Objectives

U.S. sanctions have been a major feature of U.S. Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, but U.N. and worldwide bilateral sanctions on Iran are a relatively recent (post-2006) development. Many of the U.S. sanctions reinforce U.N. and multilateral sanctions put in place in recent years by European and some Asian countries. Successive Administrations have sought to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not hamper cooperation with key international partners whose support is needed to isolate Iran.

The objectives of U.S. sanctions have evolved over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East more generally. Since the mid-2000s, U.S. sanctions have focused intently on compelling Iran to limit the scope of its nuclear program to ensure purely civilian use. Particularly since 2010, the international community has joined U.S. sanctions in pursuit of that goal. However, most sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously.

This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and, in so doing, provides examples, based on a wide range of open source reporting, of companies and countries that conduct business with Iran. CRS has no way to independently corroborate any of the reporting on which these examples are based and no mandate to assess whether any entity is complying with U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The sections below are grouped according to functional theme, in the chronological order in which these themes have emerged in U.S. sanctions policy toward Iran.

Implementation of some of the sanctions is subject to interpretation. On November 13, 2012, the Administration published in the Federal Register (Volume 77, Number 219) “Policy Guidance” explaining how it implements many of the sanctions. The guidance provides examples of specific products and chemicals that are included in the definitions of such terms as “petroleum,” “petroleum products,” and “petrochemical products” that are used in the laws and executive orders discussed below.

Blocked Iranian Property and Assets

Some U.S. sanctions began at the time of the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981 in the form of Carter Administration executive orders blocking Iranian assets held in the United States. The assets were unblocked by subsequent Orders when the crisis was resolved in early 1981 under the “Algiers Accords.” The Accords established a “U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal” at the Hague continues to arbitrate cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. Major cases yet to be decided center on hundreds of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases between the United States and the Shah’s regime, which Iran claims it paid for but were unfulfilled. A reported $400 million in proceeds from the resale of that equipment was placed in a DOD FMS account and may remain in this escrow account, although DOD has not provided CRS with a precise balance. In addition, about $50 million in Iranian diplomatic property and accounts remains blocked—this amount includes proceeds from rents received on the former Iranian

1 http://www.regulations.gov/#/documentDetail;D=DOS_FRDOC_0001-2175.
embassy in Washington, DC, and 10 other properties in several states, along with related bank accounts.\(^2\) Including Iranian assets blocked under Executive Order 13599 of February 2010, discussed below, about $1.95 billion in Iranian assets is blocked, according to the 2013 “Terrorist Assets Report.”

Other past financial disputes include the mistaken U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States paid Iran $61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage earning victim, $150,000 per nonwage earner) for the 248 Iranians killed. The United States did not compensate Iran for the airplane itself, although officials involved in the negotiations told CRS in November 2012 that the United States later arranged to provide a substitute, used aircraft to Iran.

In late 2009, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York seized the assets of the Assa Company, a UK-chartered entity. Assa allegedly was maintaining the interests of Bank Melli in an office building in New York City. An Iranian foundation, the Alavi Foundation, allegedly is an investor in the building.

Some of Iran’s assets have been held against legal judgments ordering Iran to compensate U.S. victims of Iranian-backed terrorism. Recent terrorism-related judgments include those in favor of the families of the 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. About $8.8 billion has been awarded in eight judgments against Iran for that bombing, which was perpetrated by elements that formed Lebanese Hezbollah. The Algiers Accords appears to have precluded compensation for the 52 U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran from November 1979 until January 1981. For more information, see CRS Report RL31258, *Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism*, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

**Executive Order 13599 Impounding Iran-Owned Assets**

Several executive orders discussed in this report direct the blocking of U.S.-based assets of designated Iranian entities. Executive Order 13599, issued February 5, 2012, imposes sanctions on the Central Bank and on other entities determined to be owned or controlled by the Iranian government (“government of Iran”). The order requires that any U.S.-based assets of the Central Bank of Iran, or of any Iranian government-controlled entity, be impounded by U.S. financial institutions. U.S. persons are prohibited from any dealings with such entities. U.S. financial institutions previously were required to merely refuse such transactions with the Central Bank, or return funds to it. Several designations have been made under order, as shown in *Table 5*, such as the June 21, 2013, naming of 38 entities—mostly including oil, petrochemical, and investment companies—as meeting the definition of “government of Iran.”\(^3\)

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Sanctions Against Iran’s Support for International Terrorism and Regional Activities

The United States began imposing sanctions against Iran again in the mid-1980s. The Secretary of State designated Iran a “state sponsor of terrorism” on January 23, 1984, following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon perpetrated by elements that later became Hezbollah. This designation triggers substantial sanctions on any nation so designated.

Sanctions Triggered by Terrorism List Designation: Ban on U.S. Aid, Arms Sales, Dual-Use Exports, and Certain Programs for Iran

The U.S. naming of Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism”—commonly referred to as Iran’s placement on the U.S. “terrorism list”—triggers several sanctions. The designation is made under the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended), sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international terrorism. The sanctions triggered by Iran’s state sponsor of terrorism designation are:

- **Restrictions on sales of U.S. dual use items.** The restriction is required by the Export Administration Act, as continued through presidential authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA, as implemented by executive orders).

- **Ban on direct U.S. financial assistance and arms sales to Iran.** Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, FAA (P.L. 87-95) and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended), respectively, bar these benefits to terrorism list countries. In addition, successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the late 1980s have banned direct assistance to Iran (loans, credits, insurance, Ex-Im Bank credits) without providing for a waiver.

- **Requirement that the United States vote to oppose multilateral lending.** U.S. officials are required to vote against multilateral lending to any terrorism list country by Section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118, as amended (added by Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]). Waiver authority is provided.

- **Withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to Suppliers of Terrorism List Countries.** Under Section 620G and 620H of the Foreign Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any country that provides to a terrorism list country financial assistance or arms. Waiver authority is provided. Section 321 of that act also makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons to conduct financial transactions with terrorism list governments.

- **Withholding of U.S. Aid to Organizations That Assist Iran.** Section 307 of the FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations, and require proportionate cuts if these institutions work in Iran. For example, if an international organization spends 3% of its budget for programs in Iran, then the United States is required to withhold 3% of its contribution to that international organization. No waiver is provided for.
No Ban on U.S. Humanitarian Aid

The terrorism list designation, and other U.S. sanctions laws, do not bar disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of two earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997); $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June 22, 2002, earthquake; and $5.7 million in assistance (out of total governmental pledges of about $32 million) for the victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, which killed as many as 40,000 people. The U.S. military flew in 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam.

Requirements for Removal from Terrorism List

Terminating the sanctions triggered by Iran’s terrorism list designation would require Iran’s removal from the terrorism list. The Arms Export Control Act spells out two different requirements for a President to remove a country from the list, depending on whether the country’s regime has changed.

If the regime has changed, the President can remove a country from the list immediately by certifying that change in a report to Congress.

If the country’s regime has not changed, the President must report to Congress 45 days in advance of the effective date of removal. The President must certify that (1) the country has not supported international terrorism within the preceding six months, and (2) the country has provided assurances it will not do so in the future. In this latter circumstance, Congress has the opportunity to block the removal by enacting a joint resolution to that effect. The President has the option of vetoing the joint resolution, in which case blocking the removal would require a congressional veto override vote.

Executive Order 13224 Sanctioning Terrorism-Supporting Entities

In signing Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001), the President ordered the freezing of the U.S.-based assets of and a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. This order was issued two weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, and initially targeted Al Qaeda-related entities. The Order is therefore not specific to Iran.

Implementation: Iran-related entities designated under the order for terrorism-related activities are listed in the table at the end of this report.

Sanctioning Iranian Involvement in the Region

Some relatively recent related sanctions have been imposed to try to curtail Iran’s influence in the region:

- **Executive Order 13438.** On July 7, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13438, sanctioning persons who are posing a threat to Iraqi stability, presumably by providing arms or funds to Shiite militias there. Persons sanctioned under the order, including Qods Force officers, Iraqi Shiite militia-linked figures, and other entities sanctioned under the Order are shown in the tables at the end.

- **Executive Order 13572.** Issued on April 29, 2011, the Order targets those responsible for human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people. The IRGC-Qods Force, Qods Force officers including overall commander Qasem
Soleimani, and others sanctioned under this and related Orders are shown in the tables at the end of the report.

Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment with Iran

The next major sanction imposed on Iran after those required by the terrorism list designation was a ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. It was imposed on May 6, 1995, by President Clinton, through Executive Order 12959, under the authority primarily of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).\(^4\) IEEPA gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign country when a state of emergency is declared in relations with that country. Executive Order 12959 followed and superseded an earlier (March 15, 1995) Executive Order (12957) barring U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector, which accompanied President Clinton’s declaration that a “state of emergency” exists with respect to Iran. A subsequent Executive Order, 13059 (August 19, 1997), added a prohibition on U.S. companies’ knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran. Each March since 1995, the U.S. Administration has renewed a declaration of a state of emergency that triggers the President’s trade regulation authority under IEEPA. The operation of the trade regulations is stipulated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITRs). The U.S. trade and investment ban is unaffected by the JPA—with selected exceptions, U.S. firms remain generally banned from the Iran market.

Codification of the Ban and U.S.-Iran Trade Figures

Section 103 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) codified the ban on U.S trade with Iran. In so doing, it reinstated the full ban on imports that had been relaxed by executive order in April 2000 to allow U.S. importation of Iranian nuts, fruit products (such as pomegranate juice), carpets, and caviar. The relaxations to the trade ban from then until CISADA’s effective date of September 29, 2010, account for the fact that U.S. trade with Iran expanded during that period. The restoration of the full import ban explains why U.S. imports from Iran since that time have been negligible, consisting mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States (and count as imports even though the works return to Iran after the exhibitions conclude). For all of 2013, U.S. exporters sold about $312 million in goods to Iran, mostly grain sales, but dropped to about half that for 2014. CISADA also specifies exemptions to the trade ban, including (1) exports not only of food and medical goods; (2) information technology to support personal communications among the Iranian people; (3) goods to allow civilian aircraft to fly safely; and (4) goods for supporting democracy in Iran.

Section 101 of the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293) separately codified the ban on U.S. investment in Iran. Section 101 of that law gives the President the authority to terminate sanctions under the Iran Freedom Support Act if he notifies Congress 15 days in advance (or 3 days in advance if there are “exigent circumstances”).

\(^4\) The executive order was issued not only under the authority of IEEPA but also: the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code.
What U.S.-Iran Trade Is Allowed or Prohibited?

The following provisions apply to the U.S. trade ban on Iran as specified in regulations (“Iran Transaction Regulations,” ITRs) written pursuant to the executive orders and laws discussed above. The regulations are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department.

- **Oil Transactions.** The 1995 trade ban expanded a 1987 ban on imports from Iran that was imposed by Executive Order 12613 of October 29, 1987. The 1987 ban, authorized by Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9), barred U.S. oil companies from importing Iranian oil into the United States but did not ban buying Iranian oil and trading it overseas. The 1995 ban prohibits any trading of Iranian oil. The 1995 trade ban does allow U.S. companies to apply for licenses to conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran. However, these swaps have been prohibited in practice; a Mobil Corporation application to do so was denied in April 1999, and no known applications have been submitted since.

- Regulations pursuant to the 1995 trade ban do not ban the importation, from foreign refiners, of gasoline or other energy products in which Iranian oil is contained and mixed with oil from other producers. The product of a refinery—for example major refineries in the EU countries—is considered a product of the country where that refinery is located and can be imported into the United States, even if the refined product has some Iran-origin crude oil. No EU refineries have imported Iranian oil since July 1, 2012, and only a few other refineries worldwide both continue to receive Iranian oil and export gasoline to the United States. U.S. gasoline imports from those refineries are minor.

- **Transshipment and Brokering.** The regulations that implement the trade ban prohibit transshipment of goods across Iran. They also ban any activities by U.S. persons to broker commercial transactions involving Iran.

- **Civilian Airline Parts.** Under the original 1995 Executive order banning U.S. trade with Iran, goods related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft may, on a case-by-case basis, be licensed for export to Iran (§560.528 of Title 31, C.F.R.). Some spare parts sales were licensed occasionally since that time. However, on June 23, 2011, the Administration sanctioned Iran Air under Executive Order 13382 (see below), rendering licensing of parts or repairs for that airline impermissible. Other Iranian airlines have been sanctioned under that and Executive Order 13224, as discussed below. The JPA provides for provision of spare civilian airline parts to Iran, specifically including Iran Air (notwithstanding its designation), and relevant provisions of E.O. 13382 have been suspended to enable Iran Air to benefit from this commitment. Boeing and GE have received export licenses to sell aircraft equipment and aircraft manuals to Iran since the JPA began implementation.5

- **Personal Communications, Remittances, and Publishing.** There are no applicable restrictions on personal communications (phone calls, e-mails) between the U.S.

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and Iran or on personal remittances. In December 2004, regulations were modified to allow Americans to engage in ordinary publishing activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan). On May 30, 2013, OFAC issued a general license for the exportation to Iran of goods (such as cell phones) and services, on a fee basis, that enhance the ability of the Iranian people to access communication technology. However, many banks refuse to process payments for many of these transactions, making such sales difficult in practice.

- **Food and Medical Exports.** Since April 1999, commercial sales of food and medical products to Iran have been allowed, on a case-by-case basis and subject to OFAC licensing. Among earlier relaxations, on October 22, 2012, OFAC attempted to facilitate medical sales by issuing a list of medical products, such as scalpels, prosthetics, canes, burn dressings, and other products that could be sold to Iran under “general license”—no export license requirement. That list was updated on July 25, 2013, to include electrocardiogram, electroencephalogram, and dialysis machines and other medical products. According to OFAC, licenses for exports of medical products not on the list are routinely expedited for sale to Iran, and the U.S. government has been informing foreign banks that financing such transactions is not subject to sanctions. The JPA commits the United States and its partners to facilitate humanitarian sales to Iran. Implementing that commitment did not require modifications to U.S. trade regulations on that issue.

Regulations have a specific definition of “food” that can be licensed for sale to Iran, and that definition excludes alcohol, cigarettes, gum, or fertilizer. This definition addresses information in a December 24, 2010, article that said that OFAC had approved exports to Iran of such condiments as ice cream sprinkles, chewing gum, food additives, hot sauces, body-building supplements, and other goods that have uses other than purely nutritive. Some of the licensed U.S. goods were sold through a Revolutionary Guard-owned chain of stores in Iran called Qods, as well as a government-owned Shahrvand store.

- **Humanitarian and Related Services.** Private non-financial donations by U.S. residents to Iranian victims of natural disasters (such as mailed packages of food, toys, clothes, etc.) are not prohibited, but donations to relief organizations require a specific OFAC license, because such transfers generally require use of the international banking system. Prior to September 2013, all NGOs that sought to perform relief efforts in Iran required a specific license to do so, which apparently made work in Iran impractical. On September 10, 2013, the Treasury Department eliminated licensing requirements for the provision to Iran of services for health projects, disaster relief, wildlife conservation, human rights projects, and activities related to sports matches and events. The amended regulation also allows importation from Iran of services related to sporting activities, including sponsorship of players, coaching, referees, and training. In some cases, such as the earthquake in Bam in 2003 and the earthquake in northwestern Iran in August 2012, OFAC has issued blanket temporary general licensing for relief organizations to perform relief efforts in Iran. The licensing

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requirements in the latter case allowed an NGO to transfer up to $300,000 without requiring a specific license.

- **Export Financing.** As far as financing of approved U.S. sales to Iran, private letters of credit (from non-Iranian banks) can be used to finance approved transactions. Title IX of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387) bans the use of official credit guarantees for food and medical sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S. terrorism list, except Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit such credit guarantees. No U.S. Administration has authorized credit guarantees for any U.S. exports to Iran.

**Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms**

The U.S. trade ban does not bar subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary has no operational relationship to—or control by—the parent company. For legal and policy purposes, foreign subsidiaries are considered foreign persons and are subject to the laws of the country in which the subsidiaries are incorporated. Section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) applies the U.S. trade ban to foreign subsidiaries if (1) the subsidiary is more than 50% owned by the U.S. parent; (2) the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of Directors; or (3) the parent firm directs the operations of the subsidiary. However, many subsidiaries might not meet the criteria for sanctioning stipulated in that law.

**Trade Ban Easing and Termination**

**Termination:** Section 401 of CISADA provides for the President to terminate the trade ban (Section 103) if the Administration certifies to Congress that Iran has no longer satisfies the requirements to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and that Iran has ceased pursuing and has dismantled its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and related launch technology. Alternatively, the trade ban provision in CISADA could be repealed outright by congressional action.

**Waiver Authority:** Section 103(b)(vi) of CISADA allows the President to license exports to Iran if he determines that doing so is in the national interest of the United States. This gives the President flexibility to ease the ban on U.S. exports through executive action. There is no similar provision in CISADA to ease the ban on U.S. imports from Iran.

The JPA did not require the United States to ease or lift the ban on U.S. trade with or investment in Iran. There Administration has said that this sanction will not be lifted or suspended part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.

**Energy Sanctions: Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) and Related Laws and Executive Orders**

Since 1996, Congress and successive Administrations have put in place steps to try to force foreign firms to choose between participating in the U.S. market and continuing to conduct various energy-related transactions with Iran. The intent of energy sanctions has been to put pressure on Iran’s economy and its leadership calculations, and to deny Iran the financial resources to further its nuclear and WMD programs and support terrorist organizations. Iran’s petroleum sector is vital to the Iran state and economy—prior to the imposition of oil export-related sanctions in 2012 it generated about 20% of Iran’s GDP, about 80% of its foreign exchange earnings, and about 50% of its government revenue.
Iran’s oil sector is as old as the petroleum industry itself (early 20th century), and Iran’s onshore oil fields are past peak production and in need of substantial investment. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada. With the exception of relatively small swap and barter arrangements with neighboring countries, virtually all of Iran’s oil exports flow through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about one-third of all internationally traded oil. Iran’s large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded only by Russia) were virtually undeveloped when ISA was first enacted. Its small gas exports are mainly to Armenia and Turkey; most of its gas is injected into its oil fields to boost their production.

The Iran Sanctions Act, Amendments, and Related Applications

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) has been a key component of U.S. sanctions against Iran’s energy sector, and it has been expanded to sanction dealings with other Iranian economic sectors. As initially enacted, ISA sought to thwart Iran’s opening of the sector to foreign investment in late 1995. Iran uses a “buy-back” foreign investment program in which foreign firms gradually recoup their investments as oil and gas is discovered and then produced. In September 1995, Senator Alfonse D’Amato introduced a bill to sanction foreign firms’ exports to Iran of energy technology. A revised version instead sanctioning investment in Iran’s energy sector, and also applying all provisions to Libya passed the Senate. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was signed on August 5, 1996 (P.L. 104-172). It was later retitled the Iran Sanctions Act after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. ISA was the first major “extra-territorial sanction” on Iran—a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties against third country firms. ISA’s application has been further expanded by several laws enacted since 2010 that amend its provisions.

Key Sanctions “Triggers” Under ISA

ISA consists of a number of “triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions. When triggered, ISA provides for a number of different sanctions that could harm a foreign firm’s business opportunities in the United States.

“Investment” To Develop Iran’s Oil and Gas Fields

ISA requires the President to sanction companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The definition of “investment” in ISA (§14 (9)) includes not only equity and royalty arrangements but any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran. The definition includes

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8 As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures.

9 Under §4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. P.L. 111-195 explicitly sets the threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and transactions subject to sanctions included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).

10 The original ISA definition of energy sector included oil and natural gas, and CISADA added to that definition: liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG.
additions to existing investment (added by P.L. 107-24) and pipelines to or through Iran and
contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects (added by the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 [CISADA; P.L. 111-
195]).

Implementation: Several firms have been sanctioned under ISA for investing in Iran’s oil and gas
fields, as discussed below.

Sales of Weapons Related Technology and Uranium Mining Ventures

The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) amended ISA by
adding Section 5(b)(1) subjecting to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to
Iran (1) technology useful for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or (2) “destabilizing numbers
and types” of advanced conventional weapons. (Sanctions apply if the exporter knew or had
cause to know that the final destination of the items sold would be Iran.)

Entities determined by the Administration to participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the
mining, production, or transportation of uranium are sanctionable under ISA. Under Section
5(b)(2) added by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158, signed
August 10, 2012).

Implementation: No ISA sanctions have been imposed on any entities under these provisions.

Sales of Gasoline and Related Equipment and Services

Section 102(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, signed on July 1, 2010, P.L. 111-195) amended Section 5 of ISA to exploit Iran’s
dependency on imported gasoline (40% dependency at that time). It followed legislation such as
H.R. 2880 (110th Congress, not enacted); P.L. 111-85 that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to fill
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with products from firms that sell gasoline to Iran; and P.L. 111-
117 that denied Ex-Im Bank credits to any firm that sold gasoline or related equipment and
services to Iran—initiatives that prompted Reliance Industries Ltd. of India to cease new sales of
gasoline to Iran as of December 2008. (The Ex-Im Bank, in August 2008, had extended $900
million in financing guarantees to Reliance.) The provision made the following sanctionable.

- Sales to Iran of over $1 million worth (or $5 million in a one year period) of
gasoline and related aviation and other fuels. (Fuel oil, a petroleum by-product, is
not included in the definition of refined petroleum.)

- Sales to Iran of equipment or services (same dollar threshold as above) which
would help Iran make or import gasoline. Examples of such sales include
equipment and services that Iran can use to construct or maintain its oil
refineries, or provision of related services such as shipping or port operations.

Implementation: Several firms, as discussed below, have been sanctioned under ISA for selling or
shipping gasoline to Iran.
Sales of Energy Sector Equipment, Services, and Petrochemicals

An Executive Order, 13590 (November 21, 2011), was codified by Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA, P.L. 112-158). The ITRSHA provision added Section 5(a)(5 and 6) to ISA sanctioning firms that do the following.

- Provide to Iran $1 million or more (or $5 million in a one year period) worth of goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or enhance its oil and gas sector. This subjects to sanctions, for example, transactions with Iran by global oil services firms (e.g., Schlumberger) and the sale to Iran of energy industry gear such as drills, pumps, vacuums, oil rigs, and the like.
- Provide to Iran $250,000 (or $1 million in a one year period) worth of goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or expand its production of petrochemical products. This provision was not required to be waived as a consequence of the JPA.

Implementation: See Table 1 below for ISA sanctions imposed under this provision.

Purchasing of Iranian Crude Oil and Petrochemical Products

Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012) applies virtually all of the same sanctions as ISA—as well as restrictions on foreign banks (see below)—to entities the Administration determines have engaged in the following.

- Purchased oil or other petroleum products from Iran. The part of this order pertaining to petrochemical purchases is suspended under the JPA.
- Conducted transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO).

E.O. 13622 does not amend ISA itself. And, E.O. 13622 sanctions do not apply if the parent country of the entity has received an exemption under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81—an exemption earned for “significantly reducing” oil purchases from Iran. (See below for more information on the exemption process.)

Implementation: Prior to the JPA, several firms were sanctioned under this order on May 31, 2013, for petrochemical sales to Iran. See tables at the end of this paper.

Sanctions on transactions related to purchasing Iranian crude oil were codified by Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158, signed August 10, 2012). It amends ISA by applying ISA sanctions to entities determined by the Administration to have done the following.

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12 A definition of what chemicals and products are considered “petroleum products” for the purposes of the order are in the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOS_FRDOC_0001-2175.
• Owned a vessel that was used to transport Iranian crude oil. This sanction does not apply in cases of transporting oil to countries that have received exemptions under P.L. 112-81, discussed below. The section also authorizes but does not require the President, subject to regulations, to prohibit a ship from putting to port in the United States for two years, if it is owned by a person sanctioned under this provision. ( Adds Section 5(a)(7) to ISA.)

• Participated in a joint oil and gas development venture with Iran, outside Iran, if that venture was established after January 1, 2002. The effective date exempts energy ventures in the Caspian Sea, such as the Shah Deniz oil field there. ( Adds Section 5(a)(4 to ISA).)

Implementation. Some firms have been sanctioned for providing ships to transport Iranian oil.

Insurance for Iranian Oil Entities and Purchases of Iranian Bonds

Separate provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (Sections 212, 213, and 302) do not specifically amend ISA, but require the application of 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on any company

• that provides insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); or

• that purchases or facilitates the issuance of sovereign debt of the government of Iran, including Iranian government bonds.

Dealings with Iran’s Energy, Shipbuilding, and Shipping Sector

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239, signed January 2, 2013) Subtitle D, “The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act” (IFCA), does not amend ISA but imposes at least 5 out the 12 ISA sanctions (as of July 1, 2013, 180 days after enactment) on entities determined to have done the following.

• Provided goods or services to the energy, shipbuilding, and shipping sectors of Iran, or to port operations there—or which provide insurance for such transactions. This is under Section 1244 of IFCA, which also blocks U.S.-based property and U.S.-based banking activity on violators. The sanctions do not apply when such transactions involve purchases of Iranian oil by countries that have active exemptions under P.L. 112-81 or to the purchase of natural gas from Iran (or most transactions related to such gas purchases).

• Provided underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance for a broad range of transactions with Iran, including those related to shipping oil, gasoline, or other goods for the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors in Iran. This is under Section 1246 of IFCA. There is no exception to this sanction for countries exempted under P.L. 112-81.

• Section 1248 of IFCA sanctions Iran’s state broadcasting establishment (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) as a human rights abuser, triggering sanctions under Section 105 of CISADA.
• **Dealsings in Precious Metals.** Section 1245 of IFCA imposes at least 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on entities that provide precious metals to Iran (including gold) or semi-finished metals or software for integrating industrial processes. The section therefore affects foreign firms that transfer gold or other precious metals to Iran in exchange for oil or any other product. There is no exception to this sanction for countries exempted under P.L. 112-81. The provision does not amend ISA.

This provision codifies Section 5 of Executive Order 13622 that blocks U.S.-based property of individuals or firms determined to have helped Iran purchase U.S. bank notes or precious metals or to have provided financial support to NIOC, NICO, or the Central Bank of Iran. Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013, (Section 16), applies the restriction to transfers of stones or jewels.

**Waiver authority is discussed in the box on ISA waivers below.**

**Sanctions Imposed Under IFCA:** On August 29, 2014, the State Department sanctioned UAE-based Goldentex FZE in accordance with IFCA for providing support to Iran’s shipping sector.

**The Automotive Sector and Rial Trading**

Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013, (effective July 1, 2013) does the following.

• Imposes ISA sanctions on firms that supply goods or services to Iran’s automotive (cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and related parts) sector, and blocks foreign banks from the U.S. market if they finance transactions with Iran’s automotive sector. (An executive order cannot amend a law, so the order does not amend ISA.) This provision was suspended to implement the JPA.

• Blocks U.S.-based property and prohibits U.S. bank accounts for foreign banks that conduct transactions in Iran’s currency, the rial, or hold rial accounts. This provision mostly affects banks in countries bordering on or near Iran that sometimes have dealt in the rial.

• Blocks U.S.-based property of any person that conducts transactions with any Iranian entity on the list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) or Blocked Persons.

**Mandate and Time Frame to Investigate ISA Violations**

In the original version of ISA, there was no firm requirement, and no time limit, for the Administration to investigate potential violations and determine that a firm has violated ISA’s provisions. The “Iran Freedom Support Act” (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added a provision calling for, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination.\(^\text{13}\) CISADA (Section 102(g)(5)) mandated that the Administration begin an investigation of potential ISA violations when there is “credible information” about a potential violation, and made mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.

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\(^{13}\) Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs.
A subsequent law, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158), contains a provision to define “credible information” to begin an investigation of a violation. The law defines credible information to include a corporate announcement or corporate filing to its shareholders that it has undertaken transactions with Iran that are potentially sanctionable under ISA. It also says the President may (not mandatory) use as credible information reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service.

Oversight Mechanisms: Reports Required

The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) sets up several mechanisms for Congress to oversee whether the Administration is investigating ISA violations. Section 223 requires a Government Accountability Office report, within 120 days of enactment, and another such report a year later, on companies that have undertaken specified activities with Iran that might constitute violations of ISA. Section 224 amends a reporting requirement in Section 110(b) of CISADA by requiring an Administration report every 180 days on investment in Iran’s energy sector, joint ventures with Iran, and estimates of Iran’s imports and exports of petroleum products. The GAO reports have been issued; there is no information available on whether the required Administration reports have been issued as well.

Executive Order 13574 Clarifying the Administration’s Division of Responsibilities in Administering ISA.

On May 23, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13574 clarifying that it is the responsibility of the Treasury Department to implement those ISA sanctions that involve the financial sector, including bans on loans, credits, and foreign exchange for, or imports from, the sanctioned entity, as well as blockage of property of the sanctioned entity (if these sanctions are selected by the Secretary of State, who makes the decision which penalties to impose on sanctioned entities).
Available Sanctions Under ISA

Once a firm is determined to be a violator, the original version of ISA required the imposition of two of a menu of six sanctions on that firm. CISADA added three new possible sanctions and required the imposition of at least three out of the nine against violators. CISADA added three more sanctions to the ISA menu and required imposition at least 5 out of the 12 sanctions. Executive Orders 13590 and 13622 provide for exactly the same penalties as those in ISA. The 12 available sanctions against the sanctioned entity, from which the Secretary of State or the Treasury can select, are:

1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity (original ISA)
2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity (original ISA)
3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity (original ISA)
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction) (original ISA)
5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity (original ISA)
6. prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity (added by CISADA)
7. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution (added by CISADA)
8. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the sanctioned entity has a (financial) interest in (added by CISADA)
9. restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701) (original ISA)
10. a ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person (added by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, P.L. 112-158)
11. exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned firm (added by P.L. 112-158)
12. imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm (added by P.L. 112-158).

Mandatory Sanction: Prohibition on Contracts with the U.S. Government

There is an additional mandatory sanction under ISA. CISADA (§102(b)) added a requirement in ISA that companies, as a condition of obtaining a U.S. government contract, certify to the relevant U.S. government agency that the firm—and any companies it owns or controls—are not violating ISA. Regulations to implement this requirement were issued on September 29, 2010.
ISA Waiver, Exemptions, and Sunset Provisions

ISA Waiver Provisions

The President has the authority to waive sanctions on firms determined to have violated ISA provisions. Under the original version of ISA to waive sanctions if he certifies that doing so is important to the U.S. national interest (§9(c)). CISADA (§102(c)) changed the 9(c) ISA waiver standard to “necessary” to the national interest, and the Iran Threat Reduction Act modified the standard further to “essential to the national security interests” of the United States. For sanctionable transactions involving WMD equipment, the waiver standard, as modified by the Iran Threat Reduction Act, is “vital to the national security interests of the United States.”

Under the original version of ISA, there was also waiver authority (§4(c)) if the parent country of the violating firm joined a sanctions regime against Iran. This waiver provision was changed by the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293) to allow for a waiver determination based on U.S. vital national security interests. The Section 4(c) waiver was altered again, by CISADA, to provide for a six month (renewable) waiver if doing so is “vital to the national interest,” and if the parent country of the violating entity is “closely cooperating” with U.S. efforts against Iran’s WMD and advanced conventional weapons program. The criterion of “closely cooperating” is defined in the conference report as implementing all U.N. sanctions against Iran. It could be argued that using a Section 4 waiver, rather than a Section 9 waiver, would support U.S. diplomacy with the parent country of the offending entity.

ISA (§5(f)) also contains several exceptions such that the President is not required to impose sanctions that prevent procurement of defense articles and services under existing contracts, in cases where a firm is the sole source supplier of a particular defense article or service. The President also is not required to prevent procurement of essential spare parts or component parts.

Related IFCA Waiver Authority

Sections 1244 and 1245 of IFCA provide for a waiver of sanctions for 180 days, renewable for 180 day periods, if such a waiver is determined to be vital to U.S. national security. These sections were waived in order to implement the JPA. In addition, Section 5(a)(7) of ISA was waived to allow for certain transactions with NIOC and NITC.

“Special Rule” Exempting Firms That End Their Business with Iran

Under a provision added by CISADA (§102(g)(5)), ISA provides a means—a so-called “special rule”—for firms to avoid ISA sanctions by pledging to verifiably end their business with Iran and to forgo any sanctionable business with Iran in the future. Under the special rule, the Administration is not required to make a determination of sanctionability against a firm that makes such pledges. The special rule has been invoked on several occasions, as discussed below. However, there is some imprecision in the time frame under which countries can wind down their Iran business, and some firms could work in Iran for several more years under their pledges. Energy firms insist they needed time to wind down their investments in Iran because, under the buy-back program used by Iran, the energy firms are paid back their investment over time, making it highly costly for them to suddenly end operations in Iran.

Termination Process and Requirements

In its entirety, ISA application to Iran would terminate if the Administration certifies that three requirements are met:

1. That Iran has ceased its efforts to acquire WMD;
2. That Iran has been removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and
3. That Iran no longer “poses a significant threat” to U.S. national security and U.S. allies.14

This termination provision, and the sunset provision discussed below, do not apply to those laws that apply ISA sanctions without specifically amending ISA. The executive orders and laws that apply ISA sanctions to specified violators but without amending ISA itself can be revoked by a superseding executive order or congressional action that amends or repeals the provisions involved.

Sunset Provisions

ISA is currently scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2016, as provided for by CISADA. This followed prior sunset extensions to December 31, 2011, (by P.L. 109-293), and to December 31, 2006 (P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001). The original law provided for a sunset date of August 5, 2001. P.L. 107-24 also required an Administration report on ISA’s effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of enactment; that report was submitted to Congress in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be repealed.

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14 This termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293, which formally removed Libya from the act. Application of the act to Libya terminated on April 23, 2004, with a determination that Libya had fulfilled U.N. requirements.
Interpretations and Administration of ISA and Related Laws

The sections below analyze how ISA, as amended by related laws, have been interpreted and implemented through real-world cases and examples.

Application to Energy Pipelines

ISA’s definition of “investment” that is subject to sanctions has been consistently interpreted by successive Administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. Such pipelines are deemed to help Iran develop its petroleum (oil and natural gas) sector. This interpretation was reinforced by amendments to ISA in CISADA, which specifically included in the definition of petroleum resources “products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied natural gas.” In March 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton made clear that the Obama Administration interprets the provision to be applicable from the beginning of pipeline construction.15

Implementation. No gas pipelines built linking Iran to neighboring countries have been sanctioned under ISA. Pipeline projects that are under various stages of construction or consideration are discussed in the international compliance section below.

Application to Crude Oil Purchases

The original version of ISA did not provide for sanctioning purchases of oil from Iran. Executive Order 13622 and P.L. 112-158 essentially authorize sanctions on the purchase of Iranian oil—if the parent country of the energy buyer or shipper has not received an exemption under P.L. 112-81, which is discussed below. Any new customer for Iranian oil is authorized to be sanctioned under the Order and P.L. 112-81.

Shah Deniz Project Exception

The effective dates of U.S. sanctions laws also excludes long-standing joint natural gas projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and pipeline in the Caspian Sea. The project is run by a consortium in which Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share. The other partners in the venture are BP, Azerbaijan’s natural gas firm SOCAR, Russia’s Lukoil, and other firms. NICO has been sanctioned under ISA, as discussed below. An OFAC factsheet of November 28, 2012, states that the Shah Deniz consortium, as a whole, is not determined to be “a person owned or controlled by” the government of Iran, as defined in Executive Order 13599. The factsheet states that transactions with the consortium would not violate U.S. trade regulations on Iran nor require a license from OFAC. The guidance appears to apply to both the existing pipeline as well as the second phase of the project that is now under way, which also involves NICO and will carry gas to Europe.

15 http://dawn.com/2012/03/01/tough-us-warning-on-iran-gas-pipeline/.
Application to Purchases from Iran of Natural Gas Purchases

IFCA, discussed above, authorizes sanctions on any dealings with Iran’s energy sector. However, IFCA specifically excludes from sanctions purchases of natural gas from Iran. Still, payments for the natural gas might be subject to sanctions as discussed elsewhere in this report. Purchases of Iranian gas are distinguishable from the construction of natural gas pipelines involving Iran which, as discussed, does constitute potentially sanctionable activity.

Application to Iranian Liquefied Natural Gas Development

The original version of ISA did not apply to the development by Iran of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capability. Iran has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. However, CISADA specifically includes LNG in the definition of petroleum resources and therefore made subject to sanctions LNG investment in Iran or supply of LNG tankers or pipelines to Iran.

Application to Private Financing but Not Official Credit Guarantee Agencies

The definitions of investment and other activity that can be sanctioned under ISA clearly include financing for investment in Iran’s energy sector, or for sales of gasoline and refinery-related equipment and services. Therefore, banks and other financial institutions that assist energy investment and refining and gasoline procurement activities could be sanctioned under ISA.

However, the definitions of financial institutions in Iran sanctions laws are interpreted not to apply to official credit guarantee agencies—such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes. These credit guarantee agencies are arms of their parent governments, and ISA does not provide for sanctioning governments or their agencies. Early versions of CISADA would have sanctioned such entities but such provisions were not included in the final law, reportedly to avoid a backlash from U.S. allies.

Application to Iranian Energy Institutions/NIOC and NITC

As noted above, provisions of P.L. 112-158 and Executive Order 13622—although they do not amend ISA—apply ISA sanctions to dealings with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is supervised by the Oil Ministry, the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and a previously sanctioned firm, Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), which is a subsidiary of NIOC.

Under Section 302 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158), any person who engages in a significant transaction with NIOC and NITC is subject to the imposition of 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions. Section 312 of that law required an Administration determination, within 45 days of enactment (by September 24, 2012) whether NIOC and NITC are IRGC agents or affiliates. If such a determination is made, financial transactions with NIOC and NITC would be sanctionable under CISADA (prohibition on opening U.S.-based accounts).

Implementation. On September 24, 2012, the Department of the Treasury informed Congress that it had determined that NIOC and NITC are agents or affiliates of the IRGC. As noted below, on November 8, 2012, the Treasury Department named NIOC as a proliferation entity under Executive Order 13382. In accordance with Section 104 of CISADA, that designation bars any
foreign bank determined to have dealt directly with NIOC (including with a NIOC bank account in a foreign country) from opening a U.S.-based account.

Some major components of NIOC have not been sanctioned, including the Iranian Offshore Oil Company; the National Iranian Gas Export Co.; and Petroleum Engineering and Development Co. There are also independent Iranian energy firms, such as Pasargad Oil Co, Zagros Petrochem Co, Sazeh Consultants, Qeshm Energy, and Sadid Industrial Group. Their relations with NIOC or the Revolutionary Guard (see below) are unclear, and none of these independent firms has been sanctioned under any U.S. law or executive order.

_Sanctions on dealings with NIOC and NITC were waived in accordance with the JPA._
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Companies/Country</th>
<th>Status/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 1998</td>
<td>Total SA (France); Gazprom (Russia); and Petronas (Malaysia)—$2 billion project to develop South Pars gas field.</td>
<td>Waived. ISA violation determined but sanctions waived in line with U.S.-EU agreement for EU to cooperate on anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation issues, and not to file complaint against ISA (or “Helms-Burton” Cuba sanctions law) at the WTO. Then-Secretary of State Albright, in the May 18, 1998, waiver announcement, indicated that similar future such projects by EU firms in Iran would not be sanctioned (<a href="http://www.parstimes.com/law/albright_southpars.html">http://www.parstimes.com/law/albright_southpars.html</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 30, 2010</td>
<td>Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Switzerland, Iran</td>
<td>Sanctioned. For activities to develop Iran’s energy sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 30, 2010</td>
<td>Total (France); Statoil (Norway); ENI (Italy); and Royal Dutch Shell (Britain, Netherlands)</td>
<td>Exempted. Under from sanctions under ISA “special rule” for pledging to wind down work on Iran energy fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 17, 2010</td>
<td>Inpex (Japan)</td>
<td>Exempted. Special rule applied for announcement one month earlier that it divested its remaining 10% stake in Azadegan oil field development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 2011</td>
<td>Belarusneft (Belarus, subsidiary of Belneftekhim)</td>
<td>Sanctioned. For $500 million contract with NICO (see above) to develop Jofeir oil field. Other subsidiaries of Belneftekhim were sanctioned in 2007 under E.O. 13405 (Belarus sanctions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24, 2011</td>
<td>Petrochemical Commercial Company International (PCCI) of Bailiwick of Jersey and Iran; Royal Oyster Group (UAE); Tanker Pacific (Singapore); Allvare Maritime (Liberia); Societe Anonyme Monegasque Et Aeriennne (SAMAMA, Monaco); Speedy Ship (UAE/Iran); Associated Shipbroking (Monaco); and Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA, Venezuela).</td>
<td>Sanctioned under CISADA amendment to ISA imposing sanctions for selling gasoline to Iran or helping Iran import gasoline. Allvare Maritime and SAMAMA determinations were issued on September 13, 2011, to “clarify” the May 24 determinations that had named Ofer Brothers Group. The two, as well as Tanker Pacific, are affiliated with a Europe-based trust linked to deceased Ofer brother Sami Ofer, and not Ofer Brothers Group based in Israel. Firms named subjected primarily to the financial sanctions provided in ISA. U.S.-based subsidiaries of PDVSA, such as Citgo, were not sanctioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 12, 2012</td>
<td>Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. (China); Kuo Oil Pte Ltd. (Singapore); FAL Oil Co. (UAE)</td>
<td>Sanctioned. For brokering sales or making sales to Iran of gasoline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 12, 2012</td>
<td>Sytrol (Syria)</td>
<td>Sanctioned. For sales of gasoline to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 14, 2013</td>
<td>Dr. Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping; Kish Protection and Indemnity (Iran); and Bimeh Markazi-Central Insurance of Iran (CII, Iran)</td>
<td>Sanctioned. Under amendments to ISA by Iran Threat Reduction Act sanctioning owning vessels that transport Iranian oil or providing insurance for the shipments. Treasury sanctions also imposed on these and eight UAE-based oil graders that concealed the transactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 2013</td>
<td>Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allvare Maritime</td>
<td>Sanctions lifted. Special rule applied after firms provided to the U.S. “reliable assurances” they will not engage in similar activity in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
<td>Ferland Co. Ltd. (Cyprus and Ukraine)</td>
<td>Sanctioned. For cooperating with National Iranian Tanker Co. to illicitly sell Iranian crude oil. Sanctions also imposed by Treasury under E.O. 13608.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
<td>Dettin SPA</td>
<td>Sanctioned. Italy-based company sanctioned for providing goods and services to Iran’s petrochemical industry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Department announcements.
Sanctions on Transactions with Iran’s Central Bank for Oil or Other Goods: Section 1245 of the FY2012 NDAA

In late 2011, some in Congress believed that action was needed to cut off the mechanisms oil importers use to pay Iran hard currency for oil. Legislation to cut off Iran’s Central Bank from the international financial system were based largely on that objective, as well as on the view that the Central Bank helps other Iranian banks circumvent the U.S. and U.N. banking sanctions. The FY2012 national defense authorization bill (H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed on December 31, 2011, provides for the following:

- Requires the President to prevent a foreign bank from opening an account in the United States—or impose strict limitations on existing U.S. accounts—if that bank processes payments through Iran’s Central Bank. The provision applies to a foreign central bank only if the transaction with Iran’s Central Bank is for oil purchases. The provision went into effect for non-oil related transactions 60 days after enactment (February 29, 2012), and for transactions for oil purchases after 180 days (June 28, 2012).

- Exemption Provision. The President may grant an exemption for foreign banks—for any transactions with the Central Bank, not just for oil—if the President certifies that the parent country of the bank has significantly reduced its purchases of oil from Iran. That determination is reviewed every 180 days; countries must continue to reduce their oil buys from Iran, relative to the previous 180-day period, to retain the exemption. The Iran Threat Reduction Act (P.L. 112-158) amended Section 1245 such that any country that completely ceases purchasing oil from Iran would retain an exemption.

- Sanctions on transactions for oil apply only if the President certifies to Congress—90 days after enactment (by March 30, 2012), based on a report by the Energy Information Administration to be completed 60 days after enactment (by February 29, 2012)—that the oil market is adequately supplied. The EIA report and Administration certification are required every 90 days thereafter. The first required EIA report was issued on February 29, 2012, and, on March 30, 2012, President Obama determined that there was a sufficient supply of oil worldwide to permit countries to reduce oil purchases from Iran. An EIA report of April 27, 2012, and Administration determination of June 11, 2012, made similar findings and certifications, triggering potential sanctions as of June 28, 2012. Subsequent EIA reports and Administration determinations of the state of the oil market have kept the sanctions triggers in place.

Although Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 2, 2011, that the provision could lead to a rise in oil prices that would benefit Iran, the Administration accepted the legislation. In the signing statement on the bill, President Obama indicated he would implement the provision so as not to damage U.S. relations with partner countries.
Iran Sanctions

Waiver and Termination Provisions

The law provides for the President to waive the sanctions for 120 days, renewable for successive 120 day periods, if the President determines that doing so is in the national security interest. Outright repeal or amendment of this law would require congressional action.

This provision was waived on January 20, 2014, in order to implement the JPA, meaning that Iran’s oil customers will are not required to further reduce oil purchases from Iran while the JPA is in effect. Iran is demanding that this sanction no longer apply as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.

Implementation: Exemptions Issued

The lack of precise definition of “significant reduction” in oil purchases gave the Administration flexibility in applying the exemption provision. On January 19, 2012, several Senators wrote to Treasury Secretary Geithner agreeing with outside experts that the Treasury Department should define “significant reduction” as an 18% purchase reduction based on total price paid (not just volumes). Administration officials said they largely adopted that standard. The EU embargo on purchases of Iranian oil, announced January 23, 2012, and which took full effect by July 1, 2012, implied that virtually all EU oil customers of Iran would obtain exemptions. The table below on major Iranian oil customers indicates cuts made by major customers compared to 2011.

Exemptions Issued and Maintained

- Since March 20, 2012, Japan has maintained and exemption for significantly reducing purchases and 10 EU countries have maintained exemptions for ending purchases pursuant to the EU Iran oil purchase embargo of July 1, 2012. The 10 EU countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain. (Seventeen EU countries were not granted exemptions because they were not buying Iran’s oil and could not “significantly reduce” buys from Iran.)

- Since June 2012, the following countries have maintained exemptions for significant reductions: China, India, South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan.

- Also since June 2012, the following countries have maintained exemptions based on their ending oil purchases from Iran: Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka.

Sanctions on Paying Iran with Hard Currency

The ability of Iran to acquire hard currency has been further impeded by a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction Act (P.L. 112-158), which went into effect on February 6, 2013—180 days after enactment. Section 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act amended P.L. 112-81 (adding “clause ii” to Paragraph D(1)) by requiring that any funds owed to Iran as a result of exempted transactions (oil purchases, for example) be credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign bank making the transaction. This provision has further complicated

16 Text of letter from Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez to Secretary Geithner, January 19, 2012.
Iran’s efforts to bring hard currency back to the Central Bank and compels Iran to buy the products of the oil customer countries.

**Waiver Provision**

The waiver provision that applies to the sanctions to be imposed under the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) applies to this hard currency “lock-up” provision.

To implement the JPA, a waiver was issued under P.L. 112-81 to allow Iran to receive some hard currency from ongoing oil sales in eight installments during the JPA period. Iran remains unable, even under the JPA, to remove hard currency from existing accounts abroad. Iran is likely to demand that this sanction be lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal so that Iran can access its hard currency accounts abroad unfettered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Bloc</th>
<th>2011 Average</th>
<th>Average At JPA Start (and since)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union (particularly Italy, Spain, and Greece)</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5 mbd</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.057 mbd</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and Note: International Energy Agency and rough estimates based on CRS conversations with foreign diplomats and press reports. Actual volumes might differ, and import volumes may fluctuate dramatically over short periods of time as actual tanker deliveries occur. Figures include purchases of condensates, which are light petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. Iran’s oil buyers reportedly have increased purchases of condensates since the JPA began by about 200,000 barrel per day equivalent.

**Proliferation-Related Sanctions**

Aside from the “terrorism list sanctions” discussed above, several laws and executive orders seek to bars Iran from obtaining U.S. or other technology that can be used for weapons of mass destruction programs (WMD).
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and Iraq Sanctions Act

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484, signed in October 1992) imposes a number of sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.” Sanctions imposed on violating entities include a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from that entity, and a two-year ban on licensing U.S. exports to that entity. A sanction to ban imports to the United States from the entity is authorized.

If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are a one-year ban on U.S. assistance to that country; a one-year requirement that the United States vote against international lending to it; a one-year suspension of U.S. co-production agreements with the country; a one-year suspension of technical exchanges with the country in military or dual use technology; and a one-year ban on sales of U.S. arms to the country. The President is also authorized to deny the country most-favored-nation trade status; and to impose a ban on U.S. trade with the country. Section 1603 of the act amended an earlier law, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586G(a) of P.L. 101-513), to provide for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports to Iran (including computer software).

**Waiver and Termination**

Section 1606 of the act provides a presidential waiver for the provisions of the act, and for those imposed pursuant to the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, if the President determines a waiver is “essential to the national interest.”

Terminating this sanction outright would require congressional action. It is not clear whether this sanction will be lifted or waived as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.

Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, signed in March 2000) is now called the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) after amendments applying its provisions to North Korea and to Syria. It authorizes sanctions on foreign persons (individuals or corporations, not countries or governments) that are determined by the Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include a prohibition on U.S. exportation of arms and dual use items to the sanctioned entity, and, under Executive Order 12938 (of November 14, 1994), a ban on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned entity. The law also bans U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space station unless the President can certify that the agency or entities under its control had not transferred any WMD or missile technology to Iran within the year prior.18 (A continuing resolution for FY2009, which funded the U.S. government through March 2009, waived this law to allow NASA to continue to use Russian vehicles to access the International Space Station.)

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18 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
Implementation: Entities sanctioned under this law are listed in the tables at the end of the report.

**Waiver and Termination**

Section 4 gives the President the authority to not impose sanctions if the President justifies that decision to Congress. Section 5 provides for exemptions from sanctions if certain conditions are met, particularly that the government with jurisdiction over the entity cooperating to stop future such transfers to Iran. Termination of this law outright would require congressional action.

**Executive Order 13382**

Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code.

Implementation. The numerous entities sanctioned under the order for dealings with Iran are listed in the tables at the end of this report.

**Foreign Aid Restrictions for Suppliers of Iran**

Successive foreign aid appropriations have withheld 60% of any U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. Because U.S. aid to Russia generally goes directly to programs in Russia and not to the Russian government, little or no funding has been withheld as a result of the provision.

**Sanctions on “Countries of Diversion Concern”**

Title III of CISADA established authorities to sanction countries that allow U.S. technology that Iran could use in its nuclear and WMD programs to be re-exported or diverted to Iran. Section 303 of CISADA authorizes the President to designate a country as a “Destination of Diversion Concern” if that country allows substantial diversion of goods, services, or technologies characterized in Section 302 of that law to Iranian end-users or Iranian intermediaries. The technologies specified include any goods that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear or WMD programs, as well as goods listed on various U.S. controlled-technology lists such as the Commerce Control List or Munitions List. For any country designated as a country of diversion concern, there would be prohibition of denial for licenses of U.S. exports to that country of the goods that were being re-exported or diverted to Iran.

Implementation: To date, no country has been designated a “Country of Diversion Concern.”
Waiver and Termination

Waiver: The President may waive sanctions on countries designated as of Diversion Concern for 12 months, and additional 12 month periods, pursuant to certification that the country is taking steps to prevent such diversions and re-exports.

Termination: The designation terminates on the date the President certifies to Congress that the country has adequately strengthened its export controls to prevent such diversion and re-exports to Iran in the future.

Sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Numerous sanctions discussed in this report target Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plays a role in repressing domestic dissent, developing Iran’s energy sector, developing Iran’s WMD programs particularly by procuring technology abroad, and supporting pro-Iranian militant movements and governments in the Middle East region. Much of the work on Iran’s oil and gas fields is done through a series of contractors. Some of them, such as Khatam ol-Anbia and Oriental Kish, have been identified by the U.S. government as controlled by the IRGC and have been sanctioned under various executive orders, discussed below. The 2011 appointment of Khatam ol-Anbia’s chief, Rostam Ghasemi, as oil minister, caused the U.S. government and many experts to assess that the IRGC role in Iran’s energy sector was large and growing. He was replaced by President Hassan Rouhani with a former Oil Minister and oil industry professional, but the IRGC involvement in Iran’s energy sector is not shrinking. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 27, 2014, that Khatam ol-Anbia has $50 billion in contracts with the Iranian government, including in the energy sector but also in port and highway construction. It has as many as 40,000 employees. Sanctions targeting the IRGC are discussed below:

- Section 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act requires a certification by a contractor to the U.S. government that it is not knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or any of its agents or affiliates that have been sanctioned under several executive orders discussed below. A contract may be terminated if it is determined that the company’s certification of compliance was false.

- Section 302 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act imposes at least 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on persons that materially assist, with financing or technology, the IRGC, or assist or engage in “significant” transactions with any of its affiliates that are sanctioned under Executive Order 13382, 13224, or similar executive orders discussed below—or which are determined to be affiliates of the IRGC. Section 302 did not amend ISA.

- Section 301 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act requires the President, within 90 days of enactment (by November 9, 2012), to identify “officials, agents, or affiliates” of the IRGC and to impose sanctions in accordance with Executive Order 13382 or 13224, including blocking any such designee’s U.S.-based assets or property. Some of these designations, including of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), were made by Treasury Department on November 8, 2012.

- Section 303 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act requires the imposition of sanctions on agencies of foreign governments that provide technical or financial support, or goods and services to sanctioned (under U.S. executive orders or U.N. resolutions) members or affiliates of the IRGC. Sanctions include a ban on U.S. assistance or credits for that foreign government agency, a ban on defense sales to it, a ban on U.S. arms sales to it, and a ban on exports to it of controlled U.S. technology.

- Section 104 of CISADA sanctions foreign banks that conduct significant transactions with the IRGC or any of its agents or affiliates that are sanctioned under any executive order. It also sanctions any entity that assists Iran’s Central Bank efforts to help the IRGC acquire WMD or support international terrorism.

- The IRGC is named as a proliferation supporting entity under Executive Order 13382, and the Qods Force, the unit of the IRGC that assists pro-Iranian movements and countries abroad, is named as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13324. Several Iranian firms linked to the IRGC are sanctioned, as noted in the tables at the end of this report. Several IRGC commanders are named under other executive orders, discussed below, sanctioning Iranian human rights abusers, abusers of Syrian human rights, and entities undermining stability in Iraq.

- No IRGC-related laws or executive orders were waived or suspended to implement the JPA.
Financial/Banking Sanctions

U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system have gained strength as other countries have joined the effort. These efforts have been implemented primarily by the Treasury Department through progressively strong actions, particularly using the authority in legislation in 2011 to cut off Iran’s Central Bank from the international financial system.

Early Efforts: Targeted Financial Measures

Since 2006, the Treasury Department has used existing authorities to persuade foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran by attempting to convince the banks that Iran is using the international financial system to fund terrorist groups and acquire weapons-related technology. According to a GAO report of February 2013, the Treasury Department made overtures to 145 banks in 60 countries, including several visits to banks and officials in the UAE, and convinced at least 80 foreign banks to cease handling financial transactions with Iranian banks. In November 6, 2008, the Treasury Department has barred U.S. banks from handling any indirect transactions (“U-turn transactions,” meaning transactions with non-Iranian foreign banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank) with all Iranian banks.19

Implementation: The Treasury Department also used punishments against banks that have helped Iran violate U.S. financial restrictions. Among the major fines levied or paid: (1) in 2004, UBS paid a $100 million fine for the unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and other sanctioned countries; (2) in December 2005, the Dutch bank ABN Amro paid an $80 million fine for failing to fully report the processing of financial transactions involving Iran’s Bank Melli; (3) in December 2009, Credit Suisse paid a $536 million settlement for illicitly processing of Iranian transactions with U.S. banks; (4) in June 2012, Dutch bank ING paid $619 million for falsifying records of the movement of billions of dollars through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Iranian and Cuban clients; (5) in August 2012, Standard Chartered paid $340 million to New York State regulators for processing transactions with Iran;20 (6) in January 2014, Luxembourg-based Clearstream Banking paid $152 million for permitting Iran to evade restrictions on dealing with U.S. banks; (7) in January 2014, the Bank of Moscow paid $9.5 million for illicitly moving money through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Bank Melli;21 and (8) in June 2014, BNP Paribas paid $9 billion in fines for helping Iran (and Sudan and Cuba) violate U.S. sanctions.

CISADA: Sanctioning Foreign Banks That Conduct Transactions with Sanctioned Iranian Banks

The Treasury Department efforts were enhanced substantially by Section 104 of CISADA (P.L. 111-195, signed July 1, 2010) and U.N. and EU sanctions. The intent of Section 104 was, in large part, to weaken Iran’s economy by preventing Iranian traders from obtaining “letters of credit” (trade financing) to buy or sell goods. The binding provisions of Section 104 of CISADA require the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe several sets of regulations to forbid U.S. banks from

opening new “correspondent accounts” or “payable-through accounts” (or force the cancellation of existing such accounts) for foreign banks that process “significant transactions” with

- Any foreign entity that is sanctioned by Executive Order 13224 or 13382 (terrorism and proliferation activities, respectively). These orders are discussed elsewhere in this report. To date, several hundred entities (including individuals), many of them Iran-based or of Iranian origin, have been sanctioned under these two Orders; a full list is at the end of this report.

- Any entity designated under by U.N. Security Council resolutions that impose sanctions on Iran.

- Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. (This provision was added by Section 1244(d) of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) but it does not specifically amend CISADA).

Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system. The Treasury Department has authority to determine what constitutes a “significant” financial transaction.

**Implementation of Section 104: Sanctions Imposed**

On July 31, 2012, the Administration announced the first sanctions under Section 104 of CISADA. Sanctioned were the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq. However, on May 17, 2013, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to the Iranian financial sector and stopped providing services to an Iranian bank sanctioned by the EU (Export Development Bank of Iran).

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**Waiver and Termination**

Under Section 401(a) of CISADA, the Section 104 sanctions provisions would terminate 30 days after the President certifies to Congress that Iran (1) has met the requirements for removal from the terrorism list, AND (2) has ceased pursuit, acquisition or development of, and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons and other WMD programs.

The Secretary of the Treasury may waive sanctions under Section 104, with the waiver taking effect 30 days after the Secretary determines that a waiver is necessary to the national interest and submits a report to Congress describing the reason for that determination.

Waivers of CISADA were not required to implement the JPA. Iran is likely to demand that this sanction no longer apply after any comprehensive nuclear deal.

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**Iran Designated a Money-Laundering Jurisdiction**

On November 21, 2011, the Administration took further steps to isolate Iran’s banking system by identifying Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern”22 under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A). The Treasury Department determined that Iran’s

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financial system, including the Central Bank, constitutes a threat to governments or financial institutions that do business with these banks. The designation carried no immediate penalty, but it imposed additional requirements on U.S. banks to ensure against improper Iranian access to the U.S. financial system.

Laws That Promote Divestment

Some U.S. laws require or call for divestment of shares of firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran. A divestment-promotion provision was contained in CISADA, providing a “safe harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector at levels that would trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act.

Another provision, Section 219 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, requires company reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission to disclose whether it or any corporate affiliate has engaged in any transactions with Iran that could trigger sanctions under ISA, CISADA, and other applicable laws.

Sanctions and Sanctions Exemptions to Support Democratic Change/Civil Society in Iran

A trend in U.S. policy and legislation since the June 12, 2009, election-related uprising in Iran has been to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor or censor Internet communications, and to sanction Iranian officials that commit human rights abuses. Sanctions on the IRGC (see box above) represent one facet of that trend because the IRGC is not only involved in Iran’s WMD programs but it is also the key instrument through which the regime has suppressed oppositionists. Earlier, the Iran Freedom Support Act (IFSA; P.L. 109-293) authorized “sums as may be necessary” to assist Iranians who are “dedicated” to “democratic values … and the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran”; and “advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation regimes.”

General Implementation: Individuals and entities designated under the Executive Orders and provisions discussed below are listed in the tables at the end of this report. For those provisions that ban visas to enter the United States, the State Department interprets the provisions to apply to all members of the designated entity. Similar sanctions against many of these same officials—as well as several others—have been imposed by the European Union.

No suspension of U.S. sanctions on Iran for its human rights practices was required by the JPA. The White House fact sheet on the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord with Iran states that no human rights sanctions will not be eased as part of a comprehensive nuclear settlement, if reached.

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Expanding Internet and Communications Freedoms

Some laws and Administration action focus on expanding Internet freedom in Iran or preventing the Iranian government from using the Internet to identify opponents. Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the “VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act, contained several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify (in a report to be submitted 180 days after enactment) companies that are selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor the Internet usage of Iranians. The act authorized funds to document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 2009 Iranian presidential election. Section 1241 of the act also required an Administration report by January 31, 2010, on U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Iran, and the effect of those sanctions on Iran.

Sanctions and Actions to Counter Iranian Censorship of the Internet

- Section 106 of CISADA incorporated the “Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act” (111th Congress, S. 1475 and H.R. 3284), prohibiting U.S. government contracts with foreign companies that sell technology that Iran could use to monitor or control Iranian usage of the Internet. The provisions were directed, in part, against a joint venture between Nokia (Finland) and Siemens (Germany) that reportedly sold Internet monitoring and censorship technology to Iran in 2008.24

- On April 23, 2012, President Obama issued an executive order (13606) directly addressing the issue by sanctioning persons who commit “Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology (GHRAVITY).” The order blocks the U.S.-based property and essentially bars U.S. entry and bans any U.S. trade with persons and entities listed in an Annex and persons or entities subsequently determined to be (1) operating any technology that allows the Iranian (or Syrian) government to disrupt, monitor, or track computer usage by citizens of those countries or assisting the two governments in such disruptions or monitoring; or (2) selling to Iran (or Syria) any technology that enables those governments to carry out such disruptions or monitoring.

- Section 403 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158, August 10, 2012) sanctions (visa ban, U.S.-based property blocked) persons/firms determined to have engaged in censorship in Iran, limited access to media, or—for example, a foreign satellite service provider—supported Iranian government jamming or frequency manipulation. On October 9, 2012, the President issued Executive Order 13628 reinforcing Section 403 by blocking the property of persons/firms determined to have committed the censorship, limited free expression, or assisted in jamming communications. The Order also specifies the sanctions authorities of the Department of State and of the Treasury.

Laws and Administration Actions to Promote Internet Communications by Iranians

- On March 8, 2010, OFAC amended the Iran Transactions Regulations to allow for a general license for providing free mass market software to Iranians. The ruling incorporated major features of the Iran Digital Empowerment Act (H.R. 4301 in the 111th Congress). The OFAC determination required a waiver of the provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1606 waiver provision) discussed above.

- Section 103(b)(2) of CISADA exempts equipment to help Iranians communicate and use the Internet from the U.S. export ban on Iran.

- On March 20, 2012, the Treasury Department amended U.S.-Iran trade regulations to permit several additional types of software and information technology products to be exported to Iran under general license, provided the products were available at no cost to the user. The items included personal communications, personal data storage, browsers, plug-ins, document readers, and free mobile applications related to personal communications.

- On May 30, 2013, the Treasury Department further amended the trade regulations to allow for the sale, on a cash basis (no U.S. financing), to Iran of equipment (e.g., cellphones, laptops, satellite Internet, website hosting, and related products and services) that Iranians can use to communicate.

Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses and Promote the Opposition

Another part of the effort to help Iran’s opposition has been legislation to sanction regime officials involved in suppressing the domestic opposition in Iran.

- Sanctions Against Iranian Human Rights Abusers. Section 105 of CISADA was modeled on a Senate bill, S. 3022, the Iran Human Rights Sanctions Act, in the 111th Congress. The section bans travel and freezing assets of those Iranians determined to be human rights abusers. On September 29, 2010, pursuant to Section 105, President Obama signed an Executive Order (13553) providing for the CISADA sanctions against Iranians determined to be responsible for or complicit in post-2009 Iran election human rights abuses. Those sanctioned under the provisions are listed in the tables at the end of this report. Section 105 contains its own specific authority to terminate the section through Administration action. Section 105 can be terminated if the President certifies to Congress that Iran has (1) unconditionally released all political prisoners detained in the aftermath of the June 2009 uprising; (2) ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention, torture, and abuse of citizens who were engaged in peaceful protest; (3) fully investigated abuses of political activists that occurred after the uprising; and (4) committed to and is making progress toward establishing an

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independent judiciary and respecting human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

- **Sanctions on Sales of Anti-Riot Equipment.** Section 402 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) amended Section 105 by adding provisions that sanctions (visa ban, U.S. property blocked) for any person or company that sells the Iranian government goods or technologies that it can use to commit human rights abuses against its people. Such goods include firearms, rubber bullets, police batons, chemical or pepper sprays, stun grenades, tear gas, water cannons, and like goods. Under that section, ISA sanctions are additionally to be imposed on any person determined to be selling such equipment to the IRGC.

- **Sanctions Against Iranian Government Broadcasters.** Section 1248 of IFCA (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239) mandates inclusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state broadcasting umbrella group, as a human rights abuser, thereby imposing CISADA Section 105 sanctions (travel ban, asset freeze) on that entity.

- **Sanctions Against Iranian Profiteers.** Section 1249 of IFCA amends CISADA by making sanctionable under Section 105 any person determined to have engaged in corruption or to have diverted or misappropriated humanitarian goods or funds for such goods for the Iranian people. The measure is intended to sanction Iranian profiteers who are, for example, using official connections to corner the market for vital medicines. This essentially codifies a similar provision of Executive Order 13645.

- **Separate Visa Bans.** On July 8, 2011, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on more than 50 Iranian officials for participating in political repression in Iran. The State Department announcement stated that the names of those subject to the ban would not be released because visa records are confidential. The action was taken under the authorities of Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which renders inadmissible to the United States a foreign person whose activities could have serious consequences for the United States. On May 30, 2013, the State Department announced it had imposed visa restrictions on an additional 60 Iranian officials and other individuals who participated in human rights abuses related to political repression in Iran.26

- There are certain exemptions in the case of high level Iranian visits to attend the United Nations. Under the U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264) that provides for U.S. participation in the United Nations and as host nation of U.N. headquarters in New York, visas are routinely issued to heads of state and members of their entourage attending these meetings. In September 2012, however, the State Department refused visas for 20 members of Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s traveling party on the grounds of past involvement in terrorism or human rights abuses. Still, in line with U.S. obligations under the act, then President Ahmadinejad was allowed to fly to the United States on Iran Air, even though Iran Air is a U.S.-sanctioned entity, and his plane reportedly was allowed to stay at Andrews Air Force base for the duration of his visit.

26 [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210102.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210102.htm).
U.N. Sanctions

U.N. sanctions apply to all U.N. member states and thereby provide political cover for countries to direct their companies to cooperate with U.S. sanctions. As part of a multilateral process of attempting to convince Iran to choose the path of negotiations or face further penalty, during 2006-2008, three U.N. Security Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions primarily on Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9, 2010, by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil), with one abstention (Lebanon). Resolution 1929 was key for its assertion that the energy, financial, and other sectors of the Iranian economy support Iran’s nuclear program. That concept in the Resolution is interpreted as giving U.N. member states authorization to cooperate with U.S. sanctions against Iran’s energy, financial, and related sectors. A summary of the major provisions of all four of these resolutions is contained in the table below, and Iranian entities under U.N. sanctions are in Table 5.

U.N. Security Council action was not needed to implement the JPA. The April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord states that U.N. sanctions are to be lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.

Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>(1737)</th>
<th>(1747)</th>
<th>(1803)</th>
<th>(1929)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, to suspend construction of the heavy-water reactor at Arak, ratify the “Additional Protocol” to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement.</td>
<td>(1737)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freezes the assets of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions, and requires that countries ban the travel of named Iranians.</td>
<td>(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibits transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran, except for use in light-water reactors.</td>
<td>(1737, and 1747)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology</td>
<td>(1747)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology, and prohibits Iran from launching ballistic missiles (including on its territory).</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires Iran to refrain from any development of ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but does not bar sales of missiles that are not on the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for voluntary restraint on transactions with Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for vigilance on international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitors implementation of all Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A “panel of experts” is empowered by 1929 to assist the U.N. sanctions committee in implementing the resolution and previous Iran resolutions, and to suggest ways of more effective implementation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Implementation and Compliance

During 2010-2013, converging international views on Iran produced substantial global cooperation in pressuring Iran with sanctions. Some countries apparently joined the sanctions regime primarily as a means of heading off unwanted military action against Iran by the United States or by Israel. Countries in the region cooperated at least partly in order to preserve their close relationships with the United States. A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions against Iran is contained in Table 4 below. On May 1, 2012, President Obama issued Executive Order 13608, giving the Treasury Department the ability to identify and sanction (cutting them off from the U.S. market) foreign persons who help Iran (or Syria) evade U.S. and multilateral sanctions.

The JPA requires Iran’s oil exports to remain constant at the levels they were when it began implementation in January 2014—about 1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil. Iran’s oil customers are not required to cut average purchases further but are not permitted to increase purchases either. The following countries have active exemptions under Section 1245 of the FY2012 NDAA (on dealings with the Central Bank for oil purchases or other transactions): (1) 10 EU countries, for complying with an EU embargo on Iran oil purchases; (2) China, India, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, for significantly reducing oil purchases from Iran; and (3) Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka for ending oil purchases from Iran.

Because U.S. sanctions laws do not penalize increases in purchases of condensates (which are produced in association with crude oil or natural gas), during the JPA Iran’s oil buyers appear to have increased condensate purchases by about 200,000 barrels per day (crude oil equivalent), making Iran’s exports of crude and condensates combined about 1.3 mbd.

The United States and its partners have also sought to stop Iran from using traditional trading patterns common to its neighborhood to evade sanctions. On January 10, 2013, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued an Advisory to highlight Iran’s use of hawalas (traditional informal banking and money exchanges) in the Middle East and South Asia region to circumvent financial sanctions. Because the involvement of an Iranian client is often opaque, banks have sometimes inadvertently processed hawala transactions involving Iranians.

Europe

U.S. and European approaches on Iran have converged since 2002, when it was revealed that Iran was developing a uranium enrichment capability. Previously, European and other countries appeared less concerned than the United States about Iranian policies and were reluctant to sanction Iran. Since the passage of Resolution 1929 (June 2010), European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran have become nearly as extensive as those of the United States. The EU is a party to the JPA. The following outlines European sanctions on Iran.

Note: CRS has no mandate or capability to “judge” compliance of any country with U.S., multilateral, or international sanctions against Iran. This section is intended to analyze some major trends in third country cooperation with U.S. policy toward Iran, noting that there are many aspects to U.S. relations with the countries discussed here.

The 10 are Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain.

• A ban on EU oil imports from Iran went into effect on July 1, 2012, pursuant to a January 23, 2012, EU decision. Collectively, the EU bought about 600,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil in 2011, about a quarter of Iran’s total oil exports. The embargo was imposed despite the fact that the most vulnerable EU economies—Spain, Italy, and Greece—were each buying more than 10% of their oil from Iran. Because of the embargo, ten EU countries have exemptions from sanctions under P.L. 112-81. A ban on EU imports of natural gas from Iran went into effect in October 2012. The JPA did not ease these EU bans.

• A ban on insurance for shipping oil or petrochemicals from Iran took full effect on July 1, 2012. The EU eased this sanction to implement the JPA.

• A ban on all trade with Iran in gold, precious metals, diamonds, and petrochemical products. The EU has eased this sanction to implement the JPA.

• A freezing of the assets of Iran’s Central Bank, although transactions are permitted for approved legitimate trade, and a freezing of the assets of several Iranian firms involved in shipping. The JPA did not alter this sanction.

• As of October 15, 2012, a ban on transactions between European and all Iranian banks, unless specifically authorized, and a ban on short-term export credits, guarantees, and insurance. This sanction was eased in accordance with the JPA.

• The EU banned exports to Iran of graphite, semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, industrial software, shipbuilding technology, oil storage capabilities, and flagging or classification services for Iranian tankers and cargo vessels. With the exception of exports to Iran’s automotive sector, the JPA did not alter EU implementation of these sanctions.

• **SWIFT Cutoff.** Section 220 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158, signed in August 2012), required reports on electronic payments systems such as the Brussels-based SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) that might be doing business with Iran, but does not mandate sanctions against such systems. Subsequently, the EU requested that SWIFT cut off sanctioned Iranian banks from the network. SWIFT acceded to that request on March 17, 2012, denying access to 14 Iranian banks blacklisted by the EU. Iranian banks not sanctioned by the EU can still access the SWIFT system.30 (The United States has sanctioned about 50 Iranian banks, but only those sanctioned by the EU have been cut off from SWIFT.) And, some experts report that Iranian banks are still able to conduct electronic transactions with the European Central Bank via an electronic payments system called “Target II.” The **SWIFT cutoff was not suspended to implement the JPA, but this ban apparently is to be lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.**

The harmonization of U.S. and European sanctions on Iran differs from early periods. During the 1990s, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, and the EU and Japan refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The European dialogue with Iran was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but resumed in May 1998 during Mohammad Khatemi’s presidency of Iran. In the 1990s, European and Japanese

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creditors bucked U.S. objections and rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. In July 2002, Iran tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution, selling $500 million in bonds to European banks. During 2002-2005, there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries.31 Negotiations were discontinued in late 2005 after Iran abrogated an agreement with several EU countries to suspend uranium enrichment. Similarly, there has, to date, been insufficient international support to grant Iran membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), even though U.S. Administrations ceased blocking Iran from applying in May 2005.

**China and Russia**

The position of Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, is that they will impose only those sanctions required by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Russia earns significant revenues from large projects in Iran, such as the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and it also seeks not to provoke Iran into supporting Islamist movements in the Muslim regions of Russia and the Central Asian states.

In August 2014, the two countries reportedly agreed to a broad trade and energy deal which might include an exchange of Iranian oil (500,000 barrels per day) for Russian goods. That deal could potentially violate the JPA, if implemented.32 Russia is an oil exporter, but Iranian oil that Russia might buy under this arrangement would presumably free up additional Russian oil for export. Russia and Iran reaffirmed the deal in April 2015, following the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord. Also in April 2015, Russia lifted its own ban on delivering the S-300 air defense system that it sold Iran in 2007 but refused to deliver after Resolution 1929 was adopted—even though that Resolution would technically not bar supply of that defensive system. The Russian announcements in April appeared part of an effort to ensure that Russia has an advantage in access to Iranian markets if sanctions are lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.

China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and its cooperation has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to reduce Iran’s revenue from oil sales. According to U.S. officials in May 2013, China had cut its buys of oil from Iran by 21%—to about 435,000 barrels per day—from its 2011 average of about 550,000 barrels per day. Iran’s oil exports to China fell subsequently fell further. Because China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, percentage cuts by China have a large impact in reducing Iran’s oil sales by volume—explaining State Department’s maintenance of China’s sanctions exemption. As is the case with other Iranian oil customers, some months might show spikes to higher levels as oil shipments get scheduled. Several Chinese energy firms invested in Iran’s energy sector, but some of these projects have been given to Iranian or other country firms or show little evidence of actual development work.

China settles much of its trade balance with Iran with goods rather than hard currency. Doing so is highly favorable to China financially. In August 2013, it was reported that China might settle

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31 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.

32 “Iran, Russia Negotiating Big Oil-for-Goods Deal.” Reuters, January 10, 2014.
some of its Iran oil bill by providing 315 subway cars for the Tehran metro. Press reports indicated that Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, and two Chinese companies, Geelran and Chery, produce cars in Iran. These exports were reduced substantially during 2013 because of U.S. sanctions, but have recovered somewhat since the JPA went into effect in early 2014.

Japan/Korean Peninsula/Other East Asia

Since 2010, in part in deference to their alliances with the United States, Japan and South Korea have imposed trade, banking, and energy sanctions on Iran that are similar to those imposed by the EU. Both countries have cut imports of Iranian oil sharply since 2011. Some South Korean firms have been active in energy infrastructure construction in Iran but, on December 16, 2011, South Korea banned sales to Iran of energy sector equipment. The main South Korean refiners that import Iranian crude are SK Energy and Hyundai Oilbank.

The U.S. sanctions that require on oil buyers pay Iran in local accounts to avoid U.S. sanctions—a requirement that took effect on February 6, 2013—did not affect Japan and South Korea’s trading patterns with Iran significantly. South Korea generally paid Iran’s Central Bank through local currency accounts at its Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank, and it exported to Iran mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances. Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer electronics. These exports continued after 2010, and since the JPA went into effect, using local currency accounts. The two countries also have comprised a large portion of the $700 million per month in direct hard currency payments to Iran for oil, as provided for by the JPA.

Iran reportedly has ordered from Singapore (Yangzijiang Shipbuilding Holdings Ltd.) ten ships that Iran (IRISL) is expected to use to transport iron ore and copper to foreign buyers. The purchase could potentially violate IFCA, as discussed above.

North Korea

North Korea is an ally of Iran and, like Iran, is a subject of international sanctions. North Korea asserts that it is not bound by international sanctions against Iran, and it reportedly cooperates with Iran on a wide range of WMD-related ventures. Press reports in April 2013 said that Iran might supply oil directly to North Korea, but it has not been reported that any such arrangement was finalized. Currently, a portion of China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is reportedly re-exported to North Korea.

South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

India

India has implemented U.N.-mandated sanctions against Iran but its cultural, economic, and historic ties to Iran—and their common interests in Afghanistan—have made the Indian

33 Author conversation with journalists based in China, September 1, 2013.
Iran Sanctions

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government hesitant to impose sanctions on Iran to the extent the United States and EU have. Yet, India’s private sector has come to view Iran as a “controversial market”—a term used by many international firms to describe markets that entail reputational and financial risks.

India began reducing economic relations with Iran in 2010, when India’s central bank ceased using a Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran. In January 2012, Iran agreed to accept India’s local currency, the rupee, to settle 45% of its sales to India. That local account funds the sale to Iran of Indian wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts, and other products. Still, there is a large trade imbalance, because the oil Iran exports to India are worth far more than the value of the products that India sells to an.

Even though its purchases of Iranian oil are financially advantageous, India has reduced its imports of Iranian oil substantially since 2011 in an effort to comply with U.S. policy. By the time of the JPA, Iran was only supplying about 6% of India’s oil imports (down from over 16% in 2008). India has incurred significant costs to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude. In advance of President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, the Indian government reportedly requested refiners to further cut purchases from Iran. As shown in the table later in this report, some Indian firms have ended or slowed work on investments in Iranian oil and gas fields.

India has said it intends to develop Iran’s Chahbahar port that would enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan, but Indian investment in the project appears to be contingent on finalization of the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran that would result in an easing of sanctions. Iranian and Indian officials reportedly have periodically discussed the issue of constructing an underwater natural gas pipeline, which would avoid going through Pakistani territory. However, such a route would be expensive to construct.

Pakistan

A test of Pakistan’s compliance with sanctions is a pipeline project intended to carry Iranian gas to Pakistan. Agreement on the $7 billion project was finalized on June 12, 2010, and construction was formally inaugurated in a ceremony attended by the Presidents of both countries on March 11, 2013. In line with an agreed completion date of mid-2014, Iran reportedly completed the pipeline on its side of the border. Pakistan has not completed its portion of the project, but China’s announcement in April 2015 of a $3 billion investment in the project could pave the way for the line’s completion. In March 2013, the State Department reiterated earlier comments that the project might be sanctioned under ISA. In 2009, India dissociated itself from the project, which was initially conceived as bringing Iranian gas to India, over stated concerns about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be transferred to India, pricing of the gas, and tariffs.

Afghanistan

Iran has extensive security interests in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan’s economy is small, and very few Iran-Afghanistan economic interactions are subject to international sanctions. Iranian firms have been involved in road and building construction in Afghanistan, mostly near the Iranian border and in Kabul. Some reports say that Iranian currency traders acquire dollars

that are plentiful in Afghanistan but in short supply in Iran. Iranian traders—acting on behalf of wealthy Iranians seeking to preserve the value of their savings—are said to be carrying local currency to Afghanistan to buy up some of the dollars available there. There have been allegations that Iran is using an Iran-owned bank in Afghanistan, Arian Bank, to move funds in and out of Afghanistan. The U.S. Treasury Department has warned Afghan traders not to process dollar transactions for Iran. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported in late January 2013 that Afghan security forces might have used some of U.S. aid funds to purchase fuel from Iran. In September 2013, it was reported that Anham FZCO, a U.S. contractor building food storage shelters for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, might have violated U.S. sanctions by transshipping building materials through Iran.

Turkey/South Caucasus

Turkey

Even though Turkey and Iran differ sharply on the Syria civil conflict, Turkey remains a significant buyer of Iranian oil. In 2011, it purchased about 200,000 bpd, but it subsequently reduced those buys and Turkey has maintained a Section 1245 NDAA sanctions exemption. Turkey is Iran’s main gas customer via a pipeline built in 1997. During the pipeline’s construction, the State Department testified that Turkey would be importing gas originating in Turkmenistan, not Iran, under a swap arrangement, and the State Department did not determine that the project was a violation of ISA. Even though direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001—with additional such exports through a second pipeline built in 2013—no ISA sanctions have been imposed, possibly because the State Department views the line as crucial to the energy security of Turkey. Prior to the EU decision on October 15, 2012, to bar sales of Iranian gas to Europe, Turkey was also the main conduit for Iranian gas exports to Europe (primarily Bulgaria and Greece).

Earlier, press reports accused Turkey’s Halkbank of settling much of Turkey’s payments to Iran for oil or natural gas with shipments to Iran of gold. U.S. officials testified on May 15, 2013, that Turkey is not paying for its gas imports from Iran with gold, but that the gold going from Turkey to Iran consists mainly of Iranian private citizens’ purchases of Turkish gold to hedge against the value of the rial.

On January 6, 2014, the Commerce Department issued an emergency order blocking a Turkey-based firm (3K Aviation Consulting and Logistics) from re-exporting two U.S.-made jet engines to Iran. That and other firms reportedly involved in the deal denied that the engines were bound for an Iranian airline (Pouya Airline).

Caucasus: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia

The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations used the threat of ISA sanctions to deter oil pipeline routes involving Iran and thereby successfully promoted an alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan). The route became operational in 2005. Section 6 of

37 “US Acts to Block Turkish Firm from Sending GE Engines to Iran.” Reuters, January 6, 2014.
Executive Order 13622 exempts from sanctions any pipelines that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey.

In part because Iran and Azerbaijan are often at odds, Iran and Armenia—Azerbaijan’s adversary—enjoy extensive economic relations. Armenia is Iran’s largest direct gas customer, after Turkey. In May 2009, Iran and Armenia inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by Gazprom of Russia. No determination of ISA sanctions has been issued. Armenia has said its banking controls are strong and that Iran is unable to process transactions illicitly through Armenia’s banks. However, Azerbaijani officials assert that Iran is using Armenian banks operating in the Armenia-occupied Nagorno-Karabakh territory to circumvent international financial sanctions. These institutions could include Artsakhbank and Ameriabank. In May 2014, Iran and Armenia increased weekly flights between the two from 3 to 50, suggesting that commerce between the two is growing.

Some press reports say that Iran might have used another Caucasian state, Georgia, to circumvent sanctions. IRGC companies reportedly have established 150 front companies in Georgia for the purpose of importing dual-use items and to boost Iran’s non-oil exports with sales of products such as roofing materials and jams. On the other hand, observers assert that since extensive Iran-Georgia economic ties were highly publicized in mid-2013, Georgia has obtained cooperation from its businessmen in reducing transactions with Iran.

**Persian Gulf and Iraq**

The Persian Gulf countries are oil exporters and close allies of the United States. As Iranian oil exports decreased 2012 and 2013, the Gulf states supplied the global oil market with additional oil. The Gulf states have generally sought to prevent the re-exportation to Iran of U.S. technology, and have curtailed banking relationships with Iran. On the other hand, in order not to antagonize Iran, the Gulf countries still conduct relatively normal trade with Iran and several of them allow some sanctioned Iranian banks to operate. Gulf-based shipping companies such as United Arab Shipping Company still pay port loading fees to such sanctioned IRGC-controlled port operators as Tidewater.

The UAE is particularly closely watched by U.S. officials because of the large presence of Iranian firms there. Several UAE-based firms have been sanctioned for efforts to evade sanctions, as noted in the tables at the end of the report. U.S. officials praised the UAE’s March 1, 2012, ban on transactions with Iran by Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank. Iran reportedly used the bank to process a substantial portion of its oil payments. Some Iranian gas condensates (120,000 barrels per day) reportedly are imported by Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) and refined into jet fuel, gasoline, and other products.

Iran and Kuwait have held talks on the construction of a 350-mile pipeline that would bring Iranian gas to Kuwait. No construction has been reported. The two have apparently reached

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39 Information provided to the author by regional observers. October 2013.
agreement on volumes (8.5 million cubic meters of gas would go to Kuwait each day) but not on price.42 Kuwait’s Amir visited Iran in June 2014.

Iran has sought to use its close relations with Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government to evade some sanctions. As noted above, the United States sanctioned an Iraqi bank that has cooperated with Iran’s efforts, but lifted those sanctions when the bank reduced that business. Iraq presented the United States with a more significant Iran sanctions-related dilemma on July 23, 2013, when it signed an agreement with Iran to buy 850 million cubic feet per day of natural gas through a joint pipeline that enters Iraq at Diyala province and will supply several power plants. The two countries signed a contract for the pipeline construction, estimated at $365 million, in July 2011, and it reportedly has been completed on both sides of the border.43 It is not clear whether the offensive against the Iraqi government by the Islamic State organization has affected the project. No sanctions have been imposed on the project, to date.

Iran is supplying advisers and weapons to help Iraq try to defeat Islamic State forces. U.S. officials assert that the Iranian intervention complements U.S. policy and the Iranian activity has not been sanctioned, even though Iranian arms exports are prohibited by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747. The United States has, however, cited that Resolution in pressing Iraq to halt military resupply flights from Iran to Syria. Iran supports the Assad government of Syria, whereas the United States has called for Assad to step down in the face of the armed uprising that began as peaceful protests in 2011.44

Latin America

During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iran looked to several Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela, to try to circumvent international sanctions. For the most part, however, Iran’s trade and other business dealings with Latin America remain modest and likely to reduce the effect of sanctions on Iran only marginally. And, Iran lost a key Latin American ally with the March 2013 death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. As noted elsewhere in this report, several Venezuelan firms have been sanctioned for dealings with Iran.

Africa

During the term of Ahmadinejad, Iran sought to cultivate relations with some African countries to try to circumvent sanctions. However, African countries have tended to avoid dealings with Iran in order to avoid pressure from the United States. South Africa has ended its buys of Iranian oil. In June 2012, Kenya contracted to buy about 30 million barrels of Iranian oil, but cancelled the contract the following month after the United States warned that going ahead with the purchase could hurt U.S.-Kenya relations. Tanzania has re-flagged about 6-10 Iranian tankers. Perhaps fearing similar criticism, in September 2012 Sierra Leone removed nine vessels from its shipping register after determining they belonged to IRISL.

World Bank Loans

The July 27, 2010, EU measures narrowed substantially the prior differences between the EU and the United States over international lending to Iran. As noted above, the United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote against international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international lending. No new loans have been approved to Iran since 2005, including several environmental projects under the Bank’s “Global Environmental Facility” (GEF). The initiative has slated more than $7.5 million in loans for Iran to dispose of harmful chemicals.45

Earlier, in 1993, the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the amount of those loans. The legislation contributed to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. In the 111th Congress, a provision of H.R. 6296—Title VII—cut off U.S. contributions to the World Bank, International Finance Corp., and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Corp. if the World Bank approves a new Country Assistance Strategy for Iran or makes a loan to Iran.

During 1999-2005, Iran’s moderating image had led the World Bank to consider new loans over U.S. opposition. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU and Some Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Observation:</strong> Most sweeping sanctions on Iran of virtually any country in the world</td>
<td>Increasingly sweeping, but still intended to primarily target Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs. No mandatory sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>EU closely aligns its sanctions tightening—as well as sanctions relief in the context of the nuclear deal—with those of the U.S. Japan and South Korean sanctions also increasingly extensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on U.S. Trade with and Investment in Iran:</strong> Executive Order 12959 bans (with limited exceptions) U.S. firms from exporting to Iran, importing from Iran, or investing in Iran. There is an exemption for sales to Iran of food and medical products.</td>
<td>U.N. sanctions do not ban civilian trade with Iran or general civilian sector investment in Iran. Nor do U.N. sanctions mandate restrictions on provision of trade financing or financing guarantees by national export credit guarantee agencies.</td>
<td>No general EU ban on trade in civilian goods with Iran, but bans on certain types of trade as discussed. Japan and South Korea have banned medium- and long-term trade financing and financing guarantees. Short-term credit still allowed.</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU and Some Allied Countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions on Foreign Firms that Do Business with Iran’s Energy Sector:</strong></td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent exists. However, preambular language in Resolution 1929 “not[es] the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.” This wording is interpreted by most observers as providing U.N. support for countries who want to ban their companies from investing in Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>With certain exceptions likely to fulfil the nuclear deal, the EU bans almost all dealings with Iran’s energy sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Iran Sanctions Act, P.L. 104-172, and subsequent laws and executive orders, discussed throughout the report, mandate sanctions on virtually any type of transaction with/in Iran’s energy sector. Some exemptions are permitted for firms of countries that have “significantly reduced” purchases of Iranian oil each 180 days.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese and South Korean measures ban new energy projects in Iran and call for restraint on ongoing projects. South Korea in December 2011 cautioned its firms not to sell energy or petrochemical equipment to Iran. Both have cut oil purchases from Iran sharply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Foreign Assistance:</strong></td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent</td>
<td>EU measures of July 27, 2010, ban grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran. Also prohibit financing of enterprises involved in Iran’s energy sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—other than purely humanitarian aid—is banned under §620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, which bans U.S. assistance to countries on the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Iran is also routinely denied direct U.S. foreign aid under the annual foreign operations appropriations acts (most recently in §7007 of division H of P.L. 111-8).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan and South Korea measures do not specifically ban aid or lending to Iran, but no such lending by these countries is under way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1929 (operative paragraph 8) bans all U.N. member states from selling or supplying to Iran major weapons systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships, and most missile systems, or related spare parts or advisory services for such weapons systems.</td>
<td>EU sanctions include a comprehensive ban on sale to Iran of all types of military equipment, not just major combat systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran is ineligible for U.S. arms exports under several laws, as discussed in the report.</td>
<td>The U.N. resolutions on Iran, cumulatively, ban the export of almost all dual-use items to Iran.</td>
<td>No similar Japan and South Korean measures announced, but neither has exported arms to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restriction on Exports to Iran of “Dual Use Items”:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 7) requests, but does not mandate, that countries and international financial institutions refrain from making grants or loans to Iran, except for development and humanitarian purposes.</td>
<td>EU bans the sales of dual use items to Iran, in line with U.N. resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily under §6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72) and §38 of the Arms Export Control Act, there is a denial of license applications to sell Iran goods that could have military applications.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan and S. Korea have announced full adherence to strict export control regimes when evaluating sales to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions Against International Lending to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>The July 27, 2010, measures prohibit EU members from providing grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran, including through international financial institutions.</td>
<td>No specific similar Japan or South Korea measures announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under §1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118), U.S. representatives to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are required to vote against loans to Iran by those institutions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Technology to Iran:

As discussed in this report, several laws and regulations provide for sanctions against entities, Iranian or otherwise, that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs (asset freezing, ban on transaction with the entity).

Ban on Transactions with Terrorism Supporting Entities:

Executive Order 13224 bans transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting international terrorism. Numerous entities, including some of Iranian origin, have been so designated.

Travel Ban on Named Iranians:

CISADA and H.R. 1905 provide for a prohibition on travel to the U.S., blocking of U.S.-based property, and ban on transactions with Iranians determined to be involved in serious human rights abuses against Iranians since the June 12, 2009, presidential election there, or with persons selling Iran equipment to commit such abuses.

Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:

Under Executive Order 13382, the U.S. Treasury Department has named Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and several affiliated entities as entities whose U.S.-based property is to be frozen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU and Some Allied Countries</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Technology to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph 12) imposes a worldwide freeze on the assets and property of Iranian entities named in an Annex to the Resolution. Each subsequent resolution has expanded the list of Iranian entities subject to these sanctions.</td>
<td>The EU measures imposed July 27, 2010, commit the EU to freezing the assets of entities named in the U.N. resolutions, as well as numerous other named Iranian entities. Japan and South Korea froze assets of U.N.-sanctioned entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Transactions with Terrorism Supporting Entities:</strong></td>
<td>No direct equivalent, but Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 5) bans Iran from exporting any arms—a provision widely interpreted as trying to reduce Iran’s material support to groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Shiite militias in Iraq, and insurgents in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>No direct equivalent, but many of the Iranian entities named as blocked by the EU, Japan, and South Korea overlap or complement Iranian entities named as terrorism supporting by the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Travel Ban on Named Iranians:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1803 imposed a binding ban on international travel by several Iranians named in an Annex to the Resolution. Resolution 1929 extended that ban to additional Iranians, and forty Iranians are now subject to the ban. However, the Iranians subject to the travel ban are so subjected because of their involvement in Iran’s WMD programs, not because of involvement in human rights abuses.</td>
<td>The EU sanctions announced July 27, 2010, contains an Annex of named Iranians subject to a ban on travel to the EU countries. An additional 60+ Iranians involved in human rights abuses were subjected to EU sanctions since. Japan and South Korea have announced bans on named Iranians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any ships in national or international waters—if there is an indication that the shipments include goods whose export to Iran is banned.</td>
<td>The EU measures announced July 27, 2010, bans Iran Air Cargo from access to EU airports. The measures also freeze the EU-based assets of IRISL and its affiliates. Insurance and reinsurance for Iranian firms is banned. Japan and South Korean measures took similar actions against IRISL and Iran Air.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Iran Sanctions

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<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU and Some Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banking Sanctions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>The EU froze Iran Central Bank assets January 23, 2012, and banned all transactions with Iranian banks unless authorized on October 15, 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 2006-2011, several Iranian banks have been named as proliferation or terrorism supporting entities under Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, respectively (see Table 5 at end of report).</td>
<td>No direct equivalent</td>
<td>Brussels-based SWIFT expelled sanctioned Iranian banks from the electronic payment transfer system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISADA prohibits banking relationships with U.S. banks for any foreign bank that conducts transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard or with Iranian entities sanctioned under the various U.N. resolutions.</td>
<td>However, two Iranian banks are named as sanctioned entities under the U.N. Security Council resolutions.</td>
<td>Japan and South Korea measures similar to the 2010 EU sanctions, with South Korea adhering to the same 40,000 Euro authorization requirement. Japan and S. Korea froze the assets of 15 Iranian banks; South Korea targeted Bank Mellat for freeze.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012 Defense Authorization (P.L. 112-81) prevents U.S. accounts with foreign banks that process transactions with Iran's Central Bank (with specified exemptions).</td>
<td>No direct equivalent, although, as discussed above, U.S. proliferations laws provide for sanctions against foreign entities that help Iran with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.</td>
<td>Some measures by these allies likely to be eased to implement nuclear deal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1929 (oper. paragraph 7) prohibits Iran from acquiring an interest in any country involving uranium mining, production, or use of nuclear materials, or technology related to nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Paragraph 9 prohibits Iran from undertaking &quot;any activity&quot; related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon.</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU measures on July 27, 2010, require adherence to this provision of Resolution 1929.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Private-Sector Cooperation and Compliance**

The imposition of sanctions on Iran by many governments has caused Iran to be viewed by many worldwide corporations as a “controversial market”—a market that carries political and reputational risks. On the other hand, travelers to Iran say many foreign products, including U.S. products, are readily available in Iran. Examples of major non-U.S. companies that, prior to the JPA, had discontinued business with Iran include the following:

- **ABB of Switzerland**, a major plant and equipment firm, said in January 2010 it would cease doing business with Iran. Siemens of Germany; Finmeccanica, a defense and transportation conglomerate of Italy; Thyssen-Krupp, a German steelmaker; and Indian conglomerate Tata subsequently followed suit.

- **Selling cars to Iran** has not been subject to sanctions. Yet, in 2010, the following automobile manufacturers suspended direct sales: Germany’s Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) and Porsche; Toyota (Japan); Fiat (Italy); and South Korea’s Hyundai and Kia Motors.
• As of 2007, BNP Paribas of France ceased pursuing new business in Iran, according to attorneys for the company.

• The State Department reported on September 30, 2010, that Hong Kong company NYK Line Ltd. had ended shipping business with Iran on any goods. On June 30, 2011, the Danish shipping giant Maersk said that it would no longer operate out of Iran’s three largest ports. The firm’s decision reportedly was based on the U.S. announcement on June 23, 2011, of sanctions on the operator of those ports, Tidewater Middle East Co., under Executive Order 13382.

• Well before Executive Order 13590 was issued (see above), one large oil services firm, Schlumberger, incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles, said it would wind down its business with Iran.46 Some subsidiaries of U.S. energy equipment and energy-related shipping firms were in the Iranian market as late as 2010, including Natco Group,47 Overseas Shipholding Group,48 UOP (United Oil Products, a Honeywell subsidiary based in Britain),49 Itron,50 Fluor,51 Parker Drilling, Vantage Energy Services,52 PMFG, Ceradyne, Colfax, Fuel Systems Solutions, General Maritime Company, Ameron International Corporation, and World Fuel Services Corp. As of mid-2010 almost all energy sector-related sales to Iran are subject to sanctions, and these companies have likely exited Iran’s markets.

Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms That Have Exited the Iran Market

Many foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms had exited the Iran market voluntarily, before any of their business activities with Iran became subject to sanctions.

• Chemical manufacturer Huntsman announced in January 2010 its subsidiaries would halt sales to Iran.

• In January 2005, Iran said it had contracted with U.S. company Halliburton and an Iranian company, Oriental Kish, to drill for gas in Phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. Halliburton reportedly provided $30 million to $35 million worth of services per year through Oriental Kish, leaving unclear whether Halliburton would be considered in violation of the U.S. trade and investment ban or ISA,53 because the deals several of its subsidiaries. In April 2007, Halliburton announced that its subsidiaries were no longer operating in Iran, as promised in January 2005.

47 Form 10-K filed for fiscal year ended December 31, 2008.
51 “Exhibit to 10-K Filed February 25, 2009.” Officials of Fluor claim that their only dealings with Iran involve property in Iran owned by a Fluor subsidiary, which the subsidiary has been unable to dispose of. CRS conversation with Fluor, December 2009.
52 Form 10-K for fiscal year ended December 31, 2007.
• General Electric (GE) announced in February 2005 that it would seek no new business in Iran, and it reportedly wound down preexisting contracts by July 2008. GE was selling Iran equipment and services for hydroelectric, oil, and gas services. However, GE subsidiary sales of medical diagnostic products such as MRI machines, sold through Italian, Canadian, and French subsidiaries, are not generally subject to sanctions and are believed to be continuing.

• On March 1, 2010, Caterpillar Corp. said it had altered its policies to prevent foreign subsidiaries from selling equipment to independent dealers that have been reselling the equipment to Iran. Ingersoll Rand, maker of air compressors and cooling systems, followed suit.

• In April 2010, it was reported that foreign partners of several U.S. or other multinational accounting firms had cut their ties with Iran, including KPMG of the Netherlands, and local affiliates of U.S. firms PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst and Young.

• Oilfield services firm Smith International said on March 1, 2010, it would stop sales to Iran by its subsidiaries. Another oil services firm, Flowserve, said its subsidiaries have voluntarily ceased new business with Iran as of 2006. FMC Technologies took similar action in 2009, as did Weatherford in 2008. However, in November 2013, Weatherford was fined by the Treasury Department for violating sanctions against Iran and other countries.

Effectiveness of Sanctions on Iran

The following sections examine the effectiveness of sanctions on a variety of criteria and goals.

Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program Decisions and Intentions

Iran’s acceptance of the JPA and progress in the talks on a comprehensive nuclear accord are widely considered evidence that sanctions helped produce a possible shift in Iran’s nuclear policies. The JPA came after the June 14, 2013, presidential election in Iran in which Iranians elected as president the relatively moderate mid-ranking cleric Hassan Rouhani, who ran on a platform of achieving an easing of sanctions and ending Iran’s international isolation. The talks on a comprehensive solution on Iran’s nuclear program between Iran and the “P5+1” countries (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) began in February 2014 and produced a framework for a comprehensive accord on April 2, 2015, which the parties will seek to finalize by June 30, 2015. Still, with regard to Iran’s long term nuclear intentions, Director of

57 In September 2011, the Commerce Department fined Flowserve $2.5 million to settle 288 charges of unlicensed exports and reexports of oil industry equipment to Iran, Syria, and other countries.
58 Form 10-K for fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, claims firm directed its subsidiaries to cease new business in Iran and Cuba, Syria, and Sudan as of September 2007.
National Intelligence James Clapper testified in his “Worldwide Threat Assessment” briefing to Congress on January 29, 2014 that Iran’s ultimate nuclear intentions remain “unclear.”

**Effects on Iran’s Defense Capabilities**

A related question is whether sanctions have prevented Iran from acquiring advanced conventional weapons or technology or skills for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missile programs. Some U.S. officials have asserted that sanctions have complicated Iran’s efforts to acquire key equipment for its enrichment program, but Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs clearly were able to advance despite sanctions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has testified that Iran continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal, and on March 16, 2014, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Vann Van Diepen said that Iran was still “very actively” creating front companies and engaging in other activity to conceal procurement. It is nearly impossible to determine what, if any, additional progress Iran might have achieved in its programs were sanctions not in place.

With respect to Iran’s conventional military capabilities, sanctions might have eroded those aspects of Iran’s conventional capabilities that are most dependent on foreign supplies. Resolution 1929 of June 2010 prohibited the sale to Iran of major combat systems, and there have been no reports of sales to Iran of tanks or combat aircraft since then. Iran’s arsenal of these systems are aging and a failure to modernize likely reduces Iran’s ability to project power. As an example, in early December 2014, Iran used 40 year-old aircraft (U.S.-supplied F-4 jets) to strike Islamic State targets in Iraq, near the Iranian border. Russia’s apparent decision in April 2015 to proceed with delivery of the S-300 air defense system could help modernize Iran’s air defense system to the point where these systems pose new threats to aircraft flown by U.S. or other air forces.

On the other hand, Iran’s indigenous arms industry has grown over the past two decades, partly mitigating the limited foreign supplies of weaponry. Iran is able to produce some advanced conventional weaponry indigenously, including short range ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, Iran might be acquiring some systems, such as smaller ships and small submarines, from foreign suppliers such as North Korea that do not abide by U.N. restrictions.

**Effects on Iran’s Regional Influence**

Another question is whether sanctions have weakened Iran’s ability to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. To date, neither sanctions nor oil prices that have fallen nearly 50% since June 2014 appear to have materially reduced Iran’s ability to arm militant movements in the Middle East and to provide military equipment and advisers to the embattled governments of Syria and Iraqi. In December 2014, one of Iran’s Vice Presidents stated that Iran’s economic support for Syria would continue uninterrupted despite the fall in oil prices since June 2014. Iran reportedly has continued to export arms to the Shiite rebel Houthi faction in Yemen and to militant

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59 Speech by National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at the Brookings Institution, November 22, 2011.
Palestinian Islamist factions, and has sought to supply arms to radical Shiite factions in Bahrain. Iran’s assistance might have helped the Houthis expand their control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in January 2015 and force the removal of President Abd Rabbu Mansur Al Hadi. Iran’s arms exports contravene Resolution 1747.63

**General Political Effects**

Sanctions might have produced some political change in Iran. The support of Iranians seeking reintegration with the international community helped power the most moderate candidate, Rouhani, to a first round victory in the June 2013 presidential election. The Supreme Leader welcomed Rouhani’s election and has publicly backed the JPA and the April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive nuclear accord.

No U.S. Administration has stated that sanctions on Iran are intended to bring about the change of Iran’s regime. However, some Iran sanctions advocates have stated that outcome should be the goal of the sanctions. The major unrest in Iran in 2009 was, by all accounts, a response to repression and alleged fraud in the June 2009 re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president rather than to international sanctions. Since 2012 there has been labor and other public unrest over escalating food prices and the fall of the value of Iran’s currency, but the unrest has not been large or sustained.

Some experts assess that popular unrest could re-emerge if no comprehensive nuclear deal is finalized and sanctions are not eased more substantially. Many Iranians cheered when the April 2, 2015, framework accord was reached, and there will undoubtedly be deep disappointment if no accord is finalized.

**Human Rights-Related Effects**

Recent State Department human rights reports and reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran’s human rights practices assess that there has not been significant net improvement in Iran’s human rights practices in recent years. President Rouhani has achieved the release of a few political prisoners and press reports say media freedoms have increased slightly since he took office, but executions have become more frequent. Sanctions have apparently not reduced the regime’s ability to monitor and censor use of the Internet, according to observers in and outside Iran, even though the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated on January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R) that no foreign firms were reported to have exported technologies to the Iranian government for blocking telecommunications during November 8, 2013, and December 1, 2014. This GAO analysis suggests that firms that pledged to stop selling the Iranian government such equipment, including German telecommunications firm Siemens, Chinese Internet infrastructure firm Huawei, and South African firm, MTN Group, have done so. In October 2012, Eutelsat, a significant provider of satellite service to Iran’s state broadcasting establishment, ended that relationship following EU sanctioning in March 2012 of the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Ezzatollah Zarghami.

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Economic Effects

Sanctions have taken a toll on Iran’s economy, by all accounts, as indicated below.

- **GDP Decline.** Sanctions caused Iran to suffer its first gross domestic product (GDP) contraction in two decades—about 5% contraction in 2013. Then Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2015, that Iran’s economy is 15%-20% smaller than it would have been had sanctions not been imposed. Many Iranian businesses have failed, the number of nonperforming loans held by Iranian banks increased to about 15%-30%, and many employees in the private sector have gone unpaid or underpaid. The unemployment rate is about 20%, although the Iranian government reports the rate at 13%. The sanctions relief of the JPA has stabilized the economy modestly—Iran’s economy achieved slight growth of about 1%-1.5% for 2014, according to the International Monetary Fund.

- **Oil Exports.** As noted in Table 2, sanctions drove Iran’s crude oil sales down about 60% from the 2.5 mbd of sales in 2011, reducing Iran’s crude oil sales revenue from $100 billion in 2011 to about $35 billion in 2013 and even less in 2014—in part because oil prices fell in the second half of 2014. The JPA caps Iran’s crude oil exports at about 1.1 mbd. When it was submitted to the Majles in December 2014, Iran’s 2015 budget was initially based on an oil price of $72 per barrel and anticipated $34 billion in oil revenues for 2015, but a budget revision in January 2015 lowered that estimate to assume $40 per barrel average price and oil revenues in 2015 of only about $20 billion.

- **Falling Oil Production.** When the JPA began implementation in early 2014, Iran’s oil production stood at about 2.6-2.8 mbd down from nearly 4.0 mbd at the end of 2011. Iran has tried to avoid more dramatic production cuts by storing millions of barrels of unsold crude oil on tankers in the Persian Gulf and by building additional storage tanks on shore. U.S. officials say that production has held steady at the early 2014 level and that Iran has largely succeeded in preventing damage to shut or inactive wells.

- **Hard Currency Inaccessible.** Not only have Iran’s oil exports fallen by volume, but Iran is not paid in hard currency for its oil (other than the $700 million per month agreed under the JPA) and cannot access most of its hard currency held in accounts abroad. Iran’s hard currency reserves are estimated to be about $130 billion. Of that, about $100 billion cannot be repatriated due to compliance by foreign banks with U.S. sanctions.

- **Currency Decline.** Sanctions caused the value of the rial on unofficial markets to decline about 56% from January 2012 until January 2014. The unofficial rate is currently about 37,000 to the dollar, and the government has repeatedly adjusted the official rate (currently about 27,000 to the dollar) to reduce the spread between it and the unofficial rate.

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• **Inflation.** The drop in value of the currency caused inflation to accelerate during 2011-2013. The Iranian Central Bank acknowledged an inflation rate of 45% in July 2013, but many economists asserted that the actual inflation rate was between 50% and 70%. The sanctions relief of the JPA has helped reduce the inflation rate to about 30% currently.

• **Industrial Production.** Iran’s economy is industrializing, but the manufacturing sector remains dependent on imported parts and the currency decline and financial sanctions have created difficulties for this sector. Many Iranian manufacturers are unable to obtain credit and must pre-pay, often through time-consuming and circuitous mechanisms, to obtain parts from abroad. This difficulty is particularly acute in the automotive sector; Iran’s production of automobiles fell by about 40% from 2011 to 2013. The JPA has benefitted the auto sector because of the sanctions easing on that sector, but press reports say that manufacturing overall has rebounded only modestly since the JPA implementation began.

**Iran’s Economic Coping Strategies**

Iran has had some success mitigating the economic effect of sanctions, primarily by reducing its dependency on oil exports. Iran has key inherent economic strengths, including an educated workforce—including the highest percentage of engineering graduates in the world—that is familiar with the use of the Internet and other modern technologies.

**Promoting Non-Oil Exports.** Iran’s primary strategy has been to substitute for crude oil sales by increasing sales of non-oil products. Some of the non-oil exports that have grown in recent years include minerals, cement, urea fertilizer, and other agricultural and basic industrial goods. The main customers for Iran’s non-oil exports reportedly are countries in the immediate neighborhood. Currently, non-oil exports generate about two-thirds of the revenue required to fund Iran’s imports of goods and services, greatly reducing the proportion of funds that oil exports contribute to Iran’s budget.67

**Oil Products/Condensate Sales.** Iran has sought to increase sales of oil products such as petrochemicals and condensates, which are allowed under the JPA, to compensate for some lost crude oil export revenue. In 2014, Iran exported to its main oil customers the equivalent of about 200,000 barrels per day of crude oil in condensates,68 producing about $4.7 billion in additional revenue (but not in the form of retrievable hard currency) in the first half of 2014 as compared to the latter half of 2013.69

**Reallocation of Investment Funds and Import Substitution.** Iranian manufacturers have increased production of some goods as Iranians cut back on purchases of imported goods. This trend is considered positive by Iranian economists and Iranian political leaders including Supreme Leader Khamene’i who have long maintained that Iran should expand domestic manufacturing capabilities and reduce dependence on oil revenues and imported goods. In addition, some private

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69 “Iran Reaps Less Cash from Eased Sanctions Than Predicted.” op.cit.
funds are going into the Tehran stock exchange and hard assets, such as property. However, many of these trends generally benefit the urban elite.

Subsidy Reductions. In 2007, Ahmadinejad’s government instituted a program to wean the population off of generous subsidies by compensating families with cash payments of about $40 per month. Gasoline prices began to run on a tiered system that brought them closer to regional prices—and far above the subsidized price of 40 cents per gallon. However, as sanctions began to crimp government revenues, in late 2012 Ahmadinejad postponed “phase two” of the subsidy phase-out effort. In April 2014, Rouhani instituted phase two by raising gasoline prices further and limiting the cash payments to only those families who could claim financial hardship. On December 1, 2014, subsidies on bread were reduced and bread prices rose 30%. Rouhani also has improved collections of taxes and of price increases for electricity and natural gas utilities.70

Import Restrictions. To conserve hard currency, Iran has reduced the supply of hard currency to importers of luxury goods, such as cars or cellphones, in order to maintain hard currency supplies to importers of essential goods. As noted above, the government has sought to align the official “reference” rate with the free market (or “black market”) exchange rate.

Effect on Energy Sector Long-Term Development

Sanctions have been intended, in part, to reduce Iran’s oil and gas production capacity over the longer term by denying Iran the outside technology and investment to maintain, let alone boost, production. U.S. officials estimated in 2011 that Iran had lost $60 billion in investment in the sector as numerous major firms have announced pullouts from some of their Iran projects, declined to make further investments, or resold their investments to other companies. Iran says it needs $130 billion-$145 billion in new investment by 2020 to keep oil production capacity from falling.71 Of that amount, further development of the large South Pars gas field alone requires $100 billion.72

Even though some international firms remain invested in Iran’s energy sector, observers at key energy fields in Iran say there is little evidence of foreign company development activity sighted at Iran’s various oil and gas development sites, as discussed in Table 5. The declining foreign activity appears to be a product of international firms’ decisions not to risk triggering U.S. sanctions. Some of the ongoing investments have avoided sanctions either through Administration waivers or invocation of the “special rule” (see above). Other ongoing foreign investment projects have not been determined as ISA violations and may be under State Department investigation.

Some foreign investors have left the Iran market entirely, and their work has been picked up by domestic companies, particularly those controlled or linked to the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). Foreign firms are reluctant to partner with IRGC firms as international sanctions have increasingly targeted the IRGC. The energy companies still active in Iran, particularly the Iranian firms, are reportedly not as technically capable as the international firms that have withdrawn.

70 Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op.cit.
The JPA did not ease sanctions against investing in Iran’s energy sector. However, there are numerous reports of international firms’ discussing with Iranian energy officials future investment subsequent to a comprehensive nuclear deal. Iran is reportedly working actively to lure foreign investors back into the sector, including by hiring back many of the former officials that successfully negotiated past investments.

Others maintain that Iran’s gas sector can compensate for declining oil exports, although Iran has used its gas development primarily to reinject into its oil fields rather than to export. Iran exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey and Armenia. On the other hand, sanctions have rendered Iran unable to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export business. EU sanctions have also derailed several gas ventures, including BP-NIOC joint venture in the Rhum gas field, 200 miles off the Scotland coast, and inclusion of Iran in planned gas pipeline projects to Europe.

### Table 5. Post-1999 Major Investments/Major Development Projects in Iran’s Energy Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1999</td>
<td>Doroud (oil)</td>
<td>Total (France)/ENI (Italy)</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>205,000 bpd</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy, August 2006.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total and ENI exempted from sanctions on September 30 because of pledge to exit Iran market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>Balal (oil)</td>
<td>Total/ Bow Valley (Canada)/ENI</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>40,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>Soroush and Nowruz (oil)</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands)/Japex (Japan)</td>
<td>$800 million</td>
<td>190,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;News in Brief: Iran.&quot; Middle East Economic Digest, (MEED) January 24, 2003.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal Dutch exempted from sanctions on 9/30 because of pledge to exit Iran market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2000</td>
<td>Anaran bloc (oil)</td>
<td>Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway) and Gazprom and Lukoil (Russia)</td>
<td>$105 million</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MEED Special Report, December 16, 2005, pp. 48-50.)</td>
<td>No production to date; Statoil and Norsk exited.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>Phase 4 and 5, South Pars (gas)</td>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>$1.9 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cu. ft./day (cfd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction of submersible drilling rig for Iranian partner</td>
<td>GVA Consultants (Sweden)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration</td>
<td>GVA Consultants (Sweden)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration</td>
<td>GVA Consultants (Sweden)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Darkhovin (oil)</td>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>100,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Darkhovin Production Doubles.&quot; Gulf Daily News, May 1, 2008.) ENI told CRS in April 2010 it would close out all Iran operations by 2013.</td>
<td>Field in production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>ENI exempted from sanctions on 9/30, as discussed above</td>
<td>Sheer Energy (Canada)/China National Petroleum Company (CNPC). Local partner is Naftgaran Engineering</td>
<td>$80 million</td>
<td>25,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2002</td>
<td><strong>Phase 9 + 10, South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
<td>LG Engineering and Construction Corp. (now known as GS Engineering and Construction Corp., South Korea)</td>
<td>$1.6 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;OIEC Surpasses South Korean Company in South Pars.&quot; IPR Strategic Business Information Database, November 15, 2004.)</td>
<td>On stream as of early 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td><strong>Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
<td>Statoil (Norway)</td>
<td>$750 million</td>
<td>3 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: Statoil, May 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td><strong>Azadegan (oil)—South and North</strong></td>
<td>Inpex (Japan) and CNPC (China)</td>
<td>$200 million</td>
<td>260,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 15, 2010: Inpex announced it would exit the Azadegan project entirely by selling its 10% stake; “special rule” exempting it from ISA investigation invoked November 17, 2010. China National Petroleum Corp. took a majority stake in South and North Azadegan fields in January 2009. However, on April 29, 2014, Iran cancelled the South Azadegan contract citing CNPC for performing “no effective work” since taking the stake in 2009. Industry sources say CNPC likely to also lose North Azadegan project also. (Iran-CNPC Breakup: Tehran Eyes the West, Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 2014.)</td>
<td>(Inpex stake); China $2.5 billion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td><strong>Tusan Block</strong></td>
<td>Petrobras (Brazil)</td>
<td>$178 million</td>
<td>No production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil found in block in Feb. 2009, but not in commercial quantity, according to the firm. (&quot;Iran-Petrobras Operations.&quot; APS Review Gas Market Trends, April 6, 2009; &quot;Brazil’s Petrobras Sees Few Prospects for Iran Oil,&quot; (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-iran-oil-idUSTRE53572220110406">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-iran-oil-idUSTRE53572220110406</a>))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td><strong>Yadavaran (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China), deal finalized Dec. 9, 2007</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td>300,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Science Monitor reports May 5, 2014, (op.cit.) that Iran says Sinopec has “experienced problems with regards to progress” on the field, which also extends into Iraq. But International Oil Daily quotes company on May 7, 2014, as saying project is on course to produce an initial 85,000 bpd by the end of 2014.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td><strong>Saveh bloc (oil)</strong></td>
<td>PTT (Thailand)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td><strong>GAO report, cited below</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Garmsar bloc (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China)</td>
<td>$20 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deal finalized in June 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td><strong>Arak Refinery expansion</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China); JGC (Japan). Work may have been taken over or continued by Hyundai Heavy Industries (S. Korea)</td>
<td>$959 million (major initial expansion; extent of Hyundai work unknown)</td>
<td>Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(GAO reports; Fimco FZE Machinery website; <a href="http://www.fimco.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=70&amp;Itemid=78">http://www.fimco.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=70&amp;Itemid=78</a>.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2006</td>
<td><strong>Khorramabad block (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway).</td>
<td>$49 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seismic data gathered, but no production is planned. (Statoil factsheet, May 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2006</td>
<td><strong>North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas). Includes gas purchases</strong></td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Co.</td>
<td>$16 billion</td>
<td>3.6 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work crews reportedly pulled from the project in early-mid 2011. (&quot;China Curbs Iran Energy Work&quot; Reuters, September 2, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td><strong>LNG Tanks at Tombak Port</strong></td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>$320 million</td>
<td>200,000 ton capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak, 30 miles north of Assaluyeh Port. (May not constitute “investment” as defined in pre-2010 version of ISA, because that definition did not specify LNG as “petroleum resource” of Iran.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td><strong>Phase 13, 14—South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol (Spain)</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deadline to finalize as May 20, 2009, apparently not met; firms submitted revised proposals to Iran in June 2009. (<a href="http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=77040&amp;hmpn=1">http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=77040&amp;hmpn=1</a>.) State Department said on September 30, 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol will not pursue this project any further</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td><strong>Esfahan refinery upgrade</strong></td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Daelim, Others to Upgrade Iran’s Esfahan Refinery.&quot; Chemical News and Intelligence, March 19, 2007.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td><strong>Phase 22, 23, 24—South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
<td>Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO)</td>
<td>$12 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pipeline to transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and on to Europe and building three power plants in Iran. Contract not finalized to date.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/Goal</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2007</td>
<td><strong>Golshan and Ferdowsi onshore and offshore gas and oil fields and LNG plant</strong></td>
<td>Petrofield Subsidiary of SKS Ventures (Malaysia)</td>
<td><strong>$15 billion</strong></td>
<td>3.4 billion cfd of gas/250,000 bpd of oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contract modified but reaffirmed December 2008 (GAO reports; Oil Daily, January 14, 2008.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td><strong>Jofeir Field (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Belarusneft (Belarus) under contract to Naftiran.</td>
<td><strong>$500 million</strong></td>
<td>40,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below. Belarusneft, a subsidiary of Belneftekhim, sanctioned under ISA on March 29, 2011. Naftiran sanctioned on September 29, 2010, for this and other activities.</td>
<td>No production to date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><strong>Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)</strong></td>
<td>Edison (Italy)</td>
<td><strong>$44 million</strong></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2008</td>
<td><strong>Lavan field (offshore natural gas)</strong></td>
<td>PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas Company, Poland)</td>
<td><strong>$2 billion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below invested. PGNiG invested, but delays caused Iran to void PGNiG contract in December 2011. Project to be implemented by Iranian firms. (Fars News, December 20, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td><strong>Danan Field (on-shore oil)</strong></td>
<td>Petro Vietnam Exploration and Production Co. (Vietnam)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“PVEP Wins Bid to Develop Danan Field.” Iran Press TV, March 11, 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td><strong>Iran’s Kish gas field</strong></td>
<td>Oman (co-financing of project)</td>
<td><strong>$7 billion</strong></td>
<td>1 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td><strong>Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil province)</strong></td>
<td>INA (Croatia)</td>
<td><strong>$40-$140 million</strong> (dispute over size)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 7, 2014, GAO report says INA has withdrawn from Iran.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><strong>Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction)</strong></td>
<td>Uhde (Germany)</td>
<td>300,000 metric tons/yr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td><strong>Resalat Oilfield</strong></td>
<td>Amona (Malaysia). Joined in June 2009 by CNOOC and another China firm, COSL.</td>
<td><strong>$1.5 billion</strong></td>
<td>47,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td><strong>Bushehr Polymer Plants</strong></td>
<td>Sasol (South Africa)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Capacity is 1 million tons per year. Products are exported from Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production of polyethylene at two polymer plants in Bushehr Province.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO Jan. 7, 2014, report says Sasol has withdrawn from Iran.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td><strong>Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—Incl. LNG terminal construction and Farsi Block gas field/Farzad-B bloc.</strong></td>
<td>Taken over by Indian firms (Oil and Natural Gas Corp. of India, Oil India Ltd., India Oil Corp. Ltd. in 2007); may also include minor stakes by Sonanagol (Angola) and PDVSA (Venezuela).</td>
<td><strong>$8 billion</strong> from Indian firms/$1.5 billion Sonanagol/$780 million PDVSA</td>
<td>20 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td><strong>Abadan refinery</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec</td>
<td>up to $6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas Sweetening Plant</strong></td>
<td>G and S Engineering and Construction (South Korea)</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRS conversation with Embassy of S. Korea in Washington, D.C, July 2010</td>
<td>Contract signed but then abrogated by S. Korean firm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3</strong></td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)—Part 2; Tecnimont (Italy)—Part 3</td>
<td>$4 billion ($2 bn each part)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(“Italy, South Korea To Develop South Pars Phase 12.” Press TV (Iran), November 3, 2009, <a href="http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308">http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308</a>.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2010</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 11</strong></td>
<td>CNPC (China)</td>
<td>$4.7 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drilling was to begin in March 2010, but CNPC pulled out in October 2012. (Economist Intelligence Unit “Oil Sanctions on Iran: Cracking Under Pressure.” 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td><strong>Azar Gas Field</strong></td>
<td>Gazprom (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gazprom contract voided in late 2011 by Iran due to Gazprom’s unspecified failure to fulfill its commitments.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2011</td>
<td><strong>Zagheh Oil Field</strong></td>
<td>Tatneft (Russia)</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>55,000 barrels per day within five years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preliminary deal signed December 18, 2011(Associated Press, December 18, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** As noted in table, as well as CRS conversations with officials of the State Department Bureau of Economics, and officials of embassies of the parent government of some of the listed companies. Some information comes from various GAO reports, the latest of which was January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R).

**Note:** CRS has neither the mandate, the authority, nor the means to determine which of these projects, if any, might constitute a violation of the Iran Sanctions Act. CRS has no way to confirm the precise status of any of the announced investments; some investments may have been resold to other firms or terms altered since agreement. In virtually all cases, such investments and contracts represent private agreements between Iran and its instruments and the investing firms, and firms are not necessarily required to confirm or publicly release the terms of their arrangements with Iran. Reported $20 million+ investments in oil and gas fields, refinery upgrades, and major project leadership are included in this table. Responsibility for a project to develop Iran’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.

**Effect on Gasoline Availability and Importation**

In March 2010, well before the enactment of CISADA, several suppliers announced that they had stopped or would stop selling gasoline to Iran. Other suppliers have ceased since the enactment of CISADA. Some observers say that gasoline deliveries to Iran fell from about 120,000 barrels per day before CISADA to about 30,000 barrels per day immediately thereafter, although importation later increased to about 50,000 barrels per day. The GAO report of January 7, 2014, identified no

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foreign firms selling Iran gasoline between October 1, 2012, and November 7, 2013, suggesting that a phaseout of gasoline subsidies had reduced demand for gasoline.

### Table 6. Firms That Sold Gasoline to Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Notification Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vitol of Switzerland</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in early 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafigura of Switzerland</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glencore of Switzerland</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped selling in September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of France</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance Industries of India</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petronas of Malaysia</td>
<td>Said on April 15, 2010, it had stopped sales to Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukoil of Russia</td>
<td>Was reported to have ended sales to Iran in April 2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy, although some reports continue that Lukoil affiliates are supplying Iran.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands</td>
<td>Notified GAO it stopped sales in October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait's Independent Petroleum Group</td>
<td>Told U.S. officials it stopped selling gasoline to Iran as of September 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tupras of Turkey</td>
<td>Stopped selling to Iran as of May 2011, according to the State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Petroleum of United Kingdom</td>
<td>Shell, Q8, Total, and OMV are no longer selling aviation fuel to Iran, according to U.S. State Department officials on May 24, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Crown Petroleum FZE</td>
<td>Told the author in April 2011 that, as of June 29, 2010, it no longer leases vessels for the purpose of shipping petroleum products from or through Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich Re, Allianz, Hannover Re (Germany)</td>
<td>Providing insurance and reinsurance for gasoline shipments to Iran. However, they reportedly have exited the market for insuring gasoline shipments for Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd's (Germany)</td>
<td>The major insurer had been the main company insuring Iranian gas (and other) shipping, but reportedly ended that business in July 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linde of Germany</td>
<td>According to the State Department on May 24, 2011, Linde of Germany said it had stopped supplying gas liquefaction technology to Iran, contributing to Iran's decision to suspend its LNG program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the firms sanctioned by the Administration on May 24, 2011, (discussed above), may still be providing service to Iran, including PCCI (Jersey/Iran); Associated Shipbroking (Monaco); and Petroles de Venezuela (Venezuela). Tanker Pacific representatives told the author in January 2013 that the firm had stopped dealing with Iran in April 2010 but may have been deceived by IRISL into a transaction with Iran after that time.

Zhuhai Zhenrong, Unipec, ZhenHua Oil, and China Oil of China. Zhuhai Zhenrong is no longer selling Iran gasoline, according to the January 7, 2014, GAO report (GAO-14-281R). ZhenHua, a subsidiary of arms manufacturer Norinco, supplied one third of Iran’s gasoline in March 2010, but there is little information on supplies since.

Emirates National Oil Company of UAE has been reported by GAO to still be selling to Iran, as have three other UAE energy traders, FAL, Royal Oyster Group, and Speedy Ship (UAE/Iran). Hin Leong Trading of Singapore may still be selling gasoline to Iran, as might Kuo Oil of Singapore.

**Source:** CRS conversations with various firms, GAO reports, various press reports.

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Humanitarian Effects/Air Safety

Humanitarian-related effects of sanctions have been noted in several sectors, and some of the sanctions easing in the interim nuclear deal are intended to mitigate these effects. Press reports have mounted since mid-2012 that sanctions are hurting the population’s ability to obtain Western-made medicines, such as expensive chemo-therapy medicines. Some of the scarcity is caused by banks’ refusal to finance such sales, even though doing so is technically allowed under all applicable sanctions. Some observers say the Iranian government is exaggerating reports of medicine shortages to generate opposition to the sanctions. Other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections to the government, are taking advantage of medicine shortages by cornering the market for importing key medicines.

Some human rights and other groups have suggested potential solutions. The JPA provides for the international community to provide enhanced financial channels for Iran to import medicines, although the exact mechanism has generally been limited to a U.S.-led information campaign for international banks. In July 2014, the U.S. Administration asked European medical firms to expedite sales of medical goods to Iran, and the Administration reportedly cleared banks in Switzerland and Japan to process financing for the shipments.78

In the aviation sector, some Iranian pilots have complained publicly and stridently that U.S. sanctions are causing Iran’s passenger airline fleet to deteriorate to the point of jeopardizing safety. Since the U.S. trade ban was imposed in 1995, 1,700 passengers and crew of Iranian aircraft have been killed in air accidents, although it is not clear how many of the crashes, if any, were due to difficulty in acquiring U.S. spare parts.79 The JPA provides for new sales of civilian aircraft parts to address this issue and Boeing and GE have applied for and obtained licenses to sell spare part and operating manuals to Iranian airlines.

Other reports say that pollution in Tehran and other big cities has worsened because Iran is making gasoline itself with methods that cause more impurities than imported gasoline. As noted above, Iran’s efforts to deal with environment hazards and problems might be hindered by denial of World Bank lending for that purpose.

Sanctions Easings Connected to a Nuclear Deal

Sanctions Eased by the JPA

U.S. officials have said that the JPA requires “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible” easing of international sanctions. And, despite such developments as the visits to Iran of business delegations, U.S. officials say there has not been any significant decline in international compliance with the sanctions regime since JPA implementation began in January 2014. Under the JPA:80

80 The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm.
Iran’s current oil customers are not required reduce their oil purchases from Iran “significantly” from the levels they were when the JPA went into effect. To avoid penalizing these oil buyers while the JPA is in effect, the Administration has exercised waiver authority under Section 1245(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) and Section 1244c(1) of IFCA (Title XII, subtitle D, of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239). The Administration also stated it would not impose sanctions on foreign banks under Executive Orders 13622, 13645, and 13382 and related regulations. Waivers of Section 302(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) and of Section 5(A)(7) of the Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172, as amended) have been issued to permit transactions with NIOC. The European Union has amended its own regulations to allow shipping insurers to provide insurance for ships carrying oil from Iran.  

These waivers and sanctions suspensions do not permit U.S. companies to trade in such goods with Iran.

Iran is able to repatriate $700 million per month in oil sales proceeds while the JPA is in effect and $65 million per month to make tuition payments for Iranian students abroad (paid directly to the educational institutions). The waiver authority under Section 1245(d)(1) of the FY2012 NDAA, discussed above, enables Iran to receive these proceeds directly.

The JPA permits Iran to resume sales of petrochemicals and trading in gold and other precious metals, and to resume transactions with foreign firms involved in Iran’s automotive manufacturing sector. To enable these transactions, the Administration suspended application of Executive Orders 13622 and 13645, several provisions of U.S.-Iran trade regulations, and several sections of IFCA.

The parties to the JPA pledged to facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. and partner country laws, such as sales of medicine to Iran, but which many banks refuse to finance. The United States also committed to license safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines. To implement this commitment, the Administration issued a new “Statement of Licensing Policy” to enable U.S. aircraft manufacturers to sell the appropriate equipment to Iranian airlines. Several Iranian airlines, including Iran Air, have been designated for sanctions under Executive Order 13382, which blocks U.S.-based property of entities designated as “proliferation supporters.” The Administration has suspended application of Executive Order 13382 and certain provisions of U.S. trade regulations with Iran to allow the supply of equipment to Iran Air.

The P5+1 and Iran agreed to set up a Joint Commission whose tasks will include evaluating P5+1 compliance with its commitments for sanctions relief. The commission is empowered to consider Iranian complaints about foreign firms that Tehran believes have been sanctioned inappropriately.

The JPA require that the P5+1 “not impose new nuclear-related sanctions,” if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent permissible within their political systems.

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82 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of (continued...)”
Sanctions Easing Under a Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

According to the White House fact sheet on the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord, the following sanctions easing will occur if a deal is finalized. The easing includes:

- U.S and EU nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken key nuclear-related steps. U.N. sanctions will be lifted after Iran completes additional nuclear-related commitments—a step that could potentially cause other countries to argue that the need no longer cooperate with U.S. sanctions.

- According to a wide range of observers, the U.S. sanctions to be suspended are mostly those imposed since 2010, including: (1) energy sanctions of the Iran Sanctions Act and amendments to that Act made by CISADA, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, and IFCA; (2) ISA sanctions mandated by various Executive Orders and some of these post-2010 laws; (3) the FY2012 NDAA requiring cuts in purchases of Iranian oil; (4) core CISADA provisions sanctioning foreign banks; (5) the Executive Order sanctioning transactions with Iran’s auto sector and trading in the rial; and (6) the EU oil and gas ban, other EU sanctions, and the ban on Iran’s use of the SWIFT electronic payments system.

- U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place.

- U.S. sanctions remaining in place will be: (1) E.O. 13224 sanctioning terrorism entities; (2) sanctions resulting from Iran’s place on the “terrorism list;” (3) the ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran; (4) the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act; (5) the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-Proliferation Act; and (6) the Executive Orders and the provisions of CISADA and the Iran Threat Reduction Act that pertain to human rights or democratic change in Iran.

- If a dispute over Iran’s compliance with the accord cannot be resolved through a to-be-established resolution mechanism, all U.N. sanctions could be reimposed.

There still remains to be clarified in a finalized deal the precise requirements Iran must meet in order for sanctions relief to begin. Iran seeks immediate implementation of all agreed sanctions relief, although even a fact sheet released by Iran refers to sanctions relief upon “implementation” of the agreement—and not sanctions relief upon *signature* of an agreement. Still, press reports indicate President Obama has directed U.S. negotiators to try to focus on ways to put sanctions back in place if Iran violates the terms of the deal, rather than focus on delayed sanctions relief.83

Another question is whether Iran will be satisfied with suspension of sanctions rather than outright lifting. The Administration has said that it would initially use waiver and other authorities to implement sanctions relief.84 After testing Iran’s compliance over a period of “years

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84 http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/221528-kerry-congress-consulted-on-iran-but-dont-need-initial-vote
to come, according to March 2015 testimony by OFAC head Adam Szubin, the Administration would presumably request that Congress repeal or terminate sanctions imposed by statute.85

**Possible Sanctions and Other Legislative Action While Talks Continue**

Another issue is whether the 114th Congress might seek to enact additional sanctions before an accord is finalized. Supporters of enacting additional sanctions while negotiations are ongoing express doubts that the likely deal will ensure that Iran’s nuclear program can only be used for peaceful purposes and argue that the threat of additional sanctions could prod Iran into agreeing to a deal that Congress considers acceptable. Those who take this view also dispute that Iran would walk away from the negotiations if new sanctions are enacted. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated his support for these views in his address to a Joint Session of Congress on March 3, 2015.

In his January 21, 2015, State of the Union message and several times subsequently, President Obama has stated that he will veto any new Iran sanctions legislation while talks continue. The Administration and opponents of new sanctions legislation cite Iranian and other country leadership statements in arguing that imposing new sanctions during the talks will cause Iran to walk away from talks and fracture the international coalition that imposed Iran sanctions.86 This view was underscored in January 2015 in comments by visiting British Prime Minister David Cameron and an editorial in the *Washington Post* by three top European diplomats.87 Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has repeatedly said that any U.S. imposition of new sanctions while talks are ongoing would cause a collapse of the talks.

**114th Congress: Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act (S. 269) and S.Res. 40**

At the start of the 114th Congress, some Members introduced legislation that would require a congressional vote on any comprehensive nuclear deal and would stipulate additional sanctions that would go into effect if stated deadlines for the comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran are not met. A major initiative was draft legislation entitled the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015” (S. 269). In late February 2015, the bill was marked up by the Senate Banking Committee, which has jurisdiction over sanctions legislation affecting the U.S. financial system. However, President Obama’s threat to veto the legislation appears to have contributed to a statement by its main sponsors to delay further consideration of the bill at least until the March 31 deadline for a political framework nuclear accord. There has been no further action on the legislation in the aftermath of the achievement of a framework accord on April 2. S. 269 was partly modeled on bills in the 113th Congress: S. 1881, the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013” and H.R. 850, a House bill that was passed 400-20 in July 2013.

- Both of the bills in the 113th Congress would require Iran’s remaining oil customers to accelerate the reductions of their imports of Iranian oil by reducing purchases by, collectively, an additional 1 million barrels per day (within one

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86  Ibid.
year of enactment). Countries that do not “dramatically reduce” their Iran oil buys would lose their exemptions from U.S. sanctions.

- Both would add sectors of the Iranian economy with which transactions would be subject to sanctions (under IFCA; P.L. 112-239). H.R. 850 references the automotive and mining sectors; S. 1881 references the shipbuilding, construction, engineering, and mining sectors—defining them, along with the energy and shipping sectors, as “strategic sectors.”

- H.R. 850 authorizes, but does not mandate, sanctions for conducting financial transaction with Iran’s Central Bank or other sanctioned Iranian banks for trade with Iran in any goods. Both bills would sanction foreign banks that help Iran exchange its foreign currency abroad.

- H.R. 850 would require the Administration to determine whether the Revolutionary Guard should be named a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

- S. 1881 contains provisions to delay the effective date of the sanctions beyond the duration of the JPA, provided the President certifies Iran is implementing the JPA, is negotiating in good faith on a final deal, has not (directly or through proxies) supported an act of terrorism against the United States, and has not conducted any tests of ballistic missiles of over 500 kilometer range. The suspension can be continued for an additional 60 days (two 30-day extensions) if the President certifies that a comprehensive nuclear deal that would “terminate” Iran’s “illicit” nuclear program is imminent. A waiver provision enables the President to forestall reinstatement of the act’s sanctions.

- S. 1881 also provides for sanctions to be suspended if there is a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The sanctions in the bill can be suspended for one year, with additional one-year periods, if the President certifies there is a final deal under which Iran agrees to dismantle its “illicit” nuclear infrastructure, is brought into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, resolves all issues of possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permits constant monitoring of all “suspect” facilities in Iran. Under S. 1881, this sanctions suspension could be terminated if Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. None of these delay provisions are contained in H.R. 850.

Critics of S. 1881 asserted that the bill adds requirements to avoid new sanctions that are not in the JPA—particularly that Iran not test new longer-range missiles. Others said S. 1881 sought to impose unattainable conditions on a final nuclear deal—that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure be eliminated. Supporters of the bill say that the term “illicit” allows flexibility to allow Iran to continue some enrichment as part of a final deal.

S. 269 made some modifications to the 113th Congress’s bills.

- S. 269 does not set out the parameters of a final accord that Congress would find acceptable as binding. The bill describes Congress’s views of an acceptable deal in nonbinding preamble language.

- S. 269 delineates sanctions that would take effect in successive months in late 2015. The core provision adopts the elements of S. 1881 that would compel Iran’s remaining oil customers to make “dramatic” (30%) cuts in purchases of
Iran Sanctions

Iranian oil, every successive eight months, in order to retain an exemption of their banks from U.S. sanctions.

- It would expand the authorities of IFCA (see above) to sanction transactions not only with Iran’s shipping, ship-building, and energy sector but also with Iran’s automotive, construction, engineering, and mining sectors.

- It provides a 30-day congressional review period for a comprehensive nuclear accord, and prohibits the President from using waiver authority to provide additional sanctions relief for Iran during this review period.

President Obama’s stated intent to veto the Nuclear Free Iran Act apparently also contributed to the introduction of alternative legislation that would not likely jeopardize the nuclear talks. S.Res. 40 was introduced on January 26, 2015, expressing the nonbinding sense of Congress that new sanctions should be enacted if the talks fail to produce an accord.

Related Legislation Requiring Congressional Review (S. 615)

Some in Congress appear to be asserting the need for formal congressional review of any comprehensive deal with Iran. A congressional review requirement provision was included in S. 269. A separate bill, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (S. 615/S. 625) was introduced on February 27, 2015. S. 615 was ordered to be reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a unanimous vote of the 19 Senators present. The bill provides for:

- A 30-day congressional review period after which Congress could pass legislation to approve or to disapprove of the deal, or do nothing. Such legislation would be subject to possible veto by the President.

- During the review period, the President would be barred from using waiver authority to provide any additional sanctions relief to Iran beyond that already provided under the existing JPA. The period of sanctions relief injunction extends for an additional 12 days if Congress passes a resolution to disapprove the finalized accord, and a further 10 days if the President vetoes the resolution of disapproval.

- If a resolution to disapprove the accord is enacted (presumably by overriding a presidential veto), any sanctions relief provided to Iran by laws enacted by Congress, including that provided under the JPA using waiver authority, would be ended.

- Every 90 days after the congressional review, the President is required to certify that Iran is fully complying with the agreement, according to criteria stipulated in the bill. If the President does not make the required certification of Iranian compliance, Congress “may” initiate within 60 days “expedited consideration” of legislation that would reimpose any Iran sanctions that the President had suspended through use of waiver or other authority. As is any legislation, such “snap back” sanctions legislation would be subject to potential presidential veto.

- The bill requires an Administration report every 180 days on Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s compliance with the agreement during the period covered in the report. The report is to include not only Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments but also whether Iranian banks are involved in terrorism financing; Iran’s ballistic missile advances; and whether Iran continues to support terrorism.
The Administration initially had stated opposition to the legislation, asserting that Congress already had involvement in an Iran nuclear deal with Iran through its legislative powers to decide whether to repeal or amend existing sanctions laws. However, the Administration asserted that the version of the bill that was reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met the Administration’s criteria and that President Obama would sign it—if it remained in that form throughout the remainder of the legislative process.

Other Possible U.S. and International Sanctions

There are a number of other possible sanctions that might receive consideration—either in a global or multilateral framework—presumably if no comprehensive nuclear deal is reached and Iran returns to expanding its nuclear program.

- **Sanctioning All Trade with Iran.** Some organizations, such as United Against Nuclear Iran, advocate sanctions against virtually all trade with Iran, with exceptions for food and medical products. The concept of a global trade ban on Iran has virtually no support in the United Nations Security Council, and U.S. allies strongly oppose U.S. measures that would compel allied firms to end commerce with Iran in purely civilian, non-strategic goods.

- **Comprehensive Ban on Energy Transactions with Iran.** Many experts believe that a U.N.-mandated, worldwide embargo on the purchase of any Iranian crude oil would put significant pressure on Iran. This concept would likely require support from the U.N. Security Council. Some advocate a U.N. Security Council ban on all investment in and equipment sales to Iran’s energy sector. During the 1990s, U.N. sanctions against Libya for the Pan Am 103 bombing banned the sale of energy equipment to Libya.

- **Iran Oil Free Zone.** Prior to the EU oil embargo on Iran, there was discussion of forcing a similar result by closing the loophole in the U.S. trade ban under which Iranian crude oil, when mixed with other countries’ oils at foreign refineries in Europe and elsewhere, can be imported as refined product. Some argue this concept has been mooted by the EU oil embargo, while others say the step still has value in making sure the EU oil embargo on Iran is not lifted or modified.

- **Mandating Reductions in Diplomatic Exchanges with Iran or Prohibiting Travel by Iranian Officials.** Some have suggested that the United States organize a worldwide ban on travel by senior Iranian civilian officials, a pullout of all diplomatic missions in Tehran, and expulsion of Iranian diplomats worldwide. The EU came close to adopting this option after the November 29, 2011, attack on the British Embassy in Tehran.

- **Barring Iran from International Sporting Events.** An option is to limit sports or cultural exchanges with Iran, such as Iran’s participation in the World Cup soccer tournament. However, many experts oppose using sporting events to accomplish political goals.

- **Sanctioning Iranian Profiteers and Other Abusers.** Some experts believe that, despite the provision of P.L. 112-239 discussed earlier, the United States and international community should more aggressively target for sanctions Iranians who are exploiting special rights, monopolies, or political contacts for economic gain at the expense of average Iranians. Others believe that human rights
sanctions should be extended to Iranian officials who are responsible for depriving Iranian women and other groups of internationally accepted rights.

- **Banning Passenger Flights to and from Iran.** Bans on flights to and from Libya were imposed on that country in response to the finding that its agents were responsible for the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103 (now lifted). A variation of this idea could be the imposition of sanctions against airlines that are in joint ventures or codeshare arrangements with Iranian airlines.

- **Limiting Lending to Iran by International Financial Institutions.** Resolution 1747 calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran. An option is to make a ban on such lending mandatory. Some U.S. groups have called for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to withdraw all its holdings in Iran’s Central Bank and suspend Iran’s membership in the body.

- **Banning Trade Financing or Official Insurance for Trade Financing.** Another option is to mandate a worldwide ban on official trade credit guarantees. This was not mandated by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this sanction subsequently. A ban on investment in Iranian bonds reportedly was considered but deleted to attract China and Russia’s support.

- **Restricting Operations of and Insurance for Iranian Shipping.** One option, reportedly long under consideration, has been a worldwide ban on provision of insurance or reinsurance for any shipping to or from Iran. A call for restraint is in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. As of July 1, 2012, the EU has banned such insurance, and many of the world’s major insurers are in Europe.
Table 7. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and U.S. Laws and Executive Orders

(Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated; some have since changed. Sanctions imposed, revoked, or exempted under the Iran Sanctions Act, CISADA, and IFCA are discussed above and not included in this table)

### Entities Sanctioned Under Resolution 1737

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEIO) Mesbah Energy Company (Arak supplier); Kalaye Electric (Natanz supplier); Pars Trash Company (centrifuge program); Farayand Technique (centrifuge program); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); 7th of Tir (DIO subordinate); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)—missile program; Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)—missile program; Fajr Industrial Group (missile program); Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice President; Behman Asgarpour (Arak manager); Ehsan Monajemi (Natanz construction manager); Jafar Mohammadi (Adviser to AEIO); Gen. Hosein Salmi (Commander, IRGC Air Force); Dawood Agha Jani (Natanz official); Ali Hajinia Leilabadi (director of Mesbah Energy); Lt. Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri (Malak Ashtar University of Defence Technology rector); Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO official); Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO official); Ahmad Yahid Dastjerdi (head of Aerospace Industries Org., AIO); Maj. Gen. Yaya Rahim Safavi (Commander in Chief, IRGC)

### Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747

Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (controls 7th of Tir); Parchin Chemical Industries (branch of DIO); Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Novin Energy Company; Cruise Missile Industry Group; Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO); Ya Mahdi Industries Group; Kavoshay Company (subsidiary of AEIO); Sho’a Aviation (produces IRGC light aircraft for asymmetric warfare); Bank Sepah (funds AIO and subordinate entities); Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center; Qods Aeronautics Industries (produces UAV’s, para-gliders for IRGC asymmetric warfare); Pars Aviation Services Company (maintains IRGC Air Force equipment); Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr (IRGC officer serving as deputy Interior Minister; Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander); Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (senior defense scientist); Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabai (defense scientist); Seyed Jaber Safdari (Natanz manager); Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industrial Group); Ahmad Derakshandeh (head of Bank Sepah); Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (IRGC ground forces commander); Amir Rahimi (head of Esfahan nuclear facilities); Mehrdah Akhlaghi Ketabachi (head of SBIG); Naser Maleki (head of SHIG); Brig. Gen. Morteza Reza’i (Deputy commander-in-chief, IRGC); Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan (chief of IRGC Joint Staff); Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi (Basiq commander)

### Entities Added by Resolution 1803

Thirteen Iranians named in Annex 1 to Resolution 1803; all reputedly involved in various aspects of nuclear program. Bans travel for five named Iranians.

Electro Sanam Co.; Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (centrifuge production); Barzaganin Tejaral Tavanmad Saccal; Jabber Ibne Hayan; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. (Makes batteries for Iranian military and missile systems); Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front co.); Industrial Factories of Precision; Joza Industrial Co.; Pshgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries; Tamas Co. (involved in uranium enrichment); Safety Equipment Procurement (AIO front, involved in missiles)

### Entities Added by Resolution 1929

Over 40 entities added; makes mandatory a previously nonbinding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions. Adds one individual banned for travel—AEIO head Javad Rahiqi

Amin Industrial Complex; Armament Industries Group; Defense Technology and Science Research Center (owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense); Doostan International Company; Farasakht Industries; First East Export Bank, PLC (only bank added by Resolution 1929); Kaveh Cutting Tools Company; M. Babaie Industries; Malek Ashtar University (subordinate of Defense Technology and Science Research Center above); Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (sells Iranian made arms to customers worldwide); Mizan Machinery Manufacturing; Modern Industries Technique Company; Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (research component of the AEIO); Pejman Industrial Services Corp.; Sabalan Company; Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company; Shahid Karrazi Industries; Shahid Sattari Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (acts on behalf of the DIO); Special Industries Group (another subordinate of DIO); Tiz Pars (cover name for SHIG); Yazd Metallurgy Industries

The following Revolutionary Guard affiliated firms (several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction affiliate): Fater Institute; Garaghe Szandegi Ghaem; Gorb Karbala; Gorb Nooh; Hara Company; Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute; Khatam ol-Anbiya; Makin; Omran Sahel; Oriental Oil Kish; Rah Sahel; Rahab
The following entities owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): Irano Hind Shipping Company; IRISL Benelux; and South Shipping Line Iran

**Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382**  
*(many designations coincident with designations under U.N. resolutions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran)</td>
<td>June 2005, September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran)</td>
<td>June 2005, February 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Organization of Iran</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novin Energy Company (Iran) and Mesbah Energy Company (Iran)</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
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<td>Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) and Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)</td>
<td>July 2006</td>
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<td>Bank Sepah (Iran)</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Industries Organization (Iran)</td>
<td>March 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**June 2007**

- Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program); Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program); Fajr Industries Group (Iran, missile program); Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (Iran, missile prog.)
- Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran) | September 2007 |
- Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea) | September 2007 |

**October 21, 2007**

- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; Bank Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by Guard); Bank Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC (U.K.); Bank Kargoshaee; Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based in Afghanistan; Bank Mellat (provides banking services to Iran’s nuclear sector); Mellat Bank SB CJC (Armenia). Reportedly has $1.4 billion in assets in UAE; Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.); Khatam ol Anbiya Gharaargh Szandegi Nooh (main IRGC construction and contracting arm, with $7 billion in oil, gas deals); Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil exploration firm); Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh (synonymous with Khatam ol Anbiya); Sepasad Engineering Company (Guard construction affiliate); Omran Sahel (Guard construction affiliate); Sahel Consultant Engineering (Guard construction affiliate); Hara Company; Gharaarghe Szandegi Ghaem
- Individuals: Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see above under Resolution 1737); Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (AIO head, Iran missile program); Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO, see under Resolution 1737); Morteza Rezaei (deputy commander, IRGC) See also Resolution 1747; Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander). Also, Resolution 1747; Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff). Resolution 1747; Hosein Salimi (IRGC Air Force commander). Resolution 1737; Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander). Resolution 1747.

**March 12, 2008**

- Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli)

**July 8, 2008**

- Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief); Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior Defense Ministry scientist); Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz enrichment site); Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industries, involved in missile program); Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (heads Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); Naser Maliki (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group); Tamas Company (involved in uranium enrichment); Shahid Sattari Industries (makes equipment for Shahid Bakeri); 7th of Tir (involved in developing centrifuge technology); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (partner of 7th of Tir); Parchin Chemical Industries (deals in chemicals used in ballistic missile programs)
August 12, 2008
Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC); Jabber Ibn Hayyan (reports to Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, AEIO); Safety Equipment Procurement Company; Joza Industrial Company (front company for Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, SHIG)

September 10, 2008
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8; Kazar; Irinvestship; Shipping Computer Services; Iran o Misr Shipping; Iran o Hind; IRISL Marine Services; Iriatal Shipping; South Shipping; IRISL Multimodal; Oasis; IRISL Europe; IRISL Benelux; IRISL China; Asia Marine Network; CISCO Shipping; and IRISL Malta

September 17, 2008
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, including Armament Industries Group; Farasakht Industries; Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co.; Iran Communications Industries; Iran Electronics Industries; and Shiraz Electronics Industries

October 22, 2008
Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Provides financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics

Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, C.A., Venezuelan-based Iranian bank, sanctioned as an affiliate of the Export Development Bank

Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli involved in managing property in New York City on behalf of Iran)

March 3, 2009
11 Entities Tied to Bank Melli: Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); Bank Melli Printing and Publishing; Melli Investment Holding; Mehr Cayman Ltd.; Cement Investment and Development; Mazandaran Cement Co.; Shomal Cement; Mazandaran Textile; Melli Agrochemical; First Persian Equity Fund; BMIIC Intel. General Trading

February 10, 2010
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi, head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (main IRGC corporate arm) and several entities linked to Khatem ol-Anbiya, including: Fater Engineering Institute, Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute, Makin Institute, and Rahab Institute

June 16, 2010
- Post Bank of Iran
- IRGC Air Force
- IRGC Missile Command
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anbia IRGC construction affiliate)
- Mohammad Ali Jafari—IRGC Commander-in-Chief since September 2007
- Mohammad Reza Naqdi—Head of the IRGC’s Basij militia force that suppresses dissent (since October 2009)
- Ahmad Vahedi—Defense Minister
- Javedan Mehr Toos, Javad Karimi Sabet (procurement brokers or atomic energy managers)
- Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (controlled by the Aircraft Industries Org that manages Iran’s missile programs)
- Five front companies for IRISL: Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co.; Safiran Payam Darya; and Hong Kong-based Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics.

Also identified on June 16 were 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated IRISL ships.

Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran for purposes of the ban on U.S. trade with Iran.
November 30, 2010
- Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat
- Pearl Energy Services, SA
- Ali Afzali (high official of First East Export Bank)
- IRISL front companies: Ashtead Shipping, Byfleet Shipping, Cobham Shipping, Dorking Shipping, Effingham Shipping, Farnham Shipping, Gomshall Shipping, and Horsham Shipping (all located in the Isle of Man).
- IRISL and affiliate officials: Mohammad Hosein Dajmar, Gholamhossein Golpavar, Hassan Jalil Zadeh, and Mohammad Haji Pajand.

December 21, 2010
- Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC; Ansar Bank (for providing financial services to the IRGC); Mehr Bank (same justification as above); Moallem Insurance Company (for providing marine insurance to IRISL, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)

May 17, 2011
Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM)

June 23, 2011
- Tidewater Middle East Company; Iran Air; Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Co.

March 28, 2012
Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (owned by IRGC engineering firm Khatem-ol-Anbiya, has offices in Venezuela); Deep Offshore Technology PJSC (subsidiary of the above); Malship Shipping Agency and Modality Ltd (both Malta-based affiliates of IRISL); Seyed Alaeddin Sadat Rasool (IRISL legal adviser); Ali Ezati (IRISL strategic planning and public affairs manager)

July 12, 2012
- Electronic Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN); Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center (AICTC); Digital Media Lab (DML) and Value Laboratory (owned or controlled by Rabiee or AICTC); Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX); Daniel Frosh (Austria) and International General Resourcing FZE—person and his UAE-based firm allegedly supply Iran’s missile industry.

November 8, 2012
- National Iranian Oil Company; Tehran Gostaresh, company owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Imam Hossein University, owned by IRGC; Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University, owned by IRGC or providing services to it.

December 13, 2012
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davain; Seyed Jaber Safdari of Novin Energy, a designated affiliate of AEOI; Morteza Ahmadi Behazad, provider of services to AEOI (centrifuges); Pouya Control—provides goods and services for uranium enrichment; Iran Pooya—provides materials for manufacture of IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges; Aria Nikan Marine Industry—source of goods for Iranian nuclear program; Amir Hossein Rahimyar—procurer for Iran nuclear program; Mohammad Reza Rezvanianzadeh—involved in various aspects of nuclear program; Faratech—involved in Iran heavy water reactor project; Neda Industrial Group—manufacturer of equipment for Natanz enrichment facility; Tarh O Palayesh—designer of elements of heavy water research reactor; Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran—manufacturer for entities affiliated with the nuclear program.

December 21, 2012
SAD Import Export Company (also designated by U.N. Sanctions Committee a few days earlier for violating Resolution 1747 ban on Iran arms exports, along with Yas Air) for shipping arms and other goods to Syria’s armed forces; Marine Industries Organization—designated for affiliation with Iran Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; Mustafa Esbati, for acting on behalf of Marine Industries; Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group—designated as affiliate of Defense Industries Org.; Doostan International Company—designated for providing services to Iran Aerospace Industries Org, which oversees Iran missile industries.

April 11, 2013
Babak Morteza Zanjani—chairmen of Sorinet Group that Iran uses to finance oil sales abroad; International Safe Oil—provides support to NIOC and NICO; Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers (Dubai) and First Islamic Investment Bank
Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB), for activities on behalf of the Export Development Bank of Iran that was sanctioned on October 22, 2008, (see above). EDBI was sanctioned for providing financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense.

May 31, 2013
Bukovnya AE (Ukraine) for leasing aircraft to Iran Air.

December 12, 2013
Several Iranian firms and persons: Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company; The Exploration and Nuclear Raw Materials Company; Maro Sanat Company; Navid Composite Material Company; Negin Parto Khavar; Neka Novin Officials Iraj Mohammadi Kahvarin and Mahmoud Mohammadi Dayeni; Neka Novin aliases including Kia Nirou; Qods Aviation Industries (operated by IRGC, produces UAVs, paragliders, etc); Iran Aviation Industries Organization; Reza Amidi; Fan Pardazan; Ertebat Gostar Novin

February 6, 2014
Ali Canko (Turkey) and Tiva Sanat Group, for procuring IRGC-Navy fast boats; Advance Electrical and Industrial Technologies (Spain), for procurement for Neka Novin; Ulrich Wipperman and Deutsche Forfait (Germany), and Deutsche Forfait Americas (U.S.) for facilitating oil deals for NIOC.

April 29, 2014
Karl Lee (aka Li Fangwei) and 8 China-based front companies: Sinotech Industry Co. Ltd.; MTTO Industry and Trade Limited; Success Move Ltd.; Sinotech Dalian Carbon and Graphite Manufacturing Corporation; Dalian Zhongchuang Char-White Co., Ltd.; Karat Industry Co., Ltd.; Dalian Zhenghua Maoyi Youxian Gongsi; and Tereal Industry and Trade Ltd.

August 29, 2014 (by both State and Treasury)
By State: Organization of Defensie Innovation and Research (nuclear weapons research); Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (implements nuclear projects including heavy water reactor at Arak); Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars; and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company (latter two are involved in procuring carbon fiber for proscribed aspects of Iran’s nuclear program).

By Treasury: Mohammad Javad and Arman Imanirad (for acting on behalf of Aluminat, which procures aluminum products for Iran’s nuclear program); Nefertiti Shipping (IRISL’s agent in Egypt); Sazeh Morakab (provides services to Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, SHIG, and Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co., HESA); Ali Gholami and Marzieh Bozorg (officials of Sazeh Morakab). SHIG aliases identified: Sahand Aluminum Parts Co and Ardalan Machineries Co.

Iran-Related Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)

July 25, 2007
Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad Shahid), a major Iranian foundation (bonyad)—for providing financial support to Hezbollah and PIJ; Goodwill Charitable Organization, a Martyr’s Foundation office in Dearborn, Michigan; Al Qard Al Hassan—part of Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure (and associated with previously designated Hezbollah entities Husayn al-Shami, Bayt al-Mal, and Youssef Company for Finance and Investment); Qasem Aliq—Hezbollah official, director of Martyr’s Foundation Lebanon branch, and head of Jihad al-Bina, a previously designated Lebanese construction company run by Hezbollah; Ahmad al-Shami—financial liaison between Hezbollah in Lebanon and Martyr’s Foundation chapter in Michigan

October 21, 2007
Qods Force and Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian supported terrorist groups)

January 16, 2009
Al Qaeda Operatives in Iran: Saad bin Laden; Mustafa Hamid; Muhammad Rab’a al-Bahtiyti; Alis Saleh Husain

August 3, 2010
Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi; Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and its director, Hesam Khoshnevis, for supporting Lebanese Hezbollah; Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch, and its director, Ali Zuraik, for providing support to Hezbollah; Razi Musavi, a Syrian based Iranian official allegedly providing support to Hezbollah.

**December 21, 2010**

Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah).

**October 11, 2011**

(For alleged plot against Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.):

Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander); Hamid Abdollahi (Qods force); Abdul Reza Shahlai (Qods Force); Ali Gholam Shakuri (Qods Force); Manssor Arbabsiar (alleged plotter).

**October 12, 2011**

Mahan Air (for transportation services to Qods Force).

**February 16, 2012**

Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS).

**March 27, 2012**

Yas Air (successor to Pars Air); Behineh Air (Iranian trading company); Ali Abbas Usman Jega (Nigerian shipping agent); Qods Force officers: Esmail Ghani, Sayyid Ali Tabatabaei, and Hosein Aghajani.

These entities and persons were sanctioned for weapons shipments to Syria and an October 2011 shipment bound for Gambia, intercepted in Nigeria.

**May 31, 2013**

Ukraine-Mediterranean Airlines (Um Air, Ukraine) for helping Mahan Air and Iran Air conduct illicit activities; Rodrigue Elias Merhej (owner of Um Air); Kyrgyz Trans Avia (KTA, Kyrgyzstan) for leasing aircraft to Mahan Air; Lidia Kim, director of KTA; Sirjanco (UAE) for serving as a front for Mahan Air acquisition of aircraft; Hamid Arabnejad, managing director of Mahan Air.

**February 6, 2014**

Several persons/entities in UAE aiding Mahan Air (see above): Blue Sky Aviation FZE; Avia Trust FZE; Hamidreza Malekouti Pour; Pejman Mahmood Kosrayanifard; and Gholamreza Mahmoudi.

Several IRGC-Qods Force officers or facilitators involved in Iran’s efforts in Afghanistan: Sayyed Kamal Musavi; Alireza Hemmati; Akbar Seyed Alhosseini; and Mahmud Afkhami Rashidi.

One Iran-based Al Qaeda facilitator (supporting movement of Al Qaeda affiliated fighters to Syria): Olimzhon Adkhomovich Sadikov (aka Jafar al-Uzbeki or Jafar Muidinov).

**August 29, 2014**

Meraj Air (for delivering weapons to Syria from Iran); Caspian Air (supports IRGC by transporting personnel and weapons to Syria); Sayyed Jabar Hosseini (manager of Liner Transport Kish which IRGC uses to support terrorist activities outside Iran); Pioneer Logistics (Turkey, helps Mahan Air evade sanctions); Asian Aviation Logistics (Thailand, helps Mahan Air evade sanctions). Pouya Air designated as alias of Yas Air.

**Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation Act or Executive Order 12938**

The designations are under the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) unless specified. These designations expire after two years, unless re-designated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic State Technical University and Glavkosmos, both of Russia</td>
<td>July 30, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Both removed—Baltic on January 29, 2010, and Glavkosmos on March 4, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute (Both removed on May 21, 2010)</td>
<td>January 8, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)</td>
<td>July 4, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery</td>
<td>September 17, 2003, removed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sells to Iran. (Also designated under Executive Order 12938)

13 entities sanctioned including companies from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan.

April 7, 2004

14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad), Russia, Spain, and Ukraine.

September 29, 2004

14 entities, mostly from China, for alleged supplying of Iran’s missile program. Many, such as North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp, have been sanctioned several times previously. Newly sanctioned entities included North Korea’s Paeksan Associated Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma Enterprise Co.

December 2004 and January 2005

9 entities, including those from China (Norinco yet again), India (two chemical companies), and Austria. Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of India (see September 29, 2004) were ended, presumably because of information exonerating him.

December 26, 2005

7 entities. Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms (Rosobornexport and aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban entity (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotecnology).

August 4, 2006 (see below for Rosobornexport removal)

9 entities. Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komma Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); Zibo Chemical, China National Aerotechnology, and China National Electrical (China). Korean Mining and Industrial Development (North Korea) for WMD or advanced weapons sales to Iran (and Syria).

January 2007 (see below for Tula and Rosobornexport removal)

14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. Among the new entities sanctioned for assisting Iran were Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia Company (Singapore); Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); and Arif Durrani (Pakistani national).

April 23, 2007

13 entities: China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC; Korea Mining Development Corp. (North Korea); Korea Taesong Trading Co. (NK); Yolin/Yullin Tech, Inc. (South Korea); Rosobornexport (Russia state arms export agency); Sudan Master Technology; Sudan Technical Center Co; Army Supply Bureau (Syria); R and M International FZCO (UAE); Venezuelan Military Industries Co. (CAVIM). (Rosobornexport removed May 21, 2010.)

October 23, 2008.

16 entities: Belarus: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association; Beltech Export; China: Karl Lee; Dalian Sunny Industries; Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Co.; Xian Junyun Electronic; Iran: Milad Jafari; DIO; IRISL; Qods Force; SAD Import-Export; SBIG; North Korea: Tangun Trading; Syria: Industrial Establishment of Defense; Scientific Studies and Research Center; Venezuela: CAVIM.

May 23, 2011

Mohammad Minai, senior Qods Force member involved in Iraq; Karim Muhsin al-Ghanimi, leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) militia in Iraq; Sayyid Salah Hantush al-Maksusi, senior KH member; and Riyad Jasim al-Hamidawi, Iran based KH member

November 8, 2012

**Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438**

January 8, 2008

Ahmad Forouzandeh, Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite militia fighters; Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. Iran based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq; Isma’il al-Lami (Abu Dura). Shiite militia leader, breakaway from Sadr Mahdi Army, alleged to have committed mass kidnappings and planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians; Mishan al-Jabburi. Financier of Sunni insurgents, owner of pro-insurgent Al-Zawra...
television, now banned; Al Zawra Television Station

July 2, 2009
Khata’ib Hezbollah (pro-Iranian Mahdi splinter group); Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis

Iranians Sanctioned Under September 29, 2010, Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers

September 29, 2010
1. IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari
2. Minister of Interior at time of June 2009 elections Sadeq Mahsouli
3. Minister of Intelligence at time of elections Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei
4. Tehran Prosecutor General at time of elections Saeed Mortazavi
5. Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi
6. Former Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar
7. Deputy National Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan
8. Basij (security militia) Commander at time of elections Hossein Taeb

February 23, 2011
10. Basij forces commander (since October 2009) Mohammad Reza Naqdi (was head of Basij intelligence during post 2009 election crackdown)

June 9, 2011
11. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
12. Basij Resistance Force
13. Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)
14. LEF Commander Ismail Ahmad Moghadam

February 16, 2012
15. Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)

May 30, 2013
16. Ashgar Mir-Hejazi for human rights abuses on/after June 12, 2009, and for providing material support to the IRGC and MOIS.

December 30, 2014
Abyssec, for training the IRGC in cyber tradecraft and supporting its development of offensive information operations capabilities

Iranians Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 (April 29, 2011) for Repression of the Syrian People

April 29, 2011
Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force Commander)
Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Qods Force operations and training)

May 18, 2011
Same as above

Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY)
- Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); IRGC (Guard Cyber Defense Command); Law Enforcement Forces; Datak Telecom

Entitites Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions Evaders
Designations on February 6, 2014 (persons or firms that facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of persons subject to U.S. sanctions on Iran)

Three persons based in the Republic of Georgia: Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and Houshang Farsoudeh; and eight firms owned or controlled by the three: Caucasus Energy (Georgia); Orchidea Gulf Trading (UAE and/or Turkey); Georgian Business Development (Georgia and/or UAE); Great Business Deals (Georgia and/or UAE); KSN Foundation (Lichtenstein); New York General Trading (UAE); New York Money Exchange (UAE and/or Georgia); and European Oil Traders (Switzerland).

Entities Names as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order 13599

July 12, 2012:

Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (Switzerland); Hong Kong Intertrade Company (Hong Kong); Noor Energy (Malaysia); Petro Energy Intertrade (Dubai, UAE) (all four named as front companies for NIOV, Naftiran Intertrade Company, Ltd (NICO), or NICO Sari)

20 Iranian financial institutions (names not released but available from Treasury Dept.)

58 vessels of National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC)

March 14, 2013:

Dimitris Cambis and several affiliated firms named in Treasury Dept. press release.

May 9, 2013:

Sambouk Shipping FZC, which is tied to Dr. Dimitris Cambis and his network of front companies.

May 31, 2013:

Eight petrochemicals companies were designated as Iranian government entities, including Bandar Imam; Bou Ali Sina; Mobin; Nouri; Pars; Shahid Tondgooyan; Shazand; and Tabriz.

September 6, 2013:

Six individuals including Seyed Nasser Mohammad Seyyedi, director of Sima General Trading who is also associated with NIOC and NICO. The other 5 persons sanctioned manage firms associated with NIOC and NICO.

Four businesses used by Seyyedi to assist NIOC and NICO front companies. Three are based in UAE: AA Energy FZCO; Petro Royal FZE; and KASB International LLC. The other firm is Swiss Management Services Sari.

August 29, 2014

Five Iranian banks: Khavarmianeh Bank, Ghavamin Bank, Gharzoilhasaneh Bank, Kish International Bank, and Kafolatbank (Tajikistan).

Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 (For Oil and Petrochemical Purchases from Iran and Precious Metal Transactions with Iran)

May 31, 2013:

Jam Petrochemical Company (for purchasing petrochemical products from Iran); Niksima Food and Beverage JLT (for receiving payments on behalf of Jam Petrochemical)

August 29, 2014:

Asia Bank (for delivering from Moscow to Tehran of $13 million in U.S. bank notes paid to representatives of the Iranian government).

December 30, 2014

Five individuals and one company for helping Iran acquire U.S. banknotes: Hossein Zeidi, Seyed Kamal Yasini, Azizullah Qulandary, Asadollah Seifi , Teymour Ameri, and Belfast General Trading.

Anahita Nasirbeik – Asia Bank official (see above)
Iran Sanctions

13628 (Exec. order pursuant to Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act)

November 8, 2012:
Ali Fazli, deputy commander of the Basij; Reza Taghipour, Minister of Communications and Information Technology; LEF Commander Moghaddam (see above); Center to Investigate Organized Crime (established by the IRGC to protect the government from cyber attacks; Press Supervisory Board, established in 1986 to issue licenses to publications and oversee news agencies; Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Rasool Jalili, active in assisting the government’s Internet censorship activities; Anm Afzar Goster-e-Sharif, company owned by Jalili, above, to provide web monitoring and censorship gear; PekyAsa, another company owned by Jalili, to develop telecom software.

February 6, 2013:
- Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatollah Zarghami (director and head of IRIB); Iranian Cyber Police (filters websites and hacks email accounts of political activists); Communications Regulatory Authority (filters Internet content); Iran Electronics Industries (producer of electronic systems and products including those for jamming, eavesdropping)

May 30, 2013:
Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content for engaging in censorship activities on/after June 12, 2009; Ofogh Saberin Engineering Development Company for providing services to the IRGC and Ministry of Communications to override Western satellite communications.

May 23, 2014:
Morteza Tamaddon for cutting mobile phone communications and harassing opposition leaders Mir Hosein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi when Tamaddon was governor-general of Tehran Province in 2009.

December 30, 2014
Douran Software Technologies, for acting on behalf of the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content (see above).

Entities Designated Pursuant to Executive Order 13645

December 12, 2012 (all for providing material support to NITC)
Mid Oil Asia (Singapore); Singa Tankers (Singapore); Sigiirya Maritime (Philippines); Ferland Company Limited (previously designated under other E.O.); Vitaly Sokolenko (general manager of Ferland)

April 29, 2014, (for connections to deceptive oil dealings for Iran)
Saeed Al Aqili (co-owner of Al Aqili Group LLC); Al Aqili Group LLC; Anwar Kamal Nizami (Dubai-based Pakistani facilitator, manages bank relations for affiliates of Al Aqili and Al Aqili Group. Also works for Sima General Trading, sanctioned under E.O. 13599)

August 29, 2014
Faylaca Petroleum (for obscuring the origin of Iranian sales of gas condensates); Lissome Marine Services LLC and six of its vessels (for supporting NITC with ship-to-ship transfers); Abdelhak Kaddouri (manages Iranian front companies on behalf of NICO); Mussafer Polat (for obscuring origin of Iran’s gas condensate sales); Seyyedeh Hanje Seyed Nasser Seyyedi (managing director of Faylaca).

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