Iran Sanctions

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Summary

There appears to be a growing international consensus to adopt progressively strict economic sanctions against Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. In January 2011, Secretary of State Clinton claimed that sanctions have accomplished a core objective of slowing Iran’s nuclear program. However, nuclear talks in December 2010 and in January 2011 made virtually no progress, suggesting that Iran’s leaders do not feel sufficiently pressured by sanctions to offer major concessions to obtain a nuclear deal.

Because so many major economic powers have imposed sanctions on Iran, the sanctions are, by all accounts, having a growing effect on Iran’s economy. The sanctions are reinforcing the effects of Iran’s economic mismanagement and key bottlenecks. Among other indicators, there have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting the Iranian market. Iran’s oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.9 million barrels per day, from over 4.1 million barrels per day several years ago, although Iran now has small natural gas exports that it did not have before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996.

The United States and its allies appear to agree that sanctions should continue to target Iran’s energy sector and should try to isolate Iran from the international financial system. The energy sector provides about 80% of government revenues. Iran’s large trading community depends on financing to buy goods from the West and sell them inside Iran. Using the authorities of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010, measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries target those sectors. These national measures complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to pressure Iran. Possibly in an effort to accomplish the separate objective of promoting the cause of the domestic opposition in Iran, the Obama Administration, Congress, and allied governments are increasingly emphasizing measures that would sanction Iranian officials who are human rights abusers and facilitate the democracy movement’s access to information.

U.S. efforts to curb international energy investment in Iran’s energy sector began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), a U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that conduct certain business with Iran’s energy sector. ISA represented a U.S. effort to persuade foreign firms to choose between the Iranian market and the much larger U.S. and other developed markets. In the 111th Congress, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) expanded ISA significantly to try to restrict Iran’s ability to make or import gasoline, for which Iran depends heavily on imports. Sales to Iran of gasoline have fallen dramatically since CISADA was enacted. CISADA also adds a broad range of other measures further restricting the already limited amount of U.S. trade with Iran and restricting some high technology trade with countries that allow WMD-useful technology to reach Iran. Legislation to enhance the effects of CISADA has been introduced in the 112th Congress, and additional legislative proposals are likely. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Overview

The Obama Administration’s policy approach toward Iran has contrasted with the Bush Administration’s by attempting to couple the imposition of sanctions to a consistent, direct U.S. effort to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue. That approach was not initially altered because of the Iranian dispute over its June 12, 2009, elections. However, with 2009 negotiations yielding no firm Iranian agreement to compromise, since early 2010 the Administration and Congress have focused on achieving adoption of and implementing additional U.S., U.N., and allied country sanctions whose cumulative effect would be to compel it to accept a nuclear bargain.

U.N. sanctions on Iran (the latest of which are imposed by Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010) are a relatively recent (post-2006) development. U.S. sanctions, on the other hand, have been a major feature of U.S. Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Many of the U.S. sanctions overlap each other as well as the several U.N. sanctions now in place. The Obama Administration and Congress—including in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)—have also begun to alter some U.S. laws and regulations to help Iran’s domestic opposition that has seethed since the Iranian presidential election.

CISADA significantly expanded the authorities of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) by making sanctionable sales to Iran of gasoline and related equipment and services. For at least 10 years after it was enacted, ISA had caused differences of opinion between the United States and its European allies because it mandates U.S. imposition of sanctions on foreign firms. Successive Administrations have sought to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not hamper cooperation with key international partners whose support is needed to adopt stricter international sanctions.

Sanctions Against Foreign Firms That Deal With Iran’s Energy Sector: The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) is one among many U.S. sanctions in place against Iran. Since its first enactment, it has attracted substantial attention because it is an “extra-territorial sanction”—it authorizes U.S. penalties against foreign firms, many of which are incorporated in countries that are U.S. allies. When it was first enacted in 1996, Congress and the Clinton Administration saw ISA as a potential mechanism to compel U.S. allies to join the United States in enacting trade sanctions against Iran. American firms are separately restricted from trading with or investing in Iran under separate U.S. executive measures, as discussed below. As noted, a law enacted in the 111th Congress (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) amended ISA to try to curtail additional types of activity, such as selling gasoline and gasoline production-related equipment and services to Iran, and to restrict international banking relationships with Iran (among many provisions).

Legislative History and Provisions

Originally called the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), ISA was enacted to try to deny Iran the resources to further its nuclear program and to support terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran’s petroleum sector generates about 20% of Iran’s GDP (which is about $870 billion), and 80% of its government revenue. Iran’s oil sector is
as old as the petroleum industry itself (early 20th century), and Iran’s onshore oil fields and oil industry infrastructure are far past peak production and in need of substantial investment. Its large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded only by Russia) were virtually undeveloped when ISA was first enacted. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third-largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada.

The opportunity for the United States to try to harm Iran’s energy sector came in November 1995, when Iran opened the sector to foreign investment. To accommodate its insistence on retaining control of its national resources, Iran used a “buy-back” investment program in which foreign firms gradually recoup their investments as oil and gas is discovered and then produced. With input from the Administration, on September 8, 1995, Senator Alfonse D’Amato introduced the “Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act” to sanction foreign firms’ exports to Iran of energy technology. A revised version instead sanctioning investment in Iran’s energy sector passed the Senate on December 18, 1995 (voice vote). On December 20, 1995, the Senate passed a version applying the provisions to Libya, which was refusing to yield for trial the two intelligence agents suspected in the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103. The House passed H.R. 3107, on June 19, 1996 (415-0), and then concurred on a Senate version adopted on July 16, 1996 (unanimous consent). The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was signed on August 5, 1996 (P.L. 104-172).

**Key "Triggers"**

ISA consists of a number of “triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions. When triggered, ISA provides a number of different sanctions that the President could impose that would harm a foreign firm’s business opportunities in the United States. ISA does not, and probably could not practically, compel any foreign government to take action against one of its firms.

The pre-2010 version of ISA requires the President to sanction companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment”1 of more than $20 million2 in one year in Iran’s energy sector3, or that sell to Iran weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology or “destabilizing numbers and types” of advanced conventional weapons.4

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1 The definition of “investment” in ISA (Section 14 (9)) includes not only equity and royalty arrangements (including additions to existing investment, as added by P.L. 107-24) but any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran. As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures.

2 Under Section 4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. However, P.L. 111-195 explicit sets the threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and sanctionable activity included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).

3 The definition of energy sector had included oil and natural gas, but now, as a consequence of the enactment of P.L. 111-195, also includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG.

4 This latter “trigger” was added by P.L. 109-293.
ISA primarily targets foreign firms, because American firms are already prohibited from investing in Iran under the 1995 trade and investment ban discussed earlier. As shown in the table below, P.L. 111-195 added new triggers: selling to Iran (over specified threshold amounts) refined petroleum (gasoline, aviation fuel, and other fuels included in the definitions); and selling equipment or services for Iran to expand its own ability to produce refined petroleum. (Fuel oil, a petroleum by-product which is reportedly being sold to Iran by exporters in the Kurdish region of Iraq, is not included in the definition of refined petroleum.)

Requirement and Time Frame to Investigate Violations

In the original version of ISA, there was no time frame for the Administration to determine that a firm has violated ISA's provisions. Some might argue that the amendments of P.L. 111-195 still do not set a binding determination deadline, although the parameters are narrowed significantly. Earlier, P.L. 109-293, the “Iran Freedom Support Act” (signed September 30, 2006) amended ISA by calling for, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination (there is no time limit in the original law). 5

In restricting the Administration’s ability to choose not to act on information about potential violations, CISADA (P.L. 111-195), Section 102(g)(5), made mandatory that the Administration begin an investigation of potential ISA violations when there is “credible information” about a potential violation. The same section of CISADA made mandatory the 180 day time limit for a determination of violation (with the exception that the mandatory investigations and time limit go into effect one year after enactment, with respect to gasoline related sales to Iran). However, there is still lack of precision and potential differences of opinion over what constitutes “credible information” that an investment or sanctionable sale has been undertaken.

Earlier versions of legislation (H.R. 282, S. 333) that ultimately became P.L. 109-293 contained ISA amendment proposals that were viewed by the Bush Administration as too inflexible and restrictive, and potentially harmful to U.S. relations with its allies. These provisions included setting a mandatory 90-day time limit for the Administration to determine whether an investment is a violation; cutting U.S. foreign assistance to countries whose companies violate ISA; and applying the U.S.-Iran trade ban to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.

Available Sanctions Under ISA

Once a firm is determined to be a violator, the original version of ISA required the imposition of two of a menu of six sanctions on that firm. CISADA added three new possible sanctions and requires the imposition of at least three out of the nine against violators. The nine available sanctions against the sanctioned entity that the President can select from (Section 6) include:

1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity;
2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity;

5 Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs.
3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity;

4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction);

5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity;

6. restriction on imports from the violating entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701);

7. prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity;

8. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution;

9. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, or trading any U.S.-based property.

New Mandatory ISA Sanction Imposed by CISADA: Prohibition on Contracts With the U.S. Government

CISADA (Section 102(b)) added a provision to further incent foreign companies to comply with ISA. It requires companies, as a condition of obtaining a U.S. government contract, to certify to the relevant U.S. government agency, that the firm is not violating ISA, as amended. A contract may be terminated—and further penalties imposed—if it is determined that the company’s certification of compliance was false. CISADA requires a revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (within 90 days of CISADA enactment on July 1, 2010) to reflect this requirement. This requirement has been imposed in regulations, as per an interim rule issued on September 29, 2010. H.R. 6296, introduced September 29, 2010, in the 111th Congress, would have authorized state and local governments to similarly ban such contracts.

Waivers, Exemptions, and Termination Authority

The President has had the authority under ISA to waive sanctions if he certifies that doing so is important to the U.S. national interest (Section 9(c)). CISADA (Section 102(c)), changed the 9(c) ISA waiver standard to “necessary” to the national interest. Under the original version of ISA, there was also waiver authority (Section 4(c)) if the parent country of the violating firm joined a sanctions regime against Iran, but this waiver provision was changed by P.L. 109-293 to allow for a waiver determination based on U.S. vital national security interests. The Section 4(c) waiver was altered by CISADA to provide for a six month (extendable) waiver if doing so is vital to the national interest and if the parent country of the violating entity is “closely cooperating” with U.S. efforts against Iran’s WMD and advanced conventional weapons program. The criteria of “closely cooperating” are defined in the conference report, with primary focus on implementing all U.N. sanctions against Iran. However, it is not clear why an Administration would use a Section 4 waiver rather than a Section 9 waiver, although it could be argued that using a Section 4 waiver would support U.S. diplomacy with the parent country of the offending entity.

ISA (Section 5(f)) also contains several exceptions such that the President is not required to impose sanctions that prevent procurement of defense articles and services under existing contracts, in cases where a firm is the sole source supplier of a particular defense article or
service. The President also is not required to prevent procurement or importation of essential spare parts or component parts.

In the 110th Congress, several bills contained provisions that would have further amended ISA, but they were not adopted. H.R. 1400, which passed the House on September 25, 2007 (397-16), would have removed the Administration’s ability to waive ISA sanctions under Section 9(c), national interest grounds, but it would not have imposed on the Administration a time limit to determine whether a project is sanctionable.

“Special Rule” Exempting Firms That End Their Business With Iran

CISADA (Section 102(g)(5) also amended ISA to provide a means—a so-called “special rule”—for firms to avoid any possibility of U.S. sanctions by pledging to verifiably end their business with Iran and to forgo any sanctionable business with Iran in the future. Under the special rule, the Administration is not required to make a determination of sanctionability against a firm that makes such pledges. The special rule was invoked on September 30, 2010, and again on November 17, 2010.

Termination Requirements

In its entirety, ISA application to Iran would terminate if Iran is determined by the Administration to have ceased its efforts to acquire WMD; is removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and no longer “poses a significant threat” to U.S. national security and U.S. allies. The amendments to ISA made by P.L. 111-195 would terminate if the first two of these criteria are met.

ISA Sunset

ISA was to sunset on August 5, 2001, in a climate of lessening tensions with Iran (and Libya). During 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration had eased the trade ban on Iran somewhat to try to engage the relatively moderate Iranian President Mohammad Khatemi. However, some maintained that Iran would view its expiration as a concession, and renewal legislation was enacted (P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001). This law required an Administration report on ISA’s effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of enactment; that report was submitted to Congress in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be repealed. ISA was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2011 (as provided by P.L. 109-293). The sunset is now December 31, 2016, as provided for in CISADA).

Interpretations and Implementation

Traditionally reticent to impose economic sanctions, the European Union opposed ISA, when it was first enacted, as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and filed a formal complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO). In April 1997, the United States and the EU agreed to

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6 This latter termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293. This law also removed Libya from the act, although application to Libya effectively terminated when the President determined on April 23, 2004, that Libya had fulfilled the requirements of all U.N. resolutions on Pan Am 103.
avoid a trade confrontation over ISA and a separate Cuba sanctions law (P.L. 104-114). The agreement involved the dropping of the WTO complaint and the May 18, 1998, decision by the Clinton Administration to waive ISA sanctions (“national interest”—Section 9c—waiver) on the first project determined to be in violation. That project was a $2 billion contract, signed in September 1997, for Total SA of France and its partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia, to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25+ phase South Pars gas field. The EU, for its part, pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Then-Secretary of State Albright, in a statement, indicated that similar future such projects by EU firms in Iran would not be sanctioned, provided overall EU cooperation against Iranian terrorism and proliferation continued. (The EU sanctions against Iran, announced July 27, 2010, might render this understanding moot because the EU sanctions ban EU investment in and supplies of equipment and services to Iran’s energy sector.)

**September 30, 2010, and Subsequent ISA Sanctions Determinations**

Since the Total/Petronas/Gazprom project in 1998, no projects were determined as violations of ISA until a State Department announcement of September 30, 2010. Prior to the passage of CISADA, several Members of Congress questioned why no penalties had been imposed for violations of ISA. State Department reports to Congress on ISA, required every six months, have routinely stated that U.S. diplomats raise U.S. policy concerns about Iran with investing companies and their parent countries. However, these reports have not specifically stated which foreign companies, if any, were being investigated for ISA violations. No publication of such deals has been placed in the Federal Register, as required by Section 5e of ISA. In an effort to address the congressional criticism, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns testified on July 9, 2008 (House Foreign Affairs Committee), that the Statoil project (listed in Table 3) was under review for ISA sanctions. Statoil is incorporated in Norway, which is not an EU member and it would therefore not fall under the 1998 U.S.-EU agreement discussed above.

Possibly in response to the pending CISADA legislation, and to an October 2009 letter signed by 50 Members of Congress referencing the CRS table below, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 28, 2009, that the Obama Administration would review investments in Iran for violations of ISA. Feltman testified that the preliminary review would be completed within 45 days (by December 11, 2009) to determine which projects, if any, require further investigation. He testified that some announced projects were for political purposes and did not result in actual investment.

On February 25, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the State Department’s preliminary review was completed in early February and that some of the cases reviewed “deserve[] more consideration” and were undergoing additional scrutiny. The preliminary review, according to the testimony, was conducted, in part, through State Department officials’ contacts with their counterpart officials abroad and corporation officials. The additional investigations of problematic investments would involve the intelligence

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7 Dollar figures for investments in Iran represent public estimates of the amounts investing firms are expected to spend over the life of a project, which might in some cases be several decades.

8 Text of announcement of waiver decision by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, containing expectation of similar waivers in the future. http://www.parstimes.com/law/albright_southpars.html.

9 Much of this section is derived from a meeting between the CRS author and officials of the State Department’s Economics Bureau, which is tasked with the referenced review of investment projects. November 24, 2009.
community, according to Secretary Clinton. State Department officials told CRS in November 2009 that any projects that the State Department plan was to complete the additional investigation and determine violations within 180 days of the completion of the preliminary review. (The 180-day time frame was, according to the Department officials, consistent with the Iran Freedom Support Act amendments to ISA discussed above, even though the 180 day time frame was not a mandatory deadline before CISADA was adopted.) A final determination of sanctionability would therefore, according to the Administration, be issued in early August 2010 (180 days from “early February). On June 22, 2010, Assistant Secretary of State William Burns testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there were “less than 10” cases of possible ISA violations, and that Secretary of State Clinton is consulting with “other agencies” about a sanctionability determination.

**September 30, 2010, and November 17, 2010, Determinations**

Several determinations of sanctionability were made on September 30, 2010. That day, a Swiss-based Iranian-owned oil trading company—Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO)—became the first firm to be sanctioned under ISA. The three penalties selected were a ban on Ex-Im Bank credits; a denial of dual use export licensing to the firm; and a denial of bank loans exceeding $10 million. The mandatory ban on receiving U.S. government contracts applies as well.

That same day, following a months-long Administration review discussed later, four major energy sector investing companies were deemed eligible to avoid sanctions, under the ISA “special rule,” by pledging to end their business in Iran. They are:

- Total of France,
- Statoil of Norway,
- ENI of Italy, and
- Royal Dutch Shell of Britain and the Netherlands.

- Inpex of Japan was exempted from sanctions under the special rule on November 17, 2010, according to a State Department announcement. The firm announced on October 15, 2010, that it is shedding its stake in the Azadegan development project shown in the table.

There remained some difference of opinion on the Administration invocation of the special rule, as evident at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 1, 2010. At the hearing, Under Secretary Burns stated that companies exempted under the special rule had pledged to end their existing investments in Iran “in the very near future.” Some Members of Congress questioned the imprecision of that time frame and others question the process for determining whether a firm is adhering to its pledge to pursue no future business in Iran’s energy sector. Observers provided reasons for why the energy firms insisted they needed time to wind down their investments in Iran—under the buy-back program used for investments in Iran, the energy firms are paid back their investment over time, making it highly costly for them to suddenly end operations in Iran.

**March 29, 2011, Sanctions Determination**

As shown in Table 3 below, several additional foreign investment agreements have been agreed with Iran since the 1998 Total consortium waiver, although some have stalled, not reached final
agreement, or may not have resulted in actual production. Some of the firms listed as investors remained under Administration scrutiny, and the Administration stated that determinations will be made within 180 days (by April 1, 2011).

On March 29, 2011, with the 180 deadline approaching, the State Department announced that one additional firm would be sanctioned under ISA—Belarusneft, a subsidiary of the Belarus government owned Belneftekhim—for a $500 million contract with Naftiran (the company sanctioned in September 2010) to develop the Jofeir oil field discussed in Table 3. Other subsidiaries of Belneftekhim were sanctioned in 2007 under Executive Order 13405 related to U.S. policy on Belarus. The three ISA sanctions imposed on March 29, 2011, were denial of Exim Bank financing, denial of U.S. export licenses, and denial of U.S. loans above $10 million.

The Administration announcement did not indicate that some of the other investments in Table 3, or other investments, for which no ISA determinations have been made to date, are still under investigation.

**Non-Application to Crude Oil or Natural Gas Purchases from Iran or to Sales of Most Energy Equipment or Services**

Purchases of oil or natural gas from Iran are generally considered not to constitute violations of ISA, because ISA sanctions investment in Iran’s energy sector and sales to Iran of gasoline or gasoline-related services or equipment. Some of the deals listed in the chart later in this report involve combinations of investment and purchase. Nor does ISA sanction sales to Iran of equipment that Iran could use to explore or extract its own oil or gas resources, unless such sales are structured to provide ongoing profits or royalties (and therefore meet the definition of investments as provided in ISA).10 For example, selling Iran an oil or gas drill rig or motors or other gear that Iran will use to drill for oil or gas would not appear to be sanctionable, unless the sale is structured to provide the seller ongoing profits or royalties. In addition, as noted, CISADA made sanctionable sales of equipment to Iran to enhance or expand its oil refineries, or equipment with which Iran could import gasoline (such as tankers), and of equipment that Iran could use to construct an energy pipeline.

Several significant examples of major purchases of Iran oil and gas resources have occurred in recent years. In March 2008, Switzerland’s EGL utility agreed to buy 194 trillion cubic feet per year of Iranian gas for 25 years, through a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to be built by 2010, a deal valued at over $15 billion. The United States criticized the deal as sending the “wrong message” to Iran. However, as testified by Under Secretary of State Burns on July 9, 2008, the deal appears to involve only purchase of Iranian gas, not exploration, and would likely not be considered an ISA violation. In August 2008, Germany’s Steiner-Prematechnik-Gastec Co. agreed to apply its method of turning gas into liquid fuel at three Iranian plants.

Official credit guarantee agencies are not considered sanctionable entities under ISA. In the 110th Congress, several bills—including S. 970, S. 3227, S. 3445, H.R. 957 (passed the House on July 31, 2007), and H.R. 7112 (which passed the House on September 26, 2008)—would have expanded the definition of sanctionable entities to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes, and to financial institutions and insurers generally.

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10 Prior to CISADA, the definition of investment in ISA specifically exempted sales of equipment or services under that definition. CISADA omitted that exclusion.
Some versions of CISADA would have made these entities sanctionable but these provisions were not included in the final law, probably out of concern for alienating U.S. allies in Europe.

**Table 1. Major Energy Buyers From Iran (2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (in millions of U.S. dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>309.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>372.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>182.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>964.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>214.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>21,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>843.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>127.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>174.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted by CRS, Susan Chesser, from the World Trade Atlas.

**Application to Energy Pipelines**

As noted earlier, ISA’s definition of sanctionable “investment”—which specifies investment in Iran’s petroleum resources, defined as petroleum and natural gas—has been interpreted by successive administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. That interpretation was reinforced by the amendments to ISA in P.L. 111-195, which include in the definition of petroleum resources “products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied natural gas.” The Clinton and Bush Administrations used the threat of ISA sanctions to deter oil routes involving Iran and thereby successfully promoted an alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan). The route became operational in 2005.
Only a few significant pipelines involving Iran have been constructed in recent years—a line built in 1997 to carry natural gas from Iran to Turkey. Each country constructed the pipeline on its side of their border. At the time the project was under construction, State Department testimony stated that Turkey would be importing gas originating in Turkmenistan, not Iran, under a swap arrangement. That was one reason given for why the State Department did not determine that the project was sanctionable under ISA. However, many believe the decision not to sanction the pipeline was because the line was viewed as crucial to Turkey, a key U.S. ally. That explanation was reinforced when direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001, and no determination of sanctionability has been made. In May 2009, Iran and Armenia inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by Gazprom of Russia. No determination of sanctionability has been announced.

As shown in Table 3, in July 2007, a preliminary agreement was reached to build a second Iran-Turkey pipeline, through which Iranian gas would also flow to Europe. That agreement was not finalized during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008 because of Turkish commercial concerns, but the deal reportedly remains under discussion. On February 23, 2009, Iranian newspapers said Iran had formed a joint venture with a Turkish firm to export 35 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Europe; 50% of the venture would be owned by the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC).

Iran and Kuwait have held talks on the construction of a 350-mile pipeline that would bring Iranian gas to Kuwait. The two sides have apparently reached agreement on volumes (8.5 million cubic meters of gas would go to Kuwait each day) but not on price. There are also discussions reported between Iran and Iraq on constructing pipelines to facilitate oil and gas swaps between the two, but no firm movement on these projects is evident.

**Iran-India Pipeline**

Another pending pipeline project would carry Iranian gas, by pipeline, to Pakistan. India had been a part of the $7 billion project, which would take about three years to complete, but India was reported in June 2010 to be largely out of the project. India did not sign a memorandum between Iran and Pakistan finalizing the deal on June 12, 2010. India reportedly has been concerned about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be officially transferred to India, pricing of the gas, tariffs, and the source in Iran of the gas to be sold.

During the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Rice on several occasions “expressed U.S. concern” about the pipeline deal or called it “unacceptable.” Possibly contributing to India’s hesitancy to move forward, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the Administration Special Representative on Pakistan and Afghanistan, during 2010 trips to Pakistan, raised the possibility that the project could be sanctioned if it is undertaken, citing enactment of CISADA. Other steps taken by India in late 2010 to prevent some banking transactions with Iran, discussed later, could suggest that India is now cautious about any expansion of energy or other commercial relations with Iran. Previously, the threat of imposition of U.S. sanctions had not dissuaded Indian firms from taking some equity stakes in various Iranian energy projects, as shown in Table 3 below.

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India may envision an alternative to the pipeline project, as a means of tapping into Iran’s vast gas resources. During high-level economic talks in early July 2010, Iranian and Indian officials reportedly raised the issue of constructing an underwater natural gas pipeline, which would avoid going through Pakistani territory. However, such a route would presumably be much more expensive to construct than would be an overland route.

**European Gas Pipeline Routes**

Iran also is attempting to position itself as a gas exporter to Europe. A potential project involving Iran is the Nabucco pipeline project, which would transport Iranian gas to western Europe. Iran, Turkey, and Austria reportedly have negotiated on that project. The Bush Administration did not support Iran’s participation in the project, and the Obama Administration apparently takes the same view, even though the project might make Europe less dependent on Russian gas supplies. Iran’s Energy Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari said on April 2, 2009, that Iran is considering negotiating a gas export route—the “Persian Pipeline”—that would send gas to Europe via Iraq, Syria, and the Mediterranean Sea.

**Application to Iranian Firms or the Revolutionary Guard**

Although ISA is widely understood to apply to firms around the world that reach an investment agreement with Iran, the provisions could also be applied to Iranian firms and entities subordinate to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is supervised by the Oil Ministry. The firm that was sanctioned, Naftiran Interrade Company (NICO), is one such entity; it is a subsidiary of NIOC. However, such entities, including Naftiran, do not do business in the United States and would not likely be harmed by any of the penalties that could be imposed under ISA. Some of the other major components of NIOC are:

- The Iranian Offshore Oil Company;
- The National Iranian Gas Export Co.;
- National Iranian Tanker Company; and
- Petroleum Engineering and Development Co.

Actual construction and work is largely done through a series of contractors. Some of them, such as Khatam ol-Anbia and Oriental Kish, have been identified by the U.S. government as controlled by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and have been sanctioned under various executive orders, discussed below. The relationship of other Iranian contractors to the Guard, if any, is unclear. Some of the Iranian contractor firms include Pasargad Oil Co, Zagros Petrochem. Co, Sazeh Consultants, Qeshm Energy, Sadid Industrial Group, and others.

A provision of H.R. 6296 in the 111th Congress, mentioned above, would extend ISA sanctionability to any energy project conducted with NIOC, anywhere in the world.

**Application to Liquefied Natural Gas**

The original version of ISA did not apply to the development of liquefied natural gas. Iran has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. However, CISADA, specifically includes LNG in the definition
of petroleum resources and therefore makes investment in LNG (or supply of LNG tankers or pipelines) sanctionable.

**CISADA’s Application of ISA to Gasoline Sales/Legislative History**

ISA, as initially constituted, had limited applications to Iran’s gasoline dependency. Selling Iran equipment with which it can build or expand its refineries using its own construction capabilities did not appear to constitute “investment” under the previous definition of ISA and sales to Iran of gasoline were not sanctionable either. However, taking responsibility for constructing oil refineries or petrochemical plants in Iran has always constituted sanctionable projects under ISA because ISA's definition of investment includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran.” (Table 3 provides some information on openly announced contracts to upgrade or refurbish Iranian oil refineries.)

Nor did ISA clearly apply to Iranian investments in oil refineries in several other countries, such as Iranian investment to help build five oil refineries in Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and in Syria, reported in June 2007, would have constituted “investment” under ISA. However, a provision of H.R. 6296, introduced September 29, 2010, would make sanctionable any joint project with NIOC, anywhere in the world.

Many in the 111th Congress took exception to the limited ability of ISA to take advantage of Iran’s gasoline dependency. Prior to CISADA enactment, Iran was dependent on gasoline imports to meet about 40% of its gasoline needs. Even before enactment of CISADA, Iran had been trying to reduce that dependence by announcing plans to build or expand, possibly with foreign investment, at least eight refineries. There have been a relatively limited group of major gasoline suppliers to Iran, and many in Congress believed that trying to stop such sells could put economic pressure on Iran’s leaders. The ideas that became the core of CISADA were introduced as legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2880 would have made sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources a violation of ISA.

In the 111th Congress, a few initiatives were adopted prior to CSIDA. Using U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with products from firms that sell over $1 million worth of gasoline to Iran is prevented by the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriation (H.R. 3183, P.L. 111-85, signed October 28, 2009). A provision of the FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) would deny Ex-Im Bank credits to any firm that sells gasoline to Iran, provides equipment to Iran that it can use to expand its oil refinery capabilities, or performs gasoline production projects in Iran. The Senate version of an FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) would prohibit Defense Department contracts for companies that sell gasoline to Iran or otherwise violate ISA; this provision would seem to be redundant with a provision of CSIDA, which is now law.

In the past, some threats to sanction foreign gasoline sellers to Iran have deterred sales to Iran. The Reliance Industries Ltd. of India decision to cease new sales of refined gasoline to Iran (as of December 31, 2008), mentioned above, came after several Members of Congress urged the Ex-Im Bank of the United States to suspend assistance to Reliance, on the grounds that it was assisting Iran's economy with the gas sales. The Ex-Im Bank, in August 2008, had extended a total of $900 million in financing guarantees to Reliance to help it expand.
**CISADA Legislative History**

In April 2009, several bills were introduced—H.R. 2194, S. 908, H.R. 1208, and H.R. 1985—that would amend ISA to make sanctionable efforts by foreign firms to supply refined gasoline to Iran or to supply equipment to Iran that could be used by Iran to expand or construct oil refineries. H.R. 2194 and S. 908 were both titled the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009 (IRPSA). H.R. 2194 passed the House on December 15, 2009, by a vote of 412-12, with four others voting “present” and six others not voting.

A bill in the Senate, the “Dodd-Shelby Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act,” (S. 2799), was reported to the full Senate by the Senate Banking Committee on November 19, 2009, and passed the Senate, by voice vote, on January 28, 2010. It was adopted by the Senate under unanimous consent as a substitute amendment to H.R. 2194 on March 11, 2010, setting up conference action on the two versions of H.R. 2194. The Senate bill contained very similar provisions of the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, but, as discussed in Table 2 below, added provisions affecting U.S.-Iran trade and other issues.

A public meeting of the House-Senate conference, chaired by Representative Berman and Senator Dodd, was held on April 28, 2010. Obama Administration officials were said to be concerned by some provisions of H.R. 2194 because of the legislation’s potential to weaken allied unity on Iran. The Administration sought successfully to persuade Members to delay passage of until a new U.N. sanctions resolution was adopted—for fear that some P5+1 countries might refuse to support the U.N. resolution if there is a chance their firms would be sanctioned by a new U.S. law. The U.N. Resolution was adopted on June 9, 2010. A conference report on H.R. 2194 was agreed on June 22, 2010, and was submitted on June 23, 2010. On June 24, 2010, the Senate passed it 99-0, and the House passed it 408-8, with one voting “present.” President Obama welcomed the passage and signed it into law on July 1, 2010.

As widely predicted, and as shown in Table 2 below, the final version contained many of the extensive provisions of the Senate version, and some of the efforts to compel sanctions represented in the House version. The Administration reportedly insisted that any agreed bill automatically exempt from sanctions firms of countries that are cooperating against the Iranian nuclear program. That concern was not directly met in the final version, although, as noted, the final law allows for waivers, delayed mandatory investigations of violations, and for the “special rule” exempting from sanctions companies that promise to end their business in Iran. As was widely predicted, the conference report contains provisions to sanction Iranian human rights abusers, including denial of visas for their travel to the United States and freezing of their assets.

Those who supported CISADA said it would strengthen President Obama’s ability to obtain an agreement with Iran that might impose limitations on its nuclear program. It was argued that Iran’s dependence on gasoline imports could, at the very least, cause Iran’s government to have to spend more for such imports. Others, however, believed the Iranian government would have numerous ways to circumvent its effects, including rationing, reducing gasoline subsidies in an effort to reduce gasoline consumption; or offering premium prices to obscure gasoline suppliers. The effect on Iran’s supplies are discussed later in this report.
### Table 2. Comparison of Major Versions of H.R. 2194/P.L. 111-195

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General Goals and Overview:</strong> Seeks to expand the authorities of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA, P.L. 104-172) to deter sales by foreign companies of gasoline to Iran.</td>
<td><strong>Broader goals than House:</strong> sanctions sales of gasoline to Iran similar to House version of H.R. 2194, but also would affect several other U.S. sanctions against Iran already in place, including revoking some exemptions to the U.S. ban on imports from Iran.</td>
<td>Generally closer to the Senate version, but adds new provisions (not in either version) sanctioning Iranians determined to be involved in human rights abuses and prohibiting transactions with foreign banks that conduct business with Revolutionary Guard and U.N.-sanctioned Iranian entities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statement of U.S. Policy on Sanctioning Iran’s Central Bank (Bank Markazi):**

Section 2(c) and 3(a) state that it shall be U.S. policy to fully enforce ISA to encourage foreign governments:
- to cease investing in Iran’s energy sector.
- to sanction Iran’s Central Bank and other financial institutions that do business with the Iranian Central Bank (or any Iranian bank involved in proliferation or support of terrorist activities).

Section 108 urges the President to use existing U.S. authorities to impose U.S. sanctions against the Iranian Central Bank or other Iranian banks engaged in proliferation or support of terrorist groups.

Such authorities could include Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), which authorizes designation of foreign banks as “of primary money laundering concern” and thereby cut off their relations with U.S. banks.

Section 104 (see below) contains sense of Congress urging U.S. sanctions against Iranian Central Bank and would prohibit U.S. bank dealings with any financial institution that helps the Central Bank facilitate circumvention of U.N. resolutions on Iran.

**Extension of ISA to Sales of Gasoline:**

Section 3(a) would amend ISA to make sanctionable:
- the sale to Iran of equipment or services (of over $200,000 in value, or $500,000 combined sales in one year) that would enable Iran to maintain or expand its domestic production of refined petroleum.
- or, the sale to Iran of refined petroleum products or ships, vehicles, or insurance or reinsurance to provide such gasoline to Iran (same dollar values as sale of equipment).

Section 102(a) contains similar provisions regarding both gasoline sales and sales of equipment and services for Iran to expand its own refinery capacity. However, sets the aggregate one-year sale value at $1 million—double the level of the House bill.

Section 102(a) contains provisions amending ISA to include sales of gasoline and refining services and equipment as sanctionable (similar to both versions). Sets dollar value “trigger” at $1 million transaction, or $5 million aggregate value (equipment or gasoline sales) in a one-year period.

Specifies that what is sanctionable includes helping Iran develop its liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. Products whose sales is sanctionable include LNG tankers and products to build pipelines used to transport oil or LNG. Includes aviation fuel in definition of refined petroleum.

Formally reduces investment threshold to $20 million to trigger sanctionability.
### Expansion of ISA Sanctions:

Section 3(b) would mandate certain sanctions (not currently authorized by ISA) on sellers of the equipment, gasoline, or services described in Section 3(a) to include:

- prohibition of any transactions in foreign exchange with sanctioned entity;
- prohibition of credit or payments to the sanctioned entity;
- and, prohibition on any transactions involving U.S.-based property of the sanctioned entity.

(These sanctions would be imposed in addition to the required two out of six sanctions currently specified in ISA.)

### U.S. Government Enforcement Mechanism:

Section 3(b) also requires the heads of U.S. Government agencies to ensure that their agencies contract with firms that certify to the U.S. agency that they are not selling any of the equipment, products, or services to Iran (gasoline and related equipment and services) specified in Section 3(a).

The section contains certain penalties, such as prohibition on future bids for U.S. government contracts, to be imposed on any firm that makes a false certification about such activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expansion of ISA Sanctions:</strong></td>
<td>Similar to House bill (Section 102(a)).</td>
<td>Section 102(b) amends ISA to add <em>add three sanctions to the existing menu</em> of six sanctions in ISA and requires the President to <em>impose 3 out of the 9 specified sanctions on entities determined to be violators.</em> (As it previously existed, ISA required the imposition of two out of six sanctions of the menu.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Government Enforcement Mechanism:</strong></td>
<td>Section 103(b)(4) contains a similar provision, but mandates that the head of a U.S. agency may not contract with a person who meets criteria of sanctionability in the act. Would not require the bidding/contracting firm to certify its own compliance, thereby placing the burden of verifying such compliance on the U.S. executive agency.</td>
<td>Section 102(b) amends ISA by adding a provision similar to the House version: requiring, within 90 days of enactment (by October 1, 2010) new Federal Acquisition Regulations that mandate that firms to certify that they are not in violating of ISA as a condition of receiving a U.S. government contract, and providing for penalties for any falsification. The Civilian Agency Acquisition Council issued the needed regulations (interim ruling) on September 29, 2010. Paperwork that firms must sign making that certification now included as part of their contract signature package.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional Sanctions Against Suppliers of Nuclear, Missile, or Advanced Conventional Weapons Technology to Iran:

Section 3(c) provides an additional ISA sanction to be imposed on any country whose entity(ies) violate ISA by providing nuclear weapons-related technology or missile technology to Iran.

The sanction to be imposed on such country is a ban on any nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a prohibition on U.S. sales to that country of nuclear technology in accordance with such an agreement.

The sanction can be waived if the President certifies to Congress that the country in question is taking effective actions against its violating entities.

Alterations to Waiver and Implementation Provisions:

Section 3(d)(1) imposes a requirement (rather than an non-binding exhortation in the existing law) that the Administration “immediately” initiate an investigation of any potentially sanctionable activity under ISA.

Section 3(d)(2) would require the President to certify that a waiver of penalties on violating entities described above is “vital to the national security interest of the United States.” rather than, as currently stipulated in ISA, is “important to the national interest of the United States.”

Implementation and waiver provisions closer to House version. Section 102(c) sets 9(c) waiver standard as “necessary to the national interest”

Section 102(g) also alters existing 4(c) ISA waiver to delay sanctions on firms of countries that are “closely cooperating” with U.S. efforts against Iran’s WMD programs. (This is not an automatic “carve out” for cooperating countries.)

Section 102(g)(3) adds to ISA a “special rule” that no investigation of a potential violation need be started if a firm has ended or pledged to end its violating activity in with Iran. “Special rule” invoked twice, as discussed above.
House Version | Senate Version | Final Law and Implementation Status
--- | --- | ---
**Required Reports:**
Section 3(e) would amend ISA’s current Administration reporting requirements to also include an assessment of Iran’s support for militant movements and to acquire weapons of mass destruction technology.

A new reporting requirement would be created (every six months) on firms providing Iran gasoline and related equipment and services specified above, as well as the names and dates of such activity, and any contracts such entities have with U.S. Government agencies.

The required report is to include information on persons the President determines is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), as well as persons providing material support to the IRGC or conducting financial transactions with the IRGC or its affiliates.

Also required is an Administration report, within one year of enactment, on trade between Iran and countries in the G-20.

Section 107 contains a provision similar to the new reporting requirement of the House bill with regard to firms that sold gasoline and related equipment and services to Iran, and invested in Iran’s energy sector.

The Senate bill does not require reporting on the IRGC that is stipulated in the House bill, or the report on Iran-G-20 trade.

However, the Senate bill (Section 109) expresses the sense of Congress that the United States “continue to target” the IRGC for supporting terrorism, its role in proliferation, and its oppressive activities against the people of Iran.

Various reporting requirements throughout (separate from those required to trigger or justify the various sanctions or waivers). These reporting requirements are:

- Amendment of section 10 of ISA to include a report, within 90 days of enactment, and annual thereafter, on trade between Iran and the countries of the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. (From House version)

- Section 110 of the law (not an amendment to ISA) requires a report within 90 days, and every 180 days hence, on investments made in Iran’s energy sector since January 1, 2006. The report must include significant joint ventures outside Iran in which Iranian entities are involved.

- The Section 110 report is to include an estimate of the value of ethanol imported by Iran during the reporting period.

- Section 111 (not an ISA amendment) requires a report within 90 days on the activities of export credit agencies of foreign countries in guaranteeing financing for trade with Iran).

**Expansion of ISA Definitions:**

Section 3(f) would expand the definitions of investing entities, or persons, contained in ISA, to include:

- export credit agencies. (Such a provision is widely considered controversial because export credit agencies are arms of their governments, and therefore sanctioning such agencies is considered a sanction against a government.)

Similar provision contained in Section 102(d).

Does not include export credit agencies as a sanctionable entity under ISA (as amended). (However, a report is required on export credit agency activity, as discussed above.)

Does include LNG as petroleum resources.
### Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>House Version</strong></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Termination Provisions:</strong></td>
<td>Section 3(g) would terminate the bill’s sanctions against persons who are sanctioned, under the act, for sales of WMD-related technology, if the President certifies that Iran has ceased activities to acquire a nuclear device and has ceased enrichment of uranium and other nuclear activities.</td>
<td>Title IV would terminate the act's provisions 30 days after the President certifies that Iran has: - ceased support for international terrorism and qualifies for removal from the U.S. “terrorism list” - and, has ceased the pursuit and development of WMD and ballistic missile technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISA Sunset:</strong></td>
<td>Section 3(h) would extend all provisions of ISA until December 31, 2016. It is currently scheduled to “sunset” on December 31, 2011, as amended by the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293).</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional Provisions That Are Not Amendments to ISA</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Modification to U.S. Ban on Trade With and Investment in Iran:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Same as Senate version. However, contains a new section that the existing U.S. ban (by Executive order) on most exports to Iran not include the exportation of services for Internet communications. Provision also states that the ban on most exports should not include goods or services needed to help non-governmental organizations support democracy in Iran. Both provisions designed to support opposition protesters linked to Iran’s “Green movement.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 103(b)(1) would ban all imports of Iranian origin from the United States, with the exception of informational material. Currently, modifications to the U.S. trade ban with Iran (Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995) that became effective in 2000 permit imports of Iranian luxury goods, such as carpets, caviar, nuts, and dried fruits. - Section 103(b)(2) generally reiterates/codifies current provisions of U.S. trade ban related to U.S. exports to Iran. Provision would prohibit exports to Iran of all goods except food and medical devices, informational material, articles used for humanitarian assistance to Iran, or goods needed to ensure safe operation of civilian aircraft.</td>
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Implementation: In July 2010, Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a statement that, effective September 29, 2010, the general license for imports of Iranian luxury goods will be eliminated (no such imports allowed). This went into effect that day.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Freezing of Assets/Travel Restriction on Revolutionary Guard and Related Entities and Persons:</strong></td>
<td>Section 103(b)(3) mandates the President to freeze the assets of Iranian diplomats, IRGC, or other Iranian official personnel deemed a threat to U.S. national security under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Provision would require freezing of assets of families and associates of persons so designated. Section 109 calls for a ban on travel of IRGC and affiliated persons.</td>
<td>Similar to Senate version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Application of U.S. Trade Ban to Subsidiaries:</strong></td>
<td>Section 104 would apply the provisions of the U.S. trade ban with Iran (Executive Order 12959) to subsidiaries of U.S. firms if the subsidiary is established or maintained for the purpose of avoiding the U.S. ban on trade with Iran. The definition of subsidiary, under the provision, is any entity that is more than 50% owned or is directed by a U.S. person or firm.</td>
<td>No provision</td>
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<td>No provision</td>
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| **Mandatory Sanctions on Financial Institutions that Help Iran’s Sanctioned Entities:** | No provision | Section 104(c) requires the Treasury Department to develop regulations (within 90 days of enactment) to prohibit and specify penalties for any U.S. financial transactions with any foreign financial institution that:
- facilitates efforts by the Revolutionary Guard to acquire WMD or fund terrorism
- facilitate the activities of any person sanctioned under U.N. resolutions on Iran.
- facilitates the efforts by Iran’s Central Bank to support the Guard’s WMD acquisition efforts or support any U.N.-sanctioned entity
Section 104(d) requires penalties to be specified in regulations within 90 days.
Section 104(e) requires regulations (no date specified) to make this requirement retroactive to existing accounts, pending an audit by the U.S. banks involved.
Implementation: Treasury Department regulations implementing Section 104(c) and (d) provisions issued August 16, 2010. Regulations to implement 104(e) were proposed by Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) on April 27, 2011. |
| Sanctions on Iranian Human Rights Abusers: | No provision | Section 105 requires, within 90 days, a report listing Iranian officials (or affiliates) determined responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses since the June 12, 2009, Iranian election. Those listed are ineligible for a U.S. visa, their U.S. property is to be blocked, and transactions with those listed are prohibited.
On September 29, 2010, President Obama issued Executive Order 13553 providing for these sanctions. See human rights section of this paper for Iranians sanctioned. |
Iran Sanctions

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<td><strong>Sanctioning Certain Information Technology Sales to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>Section 105 prohibits U.S. executive agencies from contracting with firms that export sensitive technology to Iran. “Sensitive technology” is defined as hardware, software, telecommunications equipment, or other technology that restricts the free flow of information in Iran or which monitor or restrict “speech” of the people of Iran.</td>
<td>Section 106 of the conference report is similar to Senate version. The contracting restriction is to be imposed “pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe.” The contracting regulations issued September 29, 2010, “partially” implement this requirement, with further regulations to be issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 106(b) authorizes $64.611 million for FY2010 (and “such sums as may be necessary” for FY2011 and 2012) for the Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The funds are authorized to ensure that countries such as Iran are not misusing the international financial system for illicit purposes. Iran is not mentioned specifically. $104.26 million is authorized by the section for FY2010 for the Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.</td>
<td>Section 109 authorizes $102 million for FY2011 and “sums as may be necessary” for FY2012 and 2013 to the Treasury Department Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Another $100 million is authorized for FY2011 for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and $113 million for FY2011 for the Bureau of Industry and Security for the Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treasury Department Authorization to prevent misuse of the U.S. financial system by Iran or other countries:</strong></td>
<td>Section 110 contains a sense of Congress that the President impose the full range of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) on Hezbollah, and that the President renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon (as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701).</td>
<td>Section 113 similar to Senate version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 110 contains a sense of Congress that the President impose the full range of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) on Hezbollah, and that the President renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon (as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701).</td>
<td>Section 113 similar to Senate version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hezbollah:</strong></td>
<td>Section 110 contains a sense of Congress that the President impose the full range of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) on Hezbollah, and that the President renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon (as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701).</td>
<td>Section 113 similar to Senate version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific provision, although, as noted above, the House bill does expand ISA reporting requirements to include Iran’s activities to support terrorist movements. Lebanese Hezbollah is named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department.</td>
<td>Section 110 contains a sense of Congress that the President impose the full range of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) on Hezbollah, and that the President renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon (as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701).</td>
<td>Section 113 similar to Senate version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Divestment:</strong></td>
<td>Title II of the Senate bill (Section 203) prevents criminal, civil, or administrative action against any investment firm or officer or adviser based on its decision to divest from securities that:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provisions</td>
<td>- have investments or operations in Sudan described in the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- or, engage in investments in Iran that would be considered sanctionable by the Senate bill.</td>
<td>Similar to Senate version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congressional Research Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevention of Transshipment, Reexportation, or Diversion of Sensitive Items to Iran:</th>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 302 requires a report by the Director of National Intelligence that identifies all countries considered a concern to allow transshipment or diversion of WMD-related technology to Iran (technically: “items subject to the provision of the Export Administration Regulations”).</td>
<td>Similar to Senate version, but does not provide for prior negotiations before designating a country as a “Destination of Possible Diversion Concern.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 303 requires the Secretary of Commerce to designate a country as a “Destination of Possible Diversion Concern” if such country is considered to have inadequate export controls or is unwilling to prevent the diversion of U.S. technology to Iran. The provision stipulates government-to-government discussions are to take place to improve that country’s export control systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If such efforts did not lead to improvement, the section would mandate designation of that country as a “Destination of Diversion Concern” and would set up a strict licensing requirement for U.S. exports of sensitive technologies to that country.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>List of countries that are believed to be allowing diversion of specified goods or technology to Iran to be named in a report provided within 180 days of enactment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>Doroud (oil)</td>
<td>Total (France)/ENI (Italy)</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy, August 2006.)</td>
<td>Total and ENI exempted from sanctions on September 30 because of pledge to exit Iran market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>Balal (oil)</td>
<td>Total/ Bow Valley (Canada)/ENI</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>Soroush and Nowruz (oil)</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands)/Japex (Japan)</td>
<td>$800 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;News in Brief: Iran.&quot; Middle East Economic Digest, (MEED) January 24, 2003.)</td>
<td>Royal Dutch exempted from sanctions on 9/30 because of pledge to exit Iran market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2000</td>
<td>Anaran bloc (oil)</td>
<td>Norsk Hydro (Norway)/Gazprom (Russia)/Lukoil (Russia)</td>
<td>$120 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MEED Special Report, December 16, 2005, pp. 48-50.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>Phase 4 and 5, South Pars (gas)</td>
<td>ENI exempted 9/30 based on pledge to exit Iran market</td>
<td>$1.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Petroleum Economist, December 1, 2004.)</td>
<td>Gas onstream as of Dec. 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration</td>
<td>GVA Consultants (Sweden)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—construction of submersible drilling rig for Iranian partner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(IPR Strategic Business Information Database, March 11, 2001.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Darkhovin (oil)</td>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Darkhovin Production Doubles.&quot; Gulf Daily News, May 1, 2008.) ENI told CRS in April 2010 it would close out all Iran operations by 2013.</td>
<td>Field in production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENI exempted from sanctions on 9/30, as discussed above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Masjed-e-Soleyman (oil)</td>
<td>Sheer Energy (Canada)/China National Petroleum Company (CNPC). Local partner is Naftgaran Engineering</td>
<td>$80 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;CNPC Gains Upstream Foothold.&quot; MEED, September 3, 2004.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2002</td>
<td>Phase 9 + 10, South Pars (gas)</td>
<td>LG Engineering and Construction Corp. (now)</td>
<td>$1.6 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Post-1999 Major Investments/Major Development Projects in Iran’s Energy Sector**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td><strong>Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
<td>known as GS Engineering and Construction Corp., South Korea)</td>
<td>On stream as of early 2009</td>
<td>Statoil (Norway) $2.65 billion 3 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td><strong>Azadegan (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Statoil pledged to exit Iran market</td>
<td>began producing late 2008</td>
<td>Inpex (Japan) 10% stake; CNPC agreed to develop “north Azadegan” in Jan. 2009; China $1.76 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td><strong>Tuscan Block</strong></td>
<td>Petrobras (Brazil) $178 million No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td><strong>Yadavaran (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China), deal finalized December 9, 2007</td>
<td>$2 billion 300,000 bpd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td><strong>Saveh bloc (oil)</strong></td>
<td>PTT (Thailand)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td><strong>Garmser bloc (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China) $20 million ?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td><strong>Arak Refinery expansion</strong></td>
<td>Sinopec (China); JGC (Japan) $959 million Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd</td>
<td></td>
<td>Norsk Hydro (Norway) $49 million ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td><strong>LNG Tanks at Tombak Port</strong></td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>$320 million</td>
<td>200,000 ton capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak, 30 miles north of Assaluyeh Port.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(May not constitute “investment” as defined in pre-2010 version of ISA, because that definition did not specify LNG as “petroleum resource” of Iran.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td><strong>Esfahan refinery upgrade</strong></td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(“Daelim, Others to Upgrade Iran’s Esfahan Refinery.” Chemical News and Intelligence, March 19, 2007.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2007</td>
<td><strong>Golshan and Ferdows onshore and offshore gas fields and LNG plant</strong></td>
<td>SKS Ventures, Petrofield Subsidiary (Malaysia)</td>
<td>$16 billion</td>
<td>3.4 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contract modified but reaffirmed December 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(GAO report; Oil Daily, January 14, 2008.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (unspec.)</td>
<td><strong>Jofeir Field (oil)</strong></td>
<td>Belarusneft (Belarus) under contract to Naftiran.</td>
<td>$500 million</td>
<td>40,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below. Belarusneft, a subsidiary of Belneftekhim, sanctioned under ISA on March 29, 2011. Naftiran sanctioned on September 29, 2010 for this and other activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><strong>Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)</strong></td>
<td>Edison (Italy)</td>
<td>$44 million</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td><strong>Lavan field (offshore natural gas)</strong></td>
<td>PGNiG (Poland)</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td>Status unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td><strong>Danan Field (on-shore oil)</strong></td>
<td>Petro Vietnam Exploration and Production Co. (Vietnam)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“PVEP Wins Bid to Develop Danan Field.” Iran Press TV, March 11, 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td><strong>Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil province)</strong></td>
<td>INA (Croatia)</td>
<td>$40-$140 million (dispute over size)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td><strong>Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction)</strong></td>
<td>Uhde (Germany)</td>
<td>$1.75 billion</td>
<td>300,000 metric tons/yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>“North Azadegan”</td>
<td>CNPC (China)</td>
<td>$1.75 billion</td>
<td>75,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas Sweetening Plant</strong>&lt;br&gt;CRS conversation with Embassy of S. Korea in Washington, D.C, July 2010&lt;br&gt;Contract signed but then abrogated by S. Korean firm</td>
<td>G and S Engineering and Construction (South Korea)</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3</strong>&lt;br&gt;&quot;Italy, South Korea To Develop South Pars Phase 12.&quot; Press TV (Iran), November 3, 2009, <a href="http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308">http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308</a>.</td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)—Part 2; Tecnimont (Italy)—Part 3</td>
<td>$4 billion ($2 bn each part)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 11</strong>&lt;br&gt;Drilling to Begin in March 2010&lt;br&gt;&quot;CNPC in Gas Deal, Beefs Up Tehran Team—Source,&quot; Reuters India, February 10, 2010, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=INTOE61909U20100210">http://in.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=INTOE61909U20100210</a>.</td>
<td>CNPC (China)</td>
<td>$4.7 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals: $41 billion investment**

**Other Pending/Preliminary Deals**

**North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas).** Includes gas purchases (December 2006)<br>(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/19/print20070519_376139.html.)


State Department said on September 30, 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol have ended negotiations with Iran and will not pursue this project any further

**Phase 22, 23, 24—South Pars (gas), incl. transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and on to Europe and building three power plants in Iran. Initialed July 2007; not finalized to date.**

**Iran’s Kish gas field** (April 2008) Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman (http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=112062&sectionid=351020103.)

**Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—part 1.** Incl. LNG terminal construction and Farzad-B natural gas bloc (March 2009). Financing stalled due to sanctions; Tehran gave ONGC and Hinduja until January 31, 2011, to line up financing or the bid will be considered abandoned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Co.</td>
<td>$16 billion</td>
<td>3.6 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol (Spain)</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO)</td>
<td>$12 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman (co-financing of project)</td>
<td>$7 billion</td>
<td>1 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken over by Indian firms (ONGC, Oil India Ltd., Hinduja, Petronet in 2007)</td>
<td>$8 billion+</td>
<td>20 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pars gas field (September 2009)</td>
<td>Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.; 10% stake in venture</td>
<td>$760 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abadan refinery</td>
<td>Sinopec</td>
<td>up to $6 billion if new refinery is built</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf coast (August 2009)

Sources: As noted in table, a wide variety of other press announcements and sources, CRS conversations with officials of the State Department Bureau of Economics (November 2009), CRS conversations with officials of embassies of the parent government of some of the listed companies (2005-2009). Some reported deals come from a March 2010 GAO report, “Firms Reported in Open Sources as Having Commercial Activity in Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors.” GAO-10-515R Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10515r.pdf. The GAO report lists 41 firms with “commercial activity in Iran’s energy sector; several of the listed agreements do not appear to constitute “investment,” as defined in ISA.

Note: CRS has neither the authority nor the means to determine which of these projects, if any, might constitute a violation of the Iran Sanctions Act. CRS has no way to confirm the precise status of any of the announced investments, and some investments may have been resold to other firms or terms altered since agreement. In virtually all cases, such investments and contracts represent private agreements between Iran and its instruments and the investing firms, and firms are not necessarily required to confirm or publicly release the terms of their arrangements with Iran. Reported $20 million+ investments in oil and gas fields, refinery upgrades, and major project leadership are included in this table. Responsibility for a project to develop Iran’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment With Iran

A ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran was imposed on May 6, 1995, by President Clinton, through Executive Order 12959. This followed an earlier March 1995 executive order barring U.S. investment in Iran's energy sector. The trade and investment ban was intended to blunt criticism that U.S. trade with Iran made U.S. appeals for multilateral containment of Iran less credible. Each March since 1995 (and most recently on March 10, 2010), the U.S. Administration has renewed a declaration of a state of emergency that triggered the investment ban; it is likely to be renewed again in March 2011. The operation of the trade regulations is stipulated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITR's). As noted above, in accordance with CISADA, the strict ban on imports from Iran was restored on September 29, 2010; the ban on exports to Iran was altered only slightly by CISADA.

Some modifications to the trade ban since 1999 account for the fact that trade between the United States and Iran is minimal. Total U.S.-Iran trade was about $300 million in 2010 ($208 million in exports to Iran, and $94 million in imports). Trade was about $350 million worth of goods for all of 2009 ($281 million in exports to Iran, and $67 million in imports from Iran). That is about half the value of the bilateral trade in 2008.

The following conditions and modifications, as administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department, apply:

- Some goods related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft may be licensed for export to Iran (Section 560.528 of Title 31, C.F.R.). As recently as September 2006, the George W. Bush Administration, in the interests of safe operations of civilian aircraft, permitted a sale by General Electric of Airbus engine spare parts to be installed on several Iran Air passenger aircraft (by European airline contractors). (A provision of H.R. 6296, a bill introduced in the 111th Congress, sought to prevent these sales to Iran.) An Administration intent to sell Iran data to repair certain GE engines for its legacy American-made aircraft, in order to ensure safe operation, was notified to Congress on March 16, 2011.

- U.S. firms may not negotiate with Iran or to trade Iranian oil overseas, but U.S. companies may apply for licenses to conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran. A Mobil Corporation application to do so was denied in April 1999.

- According to the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR’s), the ban does not apply to personal communications (phone calls, e-mails), or to humanitarian donations. U.S. non-government organizations (NGOs) require a specific license to operate in Iran, and some NGOs say the licensing requirements are too onerous to make work in Iran practical.

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12 The executive order was issued under the authority of: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. An August 1997 amendment to the trade ban (Executive Order 13059) prevented U.S. companies from knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran.
• Since April 1999, commercial sales of food and medical products to Iran have been allowed, on a case-by-case basis and subject to OFAC licensing. According to OFAC in April 2007, licenses for exports of medicines to treat HIV and leukemia are routinely expedited for sale to Iran, and license applications are viewed favorably for business school exchanges, earthquake safety seminars, plant and animal conservation, and medical training in Iran.

• OFAC generally declines to discuss export licenses approved, and a press account on December 24, 2010, paints a picture of broad export approvals to Iran of such condiments as ice cream sprinkles, chewing gum, food additives, hot sauces, body-building supplements, and other goods that appear to have uses other than those that are purely humanitarian or nutritive. U.S. exporters widely mentioned include Mars Co. (candy manufacturer); Kraft Foods; Wrigley’s (gum); and McCormick and Co. (spices). Some goods were sold through a Revolutionary Guard-owned chains of stores in Iran called Qods; as well as a government owned Shahrvand store and a chain called Refah. OFAC officials indicated in the press accounts that such licenses were not in contradiction with U.S. law or policy, although there might have been less than full scrutiny of some Iranian end users and that such scrutiny might be increased in future licensing decisions.

• As far as financing of approved U.S. sales to Iran, private letters of credit can be used to finance approved transactions, but no U.S. government credit guarantees are available, and U.S. exporters are not permitted to deal directly with Iranian banks. The FY2001 agriculture appropriations law (P.L. 106-387) contained a provision banning the use of official credit guarantees for food and medical sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S. terrorism list, except Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit such credit guarantees. No U.S. Administration has authorized credit guarantees, to date. In December 2004, the trade ban was further modified to allow Americans to freely engage in ordinary publishing activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan).

• In April 2000, the trade ban was further eased to allow U.S. importation of Iranian nuts, dried fruits, carpets, and caviar. Financing was permitted for U.S. importers of these goods. The United States was the largest market for Iranian carpets before the 1979 revolution, but U.S. anti-dumping tariffs imposed on Iranian products in 1986 dampened of many Iranian products. As discussed above, CISADA ended approval of such imports as of October 1, 2010. Prior to the entry into force of this CISADA provision, the number one U.S. import from Iran was pomegranate juice concentrate. Iranian carpets were another popular import, despite a U.S. tariff of about 3%-6%. Imports of Iranian caviar carried a duty of about 15%.

**Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms**

The U.S. trade ban does not bar subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary has no operational relationship to the parent company. Foreign subsidiaries are

generally considered foreign persons, not U.S. persons. The March 7, 2010, New York Times article, cited above, discusses some subsidiaries of U.S. firms that have been active in Iran and which have also received U.S. government contracts, grants, loans, or loan guarantees. Among major foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms that have traded with Iran are the following:

- U.S. energy equipment firms. Some subsidiaries of such firms may still be in the Iranian market, according to their “10-K” filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These include Natco Group, Overseas Shipholding Group, UOP (United Oil Products, a Honeywell subsidiary based in Britain), Itron, Fluor, Flowserve, Parker Drilling, Vantage Energy Services, Weatherford, and a few others. UOP reportedly sells refinery equipment to Iran; new such sales are now potentially sanctionable under ISA, as modified by CISADA.

- An Irish subsidiary of the Coca Cola company provides syrup for the U.S.-brand soft drink to an Iranian distributor, Khoshgovar. Local versions of both Coke and of Pepsi (with Iranian-made syrups) are also marketed in Iran by distributors who licensed the recipes for those soft drinks before the Islamic revolution and before the trade ban was imposed on Iran.

- Transammonia Corp., via a Swiss-based subsidiary, is said to be conducting business with Iran to help it export ammonia, a growth export for Iran.

**Subsidiaries Exiting Iran**

As international sanctions against Iran have increased in recent years, many foreign subsidiaries have decided that the risks of continuing to do business with Iran outweigh the benefits:

- Chemical manufacturer Huntsman announced in January 2010 its subsidiaries would halt sales to Iran.

- Halliburton. On January 11, 2005, Iran said it had contracted with U.S. company Halliburton, and an Iranian company, Oriental Kish, to drill for gas in Phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. Halliburton reportedly provided $30 million to $35 million worth of services per year through Oriental Kish, leaving unclear whether Halliburton would be considered in violation of the U.S. trade and investment
ban or the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—because the deals involved a subsidiary of Halliburton (Cayman Islands-registered Halliburton Products and Service, Ltd., based in Dubai). On April 10, 2007, Halliburton announced that its subsidiaries were, as promised in January 2005, no longer operating in Iran.

- General Electric (GE). The firm announced in February 2005 that it would seek no new business in Iran, and it reportedly wound down preexisting contracts by July 2008. GE was selling Iran equipment and services for hydroelectric, oil and gas services, and medical diagnostic projects through Italian, Canadian, and French subsidiaries.

- Oilfield services firm Smith International said on March 1, 2010, it would stop sales to Iran by its subsidiaries.

- in March 2010, Ingersoll Rand, maker of air compressors and cooling systems, said it would no longer allow its subsidiaries to do business in Iran. On March 1, 2010, Caterpillar Corp. said it had altered its policies to prevent foreign subsidiaries from selling equipment to independent dealers that have been reselling the equipment to Iran.

- In April 2010, it was reported that foreign partners of several U.S. or other multinational accounting firms had cut their ties with Iran, including KPMG of the Netherlands, and local affiliates of U.S. firms PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst and Young.

In the 110th Congress, S. 970, S. 3227, S. 3445, and three House-passed bills (H.R. 1400, H.R. 7112, and H.R. 957)—would have applied sanctions to the parent companies of U.S. subsidiaries if those subsidiaries are directed by the parent company to trade with Iran. The Senate version of CISADA contained a similar provision, but it was taken out in conference action. A provision of H.R. 6296, the bill introduced in the 111th Congress, would apply this sanction, and there reportedly is consideration of introducing similar legislation in the 112th Congress.

**Banking and Finance: Treasury Department**

**Financial Measures and CISADA**

U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system—gaining strength as other countries have joined the effort—have been implemented by the Treasury Department (office of Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey) through “targeted financial measures.” Since 2006, strengthened by leverage provided in five U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Levey and other officials have been able to convince at least 80 foreign banks that dealing with Iran entails financial risk and furthers terrorism and proliferation. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has described Levey as having “led the design of a remarkably successful program” with regard to

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26 Hearing of the Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, (continued...)
targeting Iran’s proliferation networks. Some fear that U.S. sanctions may not be as vigorously enforced now that Levey has left office as of April 2011. His replacement is Daniel Cohen.

In earlier action intended to cut Iran off from the U.S. banking system, on September 6, 2006, the Treasury Department barred U.S. banks from handling any indirect transactions (“U-turn transactions,” meaning transactions with non-Iranian foreign banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank) with Iran’s Bank Saderat (see above), which the Administration accuses of providing funds to Hezbollah.27 Bank Sepah is subject to asset freezes and transactions limitations as a result of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The Treasury Department extended that U-Turn restriction to all Iranian banks on November 6, 2008.

Thus far, the Treasury Department has not designated any bank as a “money laundering entity” for Iran-related transactions (under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act). Nor has Treasury imposed any specific sanctions against Bank Markazi (Central Bank) which, according to a February 25, 2008, Wall Street Journal story, is helping other Iranian banks circumvent the U.S. and U.N. banking pressure. Several European countries reportedly still oppose such a sanction as an extreme step with potential humanitarian consequences, for example by preventing Iran from keeping its currency stable. S. 3445, a Senate bill in the 110th Congress, and a counterpart passed by the House on September 26, 2008 (H.R. 7112), called for this sanction. The Senate version of H.R. 2194 had a similar provision, which was included in conference action. Resolution 1929 references the need for vigilance in dealing with Iran’s Central Bank but does not mandate any new sanctions against it.

The Treasury Department has also used punishments to pressure firms to cease doing business with Iran. In 2004, the Treasury Department fined UBS $100 million for the unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and other sanctioned countries, and in December 2005, the Treasury Department fined Dutch bank ABN Amro $80 million for failing to fully report the processing of financial transactions involving Iran’s Bank Melli (and another bank partially owned by Libya). In the biggest such instance, on December 16, 2009, the Treasury Department announced that Credit Suisse would pay a $536 million settlement to the United States for illicitly processing Iranian transactions with U.S. banks. Credit Suisse, according to the Treasury Department, saw business opportunity by picking up the transactions business from a competitor who had, in accordance with U.S. regulations discussed below, ceased processing dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Credit Suisse also pledged to cease doing business with Iran.

On December 17, 2008, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed a civil action seeking to seize the assets of the Assa Company, a UK-chartered entity. Assa allegedly was maintaining the interests of Bank Melli in an office building in New York City. An Iranian foundation, the Alavi Foundation, allegedly is an investor in the building.

Banking Provisions of CISADA

Section 104 of CISADA is a section of that law that, in the aggregate, would seek to exclude foreign banks from operating in the United States if these banks conduct transactions with Iranian

(...continued)

entities that are subject to international or U.S. sanctions. The premise of the provision was that cutting off Iran’s access to the international financial system would make it more difficult for Iran to move its money. The binding provisions of Section 104 require the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe several sets of regulations. Section 104 states that these regulations must forbid U.S. banks from opening new “correspondent accounts” or “payable through accounts”—or force the cancellation of existing such accounts—with foreign banks that process “significant transactions” with several categories of Iranian (or other) entities. Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish such accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system and financial industry. The entities with which transactions would trigger the sanctions are:

- The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or any of its agents or affiliates that are sanctioned under U.S. executive orders. The two executive orders that have served as the principal source of U.S. sanctions against Iranian firms and organizations are Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001) and 13382 (June 28, 2005), discussed elsewhere in this paper.

- Any entity that is sanctioned by U.S. executive orders such as the two mentioned above. To date, over 125 entities (including individuals), almost all of them Iran-based or of Iranian origin, have been designated for Iran-related proliferation or terrorism activities under these orders.

- Any entity designated under the various U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted to impose sanctions on Iran.

- Any entity that assists Iran’s Central Bank in efforts to help the IRGC acquire weapons of mass destruction or support international terrorism.

**Terrorism List Designation-Related Sanctions**

Several U.S. sanctions are in effect as a result of Iran’s presence on the U.S. “terrorism list.” The list was established by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended), sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international terrorism. Iran was added to the list in January 1984, following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon (believed perpetrated by Hezbollah). Sanctions imposed as a consequence include a ban on U.S. foreign aid to Iran; restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran of dual use items; and requires the United States to vote against international loans to Iran.

- The terrorism list designation restricts sales of U.S. dual use items (Export Administration Act, as continued through presidential authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA, as implemented by executive orders), and, under other laws, bans direct U.S. financial assistance (Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, FAA, P.L. 87-195) and arms sales (Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 95-92, as amended), and requires the United States to vote to oppose multilateral lending to the designated countries (Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132). Waivers are provided under these laws, but successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the late 1980s ban direct assistance to Iran (loans, credits, insurance, Ex-Im Bank credits) without providing for a waiver.
• Section 307 of the FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations, and require proportionate cuts if these institutions work in Iran. No waiver is provided for.

• The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132) requires the President to withhold U.S. foreign assistance to any country that provides to a terrorism list country foreign assistance or arms. Waivers are provided.

U.S. sanctions laws do not bar disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of two earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997), and another $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June 22, 2002, earthquake. (The World Bank provided some earthquake related lending as well.) The United States provided $5.7 million in assistance (out of total governmental pledges of about $32 million, of which $17 million have been remitted) to the victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, which killed as many as 40,000 people and destroyed 90% of Bam’s buildings. The United States military flew in 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam. In the Bam case, there was also a temporary exemption made in the regulations to allow for a general licensing (no need for a specific license) for donations to Iran of humanitarian goods by American citizens and organizations. Those exemptions were extended several times but expired in March 2004. When that expiration occurred, the policy reverted to a requirement for specific licensing (application to OFAC) and approval process for donations and operations in Iran of U.S.-based humanitarian NGO’s.

Executive Order 13224

The separate, but related, Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) authorizes the President to freeze the assets of and bar U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. This order, issued two weeks after the September 11 attacks, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, was intended to primarily target Al Qaeda-related entities. However, it has increasingly been applied to Iranian entities. Such Iran-related entities named and sanctioned under this order are in Table 6 at the end of this report, which also contains the names of Iranian entities sanctioned under other orders and under United Nations resolutions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program.

Proliferation-Related U.S. Sanctions

Iran is prevented from receiving advanced technology from the United States under relevant and Iran-specific anti-proliferation laws28 and by Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005). Some of these laws and executive measures seek to penalize foreign firms and countries that provide equipment to Iran’s WMD programs.

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Iran Sanctions

Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484) imposes a number of sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons.” Sanctions imposed on violating entities include a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from that entity, and a two-year ban on licensing U.S. exports to that entity. A sanction to ban imports to the United States from the entity is authorized.

If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are a one-year ban on U.S. assistance to that country; a one-year requirement that the United States vote against international lending to it; a one-year suspension of U.S. co-production agreements with the country; a one-year suspension of technical exchanges with the country in military or dual use technology; and a one-year ban on sales of U.S. arms to the country. The President is also authorized to deny the country most-favored-nation trade status; and to impose a ban on U.S. trade with the country.

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1603) also provides for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports to Iran (which would include computer software). A waiver to permit such exports, on a case-by-case basis, is provided for.

Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), now called the Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act) authorizes sanctions on foreign persons (individuals or corporations, not countries or governments) that are determined by the Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. It bans U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space station unless the President can certify that the agency or entities under its control had not transferred any WMD or missile technology to Iran within the year prior.29 (A Continuing Resolution for FY2009, which funded the U.S. government through March 2009, waived this law to allow NASA to continue to use Russian vehicles to access the International Space Station.)

Executive Order 13382

Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. Table 6 lists Iran-related entities sanctioned under the order.

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29 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
Foreign Aid Restrictions for Suppliers of Iran

In addition, successive foreign aid appropriations punish the Russian Federation for assisting Iran by withholding 60% of any U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

U.S. Efforts to Promote Divestment

A growing trend not only in Congress but in several states is to require or call for or require divestment of shares of firms that have invested in Iran’s energy sector (at the same levels considered sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act). The concept of these sanctions is to express the view of Western and other democracies that Iran is an outcast internationally.

Legislation in the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400, did not require divestment, but would have required a presidential report on firms that have invested in Iran’s energy sector. Another bill, H.R. 1357, required government pension funds to divest of shares in firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments in Iran’s energy sector and bar government and private pension funds from future investments in such firms. Two other bills, H.R. 2347 (passed by the House on July 31, 2007) and S. 1430, would protect mutual fund and other investment companies from shareholder action for any losses that would occur from divesting in firms that have investing in Iran’s energy sector.

In the 111th Congress, H.R. 1327 (Iran Sanctions Enabling Act), a bill similar to H.R. 2347 of the 110th Congress, was reported by the Financial Services Committee on April 28, 2009. It passed the House on October 14, 2009, by a vote of 414-6. A similar bill, S. 1065, was introduced in the Senate. Provisions along these lines was contained in CISADA (P.L. 111-195)—in particular providing a “safe harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector (as defined by ISA, as amended by CISADA).

U.S. Sanctions Intended to Support Iran’s Opposition

A trend in the 111th Congress, after the Iran election dispute, was to promote the prospects for the domestic opposition in Iran. Proposals to target the Revolutionary Guard for sanctions, discussed throughout, represent one facet of the trend toward measures that undermine the legitimacy of Iran’s regime and support Iran’s domestic opposition. The Revolutionary Guard is involved in Iran’s WMD programs but it is also the key instrument through which the regime has suppressed the pro-democracy movement. Several measures to support the opposition’s ability to communicate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor or censor Internet communications, and to identify and sanction Iranian human rights abusers were included in CISADA.

Earlier legislation, the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), represented a congressional effort to promote the prospects for opponents of the regime. That law authorized “sums as may be

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30 For information on the steps taken by individual states, see National Conference of State Legislatures. State Divestment Legislation.
necessary” to assist Iranians who are “dedicated” to “democratic values … and the adoption of a
democratic form of government in Iran”; and “advocates the adherence by Iran to
nonproliferation regimes....”

Expanding Internet and Communications Freedoms

Some Members have focused on expanding Internet freedom in Iran or preventing the Iranian
government from using the Internet to identify opponents. Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the “VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act
contains several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify (in a report to be
submitted 180 days after enactment, or April 25, 2009) companies that are selling Iran technology
equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor the internet usage of Iranians. The VOICE Act
authorized funds to document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 12, 2009, presidential
election. Another provision of P.L. 111-84 (Section 1241) required an Administration report, not
later than January 31, 2010, on U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Iran, and the effect of those
sanctions on Iran.

In the 111th Congress, S. 1475 and H.R. 3284, the “Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act,”
would have authorized the President to ban U.S. government contracts with foreign companies
that sell technology that Iran could use to monitor or control Iranian usage of the internet. This
provision, and another which exempts from the U.S. export ban on Iran equipment to help
Iranians communicate and use the Internet, was incorporated into CISADA. The provisions were
directed, in part, against firms, including a joint venture between Nokia (Finland) and Siemens
(Germany), reportedly sold Internet monitoring and censorship technology to Iran in 2008.31
Perhaps to avoid further embarrassment, Siemens announced on January 27, 2010, that it would
stop signing new business deals in Iran as of mid-2010.32

Also in line with this trend, on March 8, 2010, OFAC amended the Iran Transactions Regulations
that implement the U.S.-Iran trade ban to provide for a general license for providing to Iranians
free mass market software in order to facilitate internet communications. The ruling appeared to
incorporate the major features of a proposal in the 111th Congress, H.R. 4301, the “Iran Digital
Empowerment Act.” The OFAC determination required a waiver of the provision of the Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1606 waiver provision) discussed above.

Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses and Promote
the Opposition

Another part of the effort to help Iran’s opposition has been legislation to sanction regime
officials involved in suppressing the domestic opposition in Iran. Senator John McCain proposed
to offer amendments to S. 2799 (the Senate version of what became H.R. 2194) to focus on
banning travel and freezing assets of those Iranians determined to be human rights abusers. These
provisions were included in the conference report on CISADA. The provisions were similar to
those of Senator McCain’s earlier stand alone bill, S. 3022, the “Iran Human Rights Sanctions

Act.” Companion measures in the House were H.R. 4647 and H.R. 4649, which differed only slightly with each other.

On September 29, 2010, the Administration implemented the CISADA provision when President Obama signed an Executive Order (13553) providing for the CISADA sanctions against Iranians determined to be responsible for or complicit in post-2009 Iran election human rights abuses. Along with the order, an initial group of eight Iranian officials were penalized, including Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, and several other officials who were in key security or judicial positions at the time of the June 2009 election and aftermath. On February 23, 2011, the State Department added two Iranian officials to the list of those sanctioned (Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Dowlatabai and Basij Commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi). Similar sanctions against many of these same officials - as well as several others - were imposed by the European Union (a total of 32 Iranians sanctioned by the EU) on April 14, 2011.

**Blocked Iranian Property and Assets**

Iranian leaders continue to assert that the United States is holding Iranian assets, and that this is an impediment to improved relations. A U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal at the Hague continues to arbitrate cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. Major cases yet to be decided center on hundreds of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases between the United States and the Shah’s regime, which Iran claims it paid for but were unfulfilled. About $400 million in proceeds from the resale of that equipment was placed in a DOD FMS account, and about $22 million in Iranian diplomatic property remains blocked, although U.S. funds have been disbursed—credited against the DOD FMS account—to pay judgments against Iran for past acts of terrorism against Americans. Other disputes include the mistaken U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States, in accordance with an ICJ judgment, paid Iran $61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248 Iranians killed. The United States has not compensated Iran for the airplane itself. As it has in past similar cases, the Bush Administration opposed a terrorism lawsuit against Iran by victims of the U.S. Embassy Tehran seizure on the grounds of diplomatic obligation.\(^{33}\)

**U.N. Sanctions**

The U.S. sanctions discussed in this report are more comprehensive than those imposed, to date, by the United Nations Security Council or by individual foreign countries or groups of countries, such as the European Union. However, there is increasing convergence among all these varying sets of sanctions.

As part of a multilateral process of attempting to convince Iran to choose the path of negotiations or face further penalty, during 2006-2008, three U.N. Security Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions primarily on Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. The multilateral group negotiation with Iran ("P5+1:" the Security Council permanent members, plus Germany) at the same time offered Iran incentives to suspend uranium

enrichment. After failed negotiations with Iran during 2009, Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9, 2010, by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil), with one abstention (Lebanon). (Iranian entities and persons sanctioned by the United Nations are in Table 6.)

The main points of Resolution 1929 are:34

- It adds several firms affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard firms to the list of sanctioned entities.
- It makes mandatory a ban on travel for Iranian persons named in it and in previous resolutions—including those Iranians for whom there was a non-binding travel ban in previous resolutions.
- It gives countries the authorization to inspect any shipments—and to dispose of its cargo—if the shipments are suspected to carry contraband items. However, inspections on the high seas are subject to concurrence by the country that owns that ship. This provision is modeled after a similar provision imposed on North Korea, which did cause that country to reverse some of its shipments.
- It prohibits countries from allowing Iran to invest in uranium mining and related nuclear technologies, or nuclear-capable ballistic missile technology.
- It bans sales to Iran of most categories of heavy arms to Iran and requests restraint in sales of light arms, but does not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms.”
- It requires countries to insist that their companies refrain from doing business with Iran if there is reason to believe that such business could further Iran’s WMD programs.
- It requests, but does not mandate, that countries prohibit Iranian banks to open in their countries, or for their banks to open in Iran, if doing so could contribute to Iran’s WMD activities.
- It authorizes the establishment of a “panel of experts,” which is chaired by senior State Department arms control and proliferation adviser Robert Einhorn, to assess the effect of the resolution and previous Iran resolutions and suggest ways of more effective implementation.
- The resolution did not make mandatory some measures that reportedly were considered, including barring any foreign investment in Iranian bond offerings; banning insurance for transport contracts for shipments involving Iran; banning international investment in Iran’s energy sector; banning the provision of trade credits to Iran, or banning all financial dealings with Iranian banks.

34 Text of the resolution is at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Draft_resolution_on_Iran_annexes.pdf.
Table 4. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)

| Require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, and to refrain from any development of ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable (1929) |
| Prohibit transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran, except for use in light-water reactors |
| Prohibit Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology |
| Prohibit Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology |
| Freeze the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard. |
| Require that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians |
| Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran |
| Calls for “vigilance” (a non-binding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. |
| Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing and financial interactions. |
| Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered. |
| A Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitors Implementation of all Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A “panel of experts” is empowered by 1929 to make recommendations for improved enforcement. |


International Implementation and Compliance

U.S. allies have supported the Obama Administration’s sanctions toward Iran, in part because the approach is perceived as not purely punitive, and in part because concerns about Iran’s nuclear advancement have increased. U.S. and European/allied approaches have been gradually converging since 2002, when the nuclear issue came to the fore, but as of 2010, an unprecedented degree of global consensus has emerged on how to deal with Iran. There is a degree of consensus among experts that many countries, not only allies of the United States, are complying with the provisions of U.N. sanctions, but there are selected exceptions (discussed below). Implementation appears to be somewhat less complete in Iran’s immediate region, perhaps because its neighbors do not want confrontation with Iran and are hesitant to disrupt traditional relationships among traders and businessmen in the region.

European Union and Other Western States

In its July 27, 2010, sanctions measures, the product of consensus among the EU states, the EU countries imposed sanctions on Iran that exceed those mandated in Security Council resolutions. Norway is not an EU member but has announced it will adopt the EU sanctions package. A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions against Iran is contained in the chart below.
although noting that there are differing legal bases and authorities for these sanctions. A U.S. presidential proclamation cannot mandate a foreign company take any particular action; however, the U.S. government can penalize or reward foreign firms or individuals who take action that supports U.S. objectives. U.N. Security Council resolutions are considered binding on U.N. Member states. The EU clarified in late October 2010, that its sanctions against Iran do not ban importation of Iranian oil and gas, nor do they ban exports of gasoline to Iran.

Concurrent with the EU announcement of major sanctions on July 27, not only Norway but also Canada and Australia announced similar, although less sweeping, Iran sanctions. This was followed by a series of high-level U.S. visits to numerous countries to try to persuade them to align their policies with those of the United States and the EU. Countries visited included China, which is to be a particular focus because of its energy relations with Iran, UAE, Japan, South Korea, Lebanon, Bahrain, Brazil, and Ecuador.

**Japan and South Korea**

In early September 2010, Japan and then South Korea announced Iran sanctions similar to those of the EU. Both countries adopted measures limiting trade financing for Iran, limiting new banking relations with Iran, sanctioning numerous named Iranian entities, and restricting new projects in Iran’s energy sector. The sanctions adopted by both were far more extensive than was expected by U.S. officials.

**India/Asian Clearing Union**

India has generally been considered friendly toward Iran and unlikely to impose any national sanctions on that country. Therefore, many experts were surprised when India’s central bank, in late December 2010, announced that it would no longer use a regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran. The Asian Clearing Union, based in Tehran, was set up in the 1970s by the United Nations to ease commerce among Asian nations. There have been allegations in recent years that Iran might be using the Clearing Union to handle transactions so as to avoid limitations imposed by European and other banks.

The Indian move complicated India’s purchases of about 350,000-400,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil, and Indian officials subsequently undertook negotiations with Iran to find an alternate mechanism to clear Indian payments for that oil and other Iranian goods. Still, the Indian move—and the reported difficulty in agreeing to a replacement payments mechanism—appeared to signal that India was, at least in part, joining U.S./European-led efforts to shut Iran out of the international financial system. Several banks considered as replacement mechanisms were either under U.N. sanctions or fear fallout (restrictions in the U.S. banking system) from transacting banking business for Iran. The Indian move followed President Obama’s visit there in November 2010. However, in mid-February 2010, India and Iran agreed to use EIH bank (mentioned earlier) to clear the payments. EIH has accounts with National Iranian Oil Company as well as with the Central Bank of Germany, rendering the bank able to process the Indian payments to Iran.

**China, Russia, and Others**

The position of Russia, China, and several other countries is that they will impose only those sanctions required by applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions, but not impose sanctions beyond those specifically mandated. This position on the part of some countries is of concern to
the United States, but an even more significant concern is that these and other countries are refusing or failing to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons and WMD technology.

Secretary of State Clinton singled out China on January 19, 2011, as not enforcing all aspects of international sanctions that bar sales of most nuclear-related equipment to Iran; the comment came of the eve of the state visit to the United States by President Hu Jintao. On March 9, 2011, State Department Special Adviser for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Robert Einhorn, said Iran may be working with Chinese firms to obtain sensitive technology useful for nuclear weapons development. In some cases, Iran has been able, according to some reports, to obtain sophisticated technology even from U.S. firms.35

A related issue is Iran’s efforts to continue supplying weapons to groups it supports (such shipments are barred by U.N. resolutions; see above). In March 2011, Israel intercepted a freighter, the Victoria, that it said was carrying Iranian weapons to Palestinian militant groups. Also in March 2011, Turkey, generally considered friendly toward Iran, complied with U.N. requirements by twice forcing the landing in Turkey of Iranian cargo aircraft. In both cases, the aircraft were searched, and in one instance, weapons were removed, allegedly bound for Syria, before the aircraft were allowed to proceed.

Contrast With Previous Periods

The emerging consensus on Iran sanctions differs from early periods when there was far more disagreement. Reflecting the traditional European preference for providing incentives rather than enacting economic punishments, during 2002-2005, there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA). Such an agreement would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries.36 However, negotiations were discontinued after the election of Ahmadinejad in June 2005, at which time Iran’s position on its nuclear program hardened. Similarly, there is insufficient international support to grant Iran membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) until there is progress on the nuclear issue. Iran first attempted to apply to join the WTO in July 1996. On 22 occasions after that, representatives of the Clinton and then the George W. Bush Administration blocked Iran from applying (applications must be by consensus of the 148 members). As discussed above, as part of an effort to assist the EU-3 nuclear talks with Iran, at a WTO meeting in May 2005, no opposition to Iran’s application was registered, and Iran formally began accession talks.

Earlier, during the 1990s, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, and the EU and Japan refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The European dialogue with Iran was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but resumed in May 1998 during Khatemi’s presidency. In the 1990s, European and Japanese creditors—over U.S. objections—rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt. These


36 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
countries (governments and private creditors) rescheduled the debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. In July 2002, Iran tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution, selling $500 million in bonds to European banks. (A provision of H.R. 6296 would make sanctionable under ISA the purchase of Iranian sovereign debt).

**World Bank Loans**

The July 27, 2010, EU measures appear to narrow substantially the prior differences between the EU and the United States over international lending to Iran. As noted above, the United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote against international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international lending. In 1993 the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the amount of those loans. The legislation contributed to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. (In the 111th Congress, a provision of H.R. 6296—Title VII—cut off U.S. contributions to the World Bank, International Finance Corp., and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Corp. if the World Bank approves a new Country Assistance Strategy for Iran or makes a loan to Iran.)

During 1999-2005, Iran’s moderating image had led the World Bank to consider new loans over U.S. opposition. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.

**Table 5. Points of Comparison Between U.S., U.N., and EU Sanctions Against Iran**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Observation:</strong> Most sweeping sanctions on Iran of virtually any country in the world</td>
<td>Increasingly sweeping, but still intended to primarily target Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs. No mandatory sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>EU abides by all U.N. sanctions on Iran, but new package of Iran sanctions announced July 27, 2010, more closely aligns EU sanctions with those of the U.S. than ever before. Japan and South Korean sanctions (September 2010) similar to EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Sanctions</strong></td>
<td><strong>U.N. Sanctions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on U.S. Trade with and Investment in Iran:</strong></td>
<td>U.N. sanctions do not ban civilian trade with Iran or general civilian sector investment in Iran. Nor do U.N. sanctions mandate restrictions on provision of trade financing or financing guarantees by national export credit guarantee agencies.</td>
<td>No general EU ban on trade in civilian goods with Iran, although the July 27, 2010, sanctions ban sales of energy related equipment and services. EU, Japan, and South Korea measures ban “medium and long term” trade financing and financing guarantees. Short term financing is permitted, but there is a call for EU states to “exercise restraint” on that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive order 12959 bans (with limited exceptions) U.S. firms from exporting to Iran, importing from Iran, or investing in Iran.</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 27, 2010, EU sanctions prohibit EU companies from financing energy sector projects in Iran (a de-facto ban on energy sector investment) and ban sales to Iran of equipment or services for its energy sector, including projects outside Iran. No ban on buying oil or gas from Iran or selling gasoline to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is an exemption for sales to Iran of food and medical products, but no trade financing or financing guarantees are permitted.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan and South Korean measures ban new energy projects in Iran and call for restraint on ongoing projects. EU measures of July 27, 2010, ban grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran. Also prohibit financing of enterprises involved in Iran’s energy sector. Japan and South Korea measures did not specifically ban aid or lending to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions on Foreign Firms that Do Business With Iran’s Energy Sector:</strong></td>
<td>Yes, but no U.N. equivalent exists. However, preambular language in Resolution 1929 “not[es] the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.” This wording is interpreted by most observers as providing U.N. support for countries who want to ban their companies from investing in Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Iran Sanctions Act, P.L. 104-172 (as amended most recently by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195) mandates specified sanctions on foreign firms that invest threshold amounts in Iran’s Energy Sector or that sell certain threshold amounts of refined petroleum or refinery related equipment or services to Iran.</td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Foreign Assistance:</strong></td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—other than purely humanitarian aid—is banned under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. That section bans U.S. assistance to countries on the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Iran has been on this “terrorism list” since January 1984. Iran is also routinely denied direct U.S. foreign aid under the annual foreign operations appropriations acts (most recently in Section 7007 of division H of P.L. 111-8).</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
**Iran Sanctions**

### U.S. Sanctions

**Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:**
Because Iran is on the “terrorism list,” it is ineligible for U.S. arms exports pursuant to Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 95-92). The International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR Part 126.1) also cite the President’s authority to control arms exports, and to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions as a justification to ban arms exports and imports.

**Restriction on Exports to Iran of “Dual Use Items”:**
Primarily under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72) and Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, there is a denial of license applications to sell Iran goods that could have military applications.

**Sanctions Against International Lending to Iran:**
Under Section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118), U.S. representatives to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are required to vote against loans to Iran by those institutions.

**Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Technology to Iran:**
Several laws and regulations, including the Iran-Syria North Korea Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484) and Executive Order 13382 provide for sanctions against entities, Iranian or otherwise, that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs (asset freezing, ban on transaction with the entity).

### U.N. Sanctions

**Resolution 1929 (operative paragraph 8)** bans all U.N. member states from selling or supplying to Iran major weapons systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships, and most missile systems, or related spare parts or advisory services for such weapons systems.

**The U.N. Resolutions on Iran, cumulatively, ban the export of almost all dual-use items to Iran.**

**Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 7)** requests, but does not mandate, that countries and international financial institutions refrain from making grants or loans to Iran, except for development and humanitarian purposes.

**Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph 12)** imposes a worldwide freeze on the assets and property of Iranian entities named in an Annex to the Resolution. Each subsequent Resolution has expanded the list of Iranian entities subject to these sanctions.

### Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries

**EU sanctions include a comprehensive ban on sale to Iran of all types of military equipment, not just major combat systems.**

**No similar Japan and South Korean measures announced, but neither has exported arms to Iran.**

**EU bans the sales of dual use items to Iran, in line with U.N. resolutions.**

**Japan announced full adherence to strict export control regimes when evaluating sales to Iran.**

**The July 27, 2010, measures prohibit EU members from providing grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran, including through international financial institutions.**

**No specific similar Japan or South Korea measures announced.**

**The EU measures imposed July 27, 2010, commit the EU to freezing the assets of entities named in the U.N. resolutions, as well as numerous other named Iranian entities.**

**Japan and South Korea froze assets of U.N.-sanctioned entities.**
### U.S. Sanctions

**Ban on Transactions With Terrorism Supporting Entities:**

Executive Order 13224 bans transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting international terrorism. Numerous entities, including some of Iranian origin, have been so designated.

**Travel Ban on Named Iranians:**

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) provides for a prohibition on travel to the U.S., blocking of U.S.-based property, and ban on transactions with Iranians determined to be involved in serious human rights abuses against Iranians since the June 12, 2009, presidential election there.

**Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:**

Under Executive Order 13382, the U.S. Treasury Department has named Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and several affiliated entities as entities whose U.S.-based property is to be frozen.

### U.N. Sanctions

**Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries**

**Ban on Transactions With Terrorism Supporting Entities:**

No direct equivalent

The U.N. Resolutions against Iran are intended primarily to slow or halt Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs. However, Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 5) bans Iran from exporting any arms—a provision widely interpreted as trying to reduce Iran’s material support to groups such as Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, Shiite militias in Iraq, and insurgents in Afghanistan.

**Travel Ban on Named Iranians:**

Resolution 1803 imposed a binding ban on international travel by several Iranians named in an Annex to the Resolution. Resolution 1929 extended that ban to additional Iranians, and forty Iranians are now subject to the ban. However, the Iranians subject to the travel ban are so subjected because of their involvement in Iran’s WMD programs, not because of involvement in human rights abuses.

**Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:**

Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any ships in national or international waters—if there is an indication that the shipments include goods whose export to Iran is banned.

No direct equivalent, but EU measures taken July 27, 2010, include some IRGC Qods Force and related persons and entities as subject to a freeze on EU-based assets.

The EU measures announced July 27, 2010, contain an Annex of named Iranians subject to a ban on travel to the EU countries. An additional 32 Iranians involved in human rights abuses were subjected to EU sanctions on April 14, 2011.

Japan and South Korea announced bans on named Iranians.

The EU measures announced July 27, 2010, ban Iran Air Cargo from access to EU airports. The measures also freeze the EU-based assets of IRISL and its affiliates. Insurance and re-insurance for Iranian firms is banned.

Japan and South Korean measures take similar actions against IRISL and Iran Air.
Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banking Sanctions:</td>
<td>No direct equivalent</td>
<td>The EU announcement on July 27, 2010, prohibit the opening in EU countries of any new branches or offices of Iranian banks. The measures also prohibit EU banks from offices or accounts in Iran. In addition, the transfer of funds exceeding 40,000 Euros (about $50,000) between and Iranian bank and an EU bank require prior authorization by EU bank regulators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A number of provisions and policies have been employed to persuade foreign banks to end their relationships with Iranian banks. Several Iranian banks have been named as proliferation or terrorism supporting entities under Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, respectively. P.L. 111-195 contains a provision that prohibits banking relationships with U.S. banks for any foreign bank that conducts transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard or with Iranian entities sanctioned under the various U.N. resolutions.</td>
<td>However, two Iranian banks are named as sanctioned entities under the U.N. Security Council resolutions.</td>
<td>Japan and South Korea measures similar to the above, with South Korea adhering to the same 40,000 Euro authorization requirement. Japan and S. Korea froze the assets of 15 Iranian banks; South Korea targeted Bank Mellat for freeze.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No direct equivalent, although, as discussed above, U.S. proliferations laws provide for sanctions against foreign entities that help Iran with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>India ceased using Asian Clearing Union to process payments to Iran as of late December 2010; alternate payments mechanism agreed in mid-February using Hamburg-based EIH,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1929 (oper. paragraph 7) prohibits Iran from acquiring an interest in any country involving uranium mining, production, or use of nuclear materials, or technology related to nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Operative Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1929 prohibits Iran from undertaking “any activity” related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon.</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU measures on July 27, 2010, require adherence to this provision of Resolution 1929.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of Sanctions on Iran

The effectiveness of U.S. and international sanctions on Iran is often difficult to measure, but U.S. officials appear increasingly convinced that the sanctions are compounding the mismanagement and other structural inadequacies of Iran’s economy as well as slowing down the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. officials have stressed since late 2010 that the sanctions are only beginning to apply pressure on Iran’s economy. At various conferences, some Administration officials have urged to allow time for the existing sanctions to work, rather than to turn immediately to additional sanctions.
In addition, at an Iran-related conference on December 10, 2010, White House proliferation adviser Gary Samore said that new sanctions might be considered by the United States and partner countries. As of early May 2011, there does not appear to be active discussions among the P5+1 contact group on Iran’s nuclear program to draw up a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would add further sanctions against Iran. Most experts believe that the most effective sanction would be an embargo on the purchase of Iranian crude oil, although he did not indicate that such a step would be proposed or achieve consensus. With the United States and Europe seeking to boost economic growth, a sanction that would result in a further increase in oil prices would appear unlikely to attract broad support.

Effect on Nuclear Negotiations

There is a consensus that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core strategic objective of causing a demonstrable shift in Iran’s commitment to its nuclear program. Most experts assess that the optimal means for sanctions to affect the nuclear program is by contributing to a decision by Iran to a compromise that would limit Iran’s nuclear development. In late November 2010, Iran accepted new nuclear talks in Geneva. However, during two days of talks (December 6 and 7), Iran did not agree to curbs on its enrichment of uranium, the core U.S. demand. There was an agreement to have new talks in Turkey, which took place during January 21-22, 2011. However, the talks, by all accounts, made little progress as Iran refused to discuss details of various proposals for nuclear confidence building measures. The talks were said to have nearly broken down at the end of the first day and no new talks were announced or have been scheduled.

Counter-Proliferation Effects

A related issue is whether the cumulative sanctions have, in and of themselves, added bottlenecks to Iran’s nuclear efforts by making it difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. At a conference in Australia on November 8, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates, referring to ways to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, said that the “political, economic approach that we are taking is in fact having an impact in Iran.” In a statement in the UAE on January 10, 2011, Secretary of State Clinton said that “The sanctions are working…. Their program, from our best estimate, has been slowed down.” Others, however, say that there is not clear evidence that sanctions are slowing Iran’s program in that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say that Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium continues to expand. The lack of clear evidence that Iran is trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability could be caused by Iranian decisions rather than the effect of sanctions. However, sanctions could be contributing to unrest among the personnel involved in Iran’s program. In October 2010, Iran said it had arrested several “nuclear spies,” suggesting that some Iranians involved in the nuclear program may not be loyal to the government.

General Political Effects

Iran’s growing isolation and economic difficulties caused by the sanctions are apparently widening splits in Iran’s leadership and could cause its leaders to reconsider major foreign policy decisions. This is evident not only from anecdotal and measurable indicators, but also from some statements from Iranian officials. For example, in September 2010, a senior leader, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, criticized Ahmadinejad for dismissing the effect of the burgeoning sanctions on Iran’s economy. Possibly in retaliation, in March 2011 Ahmadinejad succeeded in ousting Rafsanjani from a key position—chairman of the powerful “Assembly of Experts.” Earlier, on December 13, 2010, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fired Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki for failing to prevent the imposition of the various sets of sanctions during summer 2010, although the move could have been motivated more by a desire to weaken Ahmadinejad’s political adversaries to whom Mottaki was linked. As of May 2011, there reportedly are growing differences between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader but primarily over personnel and policy issues unrelated to the effect of sanctions.

At the broader level, in February 2011, the opposition Green movement began returning to the streets with significant protests. However, the protests reflect the underlying political grievances and have not been joined by labor groups or other protesters articulating purely economic demands. In February 2011, as protests were resuming, there was an explosion at a refinery in Abadan that most observers believe was not accidental, although this could have been caused by political or other motives not related to any international sanctions.

While the Green movement has not necessarily broadened as of its return to protests in February 2011, anecdotal reports suggest that many Iranians, particularly in the middle class, which has expanded under the Islamic regime, are blaming the regime for economic difficulties. There has been unrest among small and large merchants who are having trouble obtaining trade financing, insurance, and shipping availability, which is driving up their costs by an estimated 40%, even if the merchants can complete desired transactions at all. A substantial portion of the Iranian economy depends on import-export activity, so the damage to that sector from international sanctions has been considerable. However, precise estimates on how Iran’s GDP might be affected by sanctions, or the pullout of these firms, are not available.

The difficulties felt by the merchant community could have contributed to a July 2010 two-week strike by major Tehran bazaar merchants, a stoppage that spread to other cities. The strike was ostensibly in protest of a government attempt to increase taxation on the merchants by 70%, but it is likely that the broader adverse business climate contributed to the bazaar stoppages. An agreement was eventually reached under which taxation only went up 15%. The merchant community could be a potential “swing constituency” if it sides with the young Green movement activists to mount a concerted challenge to the regime.

Economic Effects

Some of the effects of sanctions on Iran’s economy were discussed in the speech by then Treasury Under Secretary Levey on September 20, 2010, referenced above. He also, in that speech, noted the effect of Iranian mismanagement on Iran’s economic difficulty, separate from sanctions. For

example, Iran’s banks have a high percentage (20%) of loans that are non-performing because of practices of lending to well-connected Iranians rather than judging them on their creditworthiness.

A significant component of U.S. and partner strategy has been to shut Iran out of the global financial system and raise the costs for Iran of financing its transaction. That issue is discussed above in the section on “Banking and Finance: Treasury Department Financial Measures and CISADA.” The effects of the Treasury Department efforts and implementation of Resolution 1929 include:

- During 2006 and 2010, Treasury and State Departments officials say they persuaded at least 80 banks not to provide financing for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Among those that have pulled out of Iran are UBS (Switzerland), HSBC (Britain), Germany’s Commerzbank A.G., and Deutsche Bank AG. U.S. financial diplomacy has reportedly convinced Kuwaiti banks to stop transactions with Iranian accounts, and some banks in Asia (primarily South Korea and Japan) and the rest of the Middle East have done the same. Under Secretary Levey said on September 20, 2010, that “today, Iran is effectively unable to access financial services from reputable banks and is increasingly unable to conduct major transactions in dollars or Euros.”

- In late September 2010, the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, fell by about 15% when the UAE, a major financial hub for Iran, began restricting transactions with Iranian banks sanctioned by U.N. resolutions and by the United States.

- Treasury’s designations of affiliates and ships belong to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) reportedly are harming Iran’s ability to ship goods and raised the prices of goods to Iranian import-export dealers. Some ships have been impounded by various countries for non-payment of debts due on them.

- One notable exception to the Treasury efforts is Hamburg-based Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH). The bank has been sanctioned by the United States (see Table 6) but remains open and conducting business with numerous Iranian entities. It was used in March 2011 to resolve a payments dispute between Iran and India, as discussed above. Some Members of Congress characterize it as Iran’s few remaining access points to the European financial system and have asked the German government to order it closed.

**Foreign Companies Exiting the Iran Market**

Neither the U.S. ban on trade and investment with Iran, nor U.N. sanctions, nor European Union sanctions on Iran, ban trade with Iran in all civilian goods. Still, because the international community has sought to isolate Iran economically, companies all over the world have come to a decision to end their business with Iran, even when such business would not appear to violate any U.N. or national sanction. Many experts believe that, over time, the efficiency and output of

42 Speech by Stuart Levey before the Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 20, 2010.
43 Letter signed by eleven U.S. Senators to German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. February 1, 2011.
Iran’s economy will decline as foreign expertise departs and Iran invites in or makes purchases from less capable foreign companies.

- In August 2010, Japan and South Korea announced that their automakers Toyota and Hyundai, respectively, would conduct no new business with Iran.

- ABB of Switzerland made a similar announcement regarding its products in January 2010.

- Thyssen-Krupp, a German steelmaker, said on September 23, 2010, it would end all business with Iran.

- Germany’s Daimler (Mercedes-Benz maker) said in April 2010 it would freeze planned exports to Iran of cars and trucks.

- Siemens of Germany was active in the Iran telecommunications infrastructure market, but announced in February 2010 that it would cease pursuing business in Iran.

**Foreign Firms Remaining in the Iran Market**

Some firms continue to run the financial risk of doing business with Iran. Some of the well-known firms that continue to do so include Alcatel-Lucent of France; Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ; BNP Paribas of France; Bosch of Germany; Canon of Japan; Fiat SPA of Italy; Ericsson of Sweden; ING Group of the Netherlands; Mercedes of Germany; Renault of France; Samsung of South Korea; Sony of Japan; Volkswagen of Germany; Volvo of Sweden; and numerous others. Some of the foreign firms that trade with Iran, such as Mitsui and Co. of Japan, Alstom of France, and Schneider Electric of France, are discussed in the March 7, 2010, New York Times article on foreign firms that do business with Iran and also receive U.S. contracts or financing. The Times article does not claim that these firms have violated any U.S. sanctions laws.

Other questions have arisen over how U.S. sanctions might apply to business with foreign firms that Iran might acquire a full or partial interest in. Such firms include Daewoo Electronics of South Korea, where an Iranian firm—Entekhab Industrial Corp.—is a leading bidder to take over that firm. Another example is Adabank of Turkey, which reportedly might be sold to Iran.

**Subsidy Phase-Out Issue**

A larger issue, which may have been affected by sanctions, but perhaps positively for Iran, is a long-delayed plan to phase out state subsidies on staple goods such as gasoline and some foods over the next five years. International sanctions might have helped Ahmadinejad convince the Majles (parliament) that passing the subsidy reduction plan was urgent if Iran was to parry the effects of burgeoning international sanctions. After several delays, the program started on December 19, 2010, with a reduction in subsidies of gasoline and bread. The price of traditional bread immediately escalated to 40 cents, from 15 cents, when the program began. Gasoline prices now run on a tiered system in which a small increment is available at the subsidized price of about 1.60 per gallon, but amounts above that threshold are available only at a price of about
$2.60 per gallon, close to the world price. The lower and lower middle class is being compensated with direct cash payments of about $40 per month.\textsuperscript{44}

Major unrest was feared among those in the middle class who might feel deprived by this new program—many of whom are also supportive of the Green movement. However, opposition to the subsidy phase-out plan, in and of itself, appeared minimal. When the plan went into effect in December 2010, some Iranian truckers simply stopped working on the grounds that their work was no longer profitable (because the government limited the amount of extra fees that can be charged to make up for the increase in costs).

**Effect on the Energy Sector**

As noted throughout, the U.S. objective has been to target sanctions against Iran’s energy sector, considered the engine of Iran’s economy and source of most of its revenue. Depriving the regime of revenue, it is believed, will reduce its ability to enlist and maintain the loyalty of security personnel or to buy off key interest groups. There are clear indications that the sanctions—coupled with the overall sense that Iran is isolated from the international community—are causing substantial injury to this sector. State Department Special Advisor Einhorn testified on July 29, 2010, that about $50 billion in investment in Iran’s energy sector had been deterred by sanctions and other forms of pressure. As noted above, several major European firms have either announced pullouts from some of their Iran projects, declined to make further investments, or resold their investments to other companies. The actions to deny Iran financing have, according to the International Monetary Fund, partly dried up financing for energy industry and other projects in Iran. Observers at key energy fields in Iran say there is little evidence of foreign investment activity and little new development activity sighted, including at the large South Pars gas field that Iran has focused on for at least 10 years. It is highly unlikely that Iran will attract the $145 billion in new investment by 2018 that Iran’s deputy Oil Minister said in November 2008 that Iran needs.

Possibly as a result, Iran’s oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.8 million barrels per day (mbd) from about 4.1 million barrels per day (mbd) in the mid-2000s, and is projected to fall to about 3.3 mbd by 2015.\textsuperscript{45} With Iran’s oil production appearing to slip gradually, some analyses, including by the National Academy of Sciences, say that Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.\textsuperscript{46} Others maintain that Iran’s gas sector can more than compensate for declining oil exports, although it needs gas to reinject into its oil fields and remains a relatively minor gas exporter. It exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey. Some Members of Congress believe that ISA would have been even more effective if successive administrations had imposed sanctions available in U.S. law, and have expressed frustration that the executive branch has imposed few, if any, actual sanctions under ISA.

There is also the potential for the EU sanctions to force the closure of a BP-NIOC joint venture in the Rhum gas field, 200 miles off the coast of Scotland. Doing so would likely be up to BP to

\textsuperscript{44} Erdbink, Thomas. “Leaving Iran’s Middle Class Behind.” *Washington Post*, November 7, 2010.

\textsuperscript{45} http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704569204575328851816763476.html.

decide, judging whether continuing the venture could open BP to ISA sanctions, although ISA is generally viewed as applying to oil and gas fields in Iranian territory.

Some believe that a key to further harming Iran’s energy sector is to persuade remaining oil services firms to pull out of Iran. In press articles and in the December 1, 2010, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing discussed above, the large oil services firm Schlumberger, which in incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles, has said it will wind down its business with Iran. However, press reports citing company documents say all contracts with Iran might not be terminated until at least 2013.47

Concerns About “Backfill”

There has been a concern that some of the investment void might be “backfilled,” at least partly, by Asian firms such as those from China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and countries in Eastern Europe. Russian firms are said to be in talks with Iran on new energy projects. However, many such deals are said to be in preliminary stages, and clear examples of “backfilling” are few, to date. Most of the potential backfilling companies are perceived as not being as technically capable as those that have withdrawn from Iran. In July 2010, after the enactment of Resolution 1929 and CISADA, the Revolutionary Guard’s main construction affiliate, Khatem ol-Anbiya, announced it had withdrawn from developing Phases 15 and 16 of South Pars—a project worth $2 billion.48 Khatem ol-Anbiya took over that project in 2006 when Norway’s Kvaerner pulled out of it. It is likely that the IRGC perceived its involvement as likely to scare away foreign participation in the work because U.S. and U.N. sanctions are targeting the IRGC and its corporate affiliates.

Effect on Gasoline Availability and Importation

In March 2010, well before the passage of CSIDA on June 24, 2010, several gas suppliers to Iran, anticipating this legislation, announced that they had stopped or would stop supplying gasoline to Iran.49 Others have ceased since the enactment of CISADA, and some observers say that gasoline deliveries to Iran have fallen from about 3.5 million barrels per day before CISADA to about 900,000 barrels per day.50 That is a decline of nearly 75%, a reduction that most experts continue to view as valid. As noted in a New York Times report of March 7, 2010,51 and a Government Accountability Office study released September 3, 2010,52 some firms that have supplied Iran have received U.S. credit guarantees or contracts.

The main suppliers to Iran over the past few years, and the GAO-reported status of their sales to Iran are listed below (with the caveat that some reports say that partners or affiliates of these firms may still sell to Iran in cases where the corporate headquarters have announced a halt):

- Vitol of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in early 2010);

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•  Trafigura of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in November 2009);
•  Glencore of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling in September 2009);
•  Total of France (notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2010);
•  Reliance Industries of India (notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2009);
•  Petronas of Malaysia (said on April 15, 2010, it had stopped sales to Iran);\(^{53}\)
•  Lukoil of Russia (reportedly to have ended sales to Iran in April 2010,\(^{54}\) although some reports continue that Lukoil affiliates are supplying Iran);
•  Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands (notified GAO it stopped sales in October 2009);
•  Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum Group told U.S. officials it is no longer selling gasoline to Iran, as of September 2010;\(^{55}\)
•  Tupras of Turkey (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran as of enactment of CISADA on July 1, 2010);
•  British Petroleum of United Kingdom and Shell (are no longer selling aviation fuel to Iran Air, according to U.S. State Department officials on September 30, 2010);
•  One UAE firm, Dragon Oil, has not renewed a deal with Iran, which expired in July 2010, to swap oil with Iran via Turkmenistan. Another UAE firm, Golden Crown Petroleum FZE, told the author in April 2011 that, as of June 29, 2010, it no longer leases vessels for the purpose of shipping petroleum products from or through Iran.
•  Munich Re, Allianz, Hannover Re (Germany) were providing insurance and reinsurance for gasoline shipments to Iran. However, they reportedly have exited the market for insuring gasoline shipments for Iran.\(^{56}\)
•  Lloyd’s (Britain). The major insurer had been the main company insuring Iranian gas (and other) shipping, but reportedly has ended that business as of July 2010. According to the State Department, key shipping associations have created clauses in their contracts that enable ship owners to refuse to deliver gasoline to Iran;
•  In addition to BP, various aviation gasoline suppliers at various airports in Europe reportedly have suspended some refueling of Iran Air passenger aircraft after enactment of CISADA. That reportedly has prompted Iran to threaten not to refuel aircraft in Tehran belonging to some major European carriers. OMV of Austria says it is continuing to refuel Iran Air in Vienna.

The State Department reported on September 30, 2010, that Hong Kong company NYK Line Ltd. had ended shipping business with Iran (on any goods, not just gasoline).

**Firms Believed to Still Be Supplying Iran**

- Zhuhai Zhenrong, Unipec, and China Oil of China are said by GAO to still be selling to Iran and have not denied continuing sales to the GAO;
- Petroleos de Venezuela reportedly reached a September 2009 deal to supply Iran with gasoline and is said to still be supplying Iran, although some reports say stopping that activity may be under consideration);
- Emirates National Oil Company of UAE was reported by GAO to still be selling to Iran. Some observers have reported that another UAE firm—Royal Oyster Group still sells gasoline to Iran.
- Hin Leong Trading of Singapore (reported by GAO to still be selling gasoline to Iran).
- Some refiners in Bahrain reportedly may still be selling gasoline to Iran.

Despite the large reduction in gasoline sales to Iran, as of late 2010, Iranian officials have said they have largely coped with the reduction in gasoline imports. The phaseout of gasoline subsidies discussed above has already reportedly begun to reduce demand for gasoline, and contribute to Iran’s strategy to cope with the reduction in gasoline imports. Still, in December 2010 Iran slowed gasoline shipments to Afghanistan under a long-standing arrangement, possible to have gasoline available inside Iran to cope with any unrest that might result from real or perceived gas shortages.

Even before the subsidy reduction, there had not been gasoline shortages or gasoline rationing, although some Iranian oppositionists have reported otherwise. Iran has coped by converting at least two petrochemical plants to gasoline production, through a generally inferior process that initially produces benzene. The gasoline produced reportedly has led to a large increase in air pollution in Tehran, which was expected. Iran also says it has accelerated renovations and other improvements to existing gasoline refineries, allocating $2.2 billion for that purpose.

Building new refining capacity appears to be Iran’s long term effort to reduce its vulnerability to gasoline supply reductions. Iran’s deputy oil minister said in July 2010 Iran would try to invest $46 billion to upgrade its nine refineries and build seven new ones, a far larger amount than Iran had previously allocated to oil refining capacity.

**Recent or Pending Legislation to Impose Additional Sanctions**

Some in Congress believe that the cumulative effect of U.S. and international sanctions remain insufficient to accomplish key U.S. policy goals toward Iran, and are advocating further steps.

As far as economic sanctions, in the 111th Congress, on September 29, 2010, Representative Sherman introduced H.R. 6296, which, in Section 202, would amend ISA to make sanctionable
“long term agreements” to buy oil from Iran—agreements that would involve large, up-front payments to Iran for purchases of oil over a long period of time. An amended version of that bill was introduced in the 112th Congress (H.R. 1655, introduced April 15, 2011).

Among other measures in the 112th Congress, measures have been introduced (S. 366 and H.R. 740) to try to ensure that violations of ISA are noted. The bills would require firms to declare in their required filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission whether that firm had undertaken activity that could violate ISA, CISADA, or executive orders (13224 or 13382) and regulations that bar dealings with designated Iranian entities. Other ideas purportedly circulating in the 112th Congress include making sanctionable all sales of energy related equipment and services to Iran—an action that would presumably be designed to compel large oil service companies to exit the Iran market. Many energy experts believe that Iran is unable to replace the skills provided by Western oil services firms if they were to exit the Iran market—in particular in developing complex oil and gas fields/fractured fields.

Others believe that economic sanctions are already comprehensive and that new areas be further pursued, such as sanctioning Iran for its human rights abuses. Proposals purportedly build on the human rights provisions of CISADA and the earlier Iran Freedom Support Act. In the 111th Congress, S. 3008, the Iran Democratic Transition Act, called for a forthright declaration that it is the policy of the United States to support efforts by the Iranian people to remove the regime. It called for the use of U.S. broadcasting and humanitarian funds to help democratic organizations in Iran.

In the 112th Congress, some observers believe that Senator Cornyn and other Members are likely to support a version of S. 3008, if it is reintroduced. Members who support such legislation have been named to committee chairmanships and other prominent positions. One example is incoming House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who has, in statements since December 2010, said the Administration and Congress should do more to openly support the Iranian opposition Green movement. Other members are said to favor legislation that would require the Administration to sanction Iranian human rights abusers and might provide for sanctions (similar to those in ISA) against foreign firms that sell Iran equipment to suppress protests.
Table 6. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and U.S. Laws and Executive Orders

(Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated; some have since changed.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities Named for Sanctions Under Resolution 1737</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEIO) Mesbah Energy Company (Arak supplier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaye Electric (Natanz supplier))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pars Trash Company (centrifuge program) Farayand Technique (centrifuge program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Industries Organization (DIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th of Tir (DIO subordinate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)—missile program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)—missile program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fajr Industrial Group (missile program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behman Asgarpour (Arak manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehsan Monajemi (Natanz construction manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jafar Mohammadi (Adviser to AEIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Hosein Salimi (Commander, IRGC Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawood Agha Jani (Natanz official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Hajinia Leilabadi (director of Mesbah Energy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri (Malak Ashtar University of Defence Technology rector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Yahid Dastjerdi (head of Aerospace Industries Org., AIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi (Commander in Chief, IRGC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (controls 7th of Tir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parchin Chemical Industries (branch of DIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaj Nuclear Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novin Energy Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Missile Industry Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ya Mahdi Industries Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavoshyar Company (subsidiary of AEIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sho'a Aviation (produces IRGC light aircraft for asymmetric warfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Sepah (funds AIO and subordinate entities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qods Aeronautics Industries (produces UAV's, para-gliders for IRGC asymmetric warfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pars Aviation Services Company (maintains IRGC Air Force equipment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr (IRGC officer serving as deputy Interior Minister)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander)
Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (senior defense scientist)
Mohasen Fakrizadeh-Mahabai (defense scientist)
Seyed Jaber Safdari (Natanz manager)
Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industrial Group)
Ahmad Derakshandeh (head of Bank Sepah)
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (IRGC ground forces commander)
Amir Rahimi (head of Esfahan nuclear facilities)
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (head of SBIG)
Naser Maleki (head of SHIG)
Brig. Gen. Morteza Reza'i (Deputy commander-in-chief, IRGC)
Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan (chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander)

Entities Added by Resolution 1803

Thirteen Iranians named in Annex 1 to Resolution 1803; all reputedly involved in various aspects of nuclear program. Bans travel for five named Iranians.

Electro Sanam Co.
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (centrifuge production)
Barzaganin Tejaral Tavanmad Saccal
Jabber Ibn Hayan
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. (Makes batteries for Iranian military and missile systems)
Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front co.)
Industrial Factories of Precision
Joza Industrial Co.
Pshgarn (Pioneer) Energy Industries
Tamas Co. (involved in uranium enrichment)
Safety Equipment Procurement (AIO front, involved in missiles)

Entities Added by Resolution 1929

Over 40 entities added; makes mandatory a previously non-binding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions. Adds one individual banned for travel—AEIO head Javad Rahiqi

Amin Industrial Complex
Armament Industries Group
Defense Technology and Science Research Center (owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense)……..
Doostan International Company
Farasakht Industries
First East Export Bank, PLC (only bank added by 1929)
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
M. Babaie Industries
Malek Ashtar University (subordinate of Defense Technology and Science Research Center, above)
Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (sells Iranian made arms to customers worldwide)
Mizan Machinery Manufacturing
Modern Industries Technique Company
Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (research component of the AEIO)
Pejman Industrial Services Corp.
Sabalan Company
Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company
Shahid Karrazi Industries
Shahid Sattari Industries
Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (acts on behalf of the DIO)
Special Industries Group (another subordinate of DIO)
Tiz Pars (cover name for SHIG)
Yazd Metallurgy Industries

The following are Revolutionary Guard affiliated firms, several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction affiliate:
Fater Institute
Garaghe Sazendegi Ghaem
Gorb Karbala
Gorb Nooh
Hara Company
Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
Khatam ol-Anbiya
Makin
Omran Sahel
Oriental Oil Kish
Rah Sahel
Rahab Engineering Institute
Sahel Consultant Engineers
Sepanir
Sepasad Engineering Company

The following are entities owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL):
Irano Hind Shipping Company
IRISL Benelux
South Shipping Line Iran

**Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382**
(many designations coincident with designations under U.N. resolutions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran)</td>
<td>June 2005, September 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran) June 2005, February 2009
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran June 2005
Novin Energy Company (Iran) January 2006
Mesbah Energy Company (Iran) January 2006
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) July 2006
Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran) July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran) January 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran) March 2007
Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program) June 2007
Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program) June 2007
Fajr Industries Group (Iran, missile program) June 2007
Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (Iran, missile prog.) June 2007
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran) September 2007
Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea) September 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) October 21, 2007
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics October 21, 2007
Bank Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by Guard); Bank Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC (U.K.) October 21, 2007
Bank Kargoshaee October 21, 2007
Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based in Afghanistan October 21, 2007
Bank Mellat (provides banking services to Iran’s nuclear sector); Mellat Bank SB CJSC (Armenia). Reportedly has $1.4 billion in assets in UAE October 21, 2007
Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.) October 21, 2007
Khataam ol Anbiya Gharargah Sazendegi Nooh (main IRGC construction and contracting arm, with $7 billion in oil, gas deals) October 21, 2007
Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil exploration firm) October 21, 2007
Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh (synonymous with Khataam ol Anbiya) October 21, 2007
Sepasad Engineering Company (Guard construction affiliate) October 21, 2007
Omran Sahel (Guard construction affiliate) October 21, 2007
Sahel Consultant Engineering (Guard construction affiliate) October 21, 2007
Hara Company October 21, 2007
Ghararghe Sazandegi Ghaem October 21, 2007
Bahmanyar Mortezab Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see above under Resolution 1737) October 21, 2007
Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (AIO head, Iran missile program) October 21, 2007
Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO, see under Resolution 1737) October 21, 2007

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Morteza Reza'i (deputy commander, IRGC) See also Resolution 1747 October 21, 2007
Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander). Also, Resolution 1747 October 21, 2007
Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff). Resolution 1747 October 21, 2007
Hosein Salimi (IRGC Air Force commander). Resolution 1737 October 21, 2007
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander). Resolution 1747 October 21, 2007
Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli) March 12, 2008
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief July 8, 2008
Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior Defense Ministry scientist) July 8, 2008
Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz enrichment site) July 8, 2008
Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industries, involved in missile program) July 8, 2008
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (heads Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group) July 8, 2008
Naser Maliki (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group) July 8, 2008
Tamas Company (involved in uranium enrichment) July 8, 2008
Shahid Sattari Industries (makes equipment for Shahid Bakeri) July 8, 2008
7th of Tir (involved in developing centrifuge technology) July 8, 2008
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (partner of 7th of Tir) July 8, 2008
Parchin Chemical Industries (deals in chemicals used in ballistic missile programs) July 8, 2008
Karaj Nuclear Research Center August 12, 2008
Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC) August 12, 2008
Jabber Ibn Hayyan (reports to Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, AEIO) August 12, 2008
Safety Equipment Procurement Company August 12, 2008
Joza Industrial Company (front company for Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, SHIG) August 12, 2008
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8; Kazar; Irinvestship; Shipping Computer Services; Iran o Misr Shipping; Iran o Hind; IRISL Marine Services; Iriatal Shipping; South Shipping; IRISL Multimodal; Oasis; IRISL Europe; IRISL Benelux; IRISL China; Asia Marine Network; CISCO Shipping; and IRISL Malta September 10, 2008
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, including Armament Industries Group; Farasakht Industries; Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co.; Iran Communications Industries; Iran Electronics Industries; and Shiraz Electronics Industries September 17, 2008
Export Development Bank of Iran. Provides financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics October 22, 2008
Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli involved in managing property in New York City on behalf of Iran) December 17, 2008
11 Entities Tied to Bank Melli: Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); Bank Melli Printing and Publishing; Melli Investment Holding; Mehr Cayman Ltd.; Cement Investment and Development; Mazandaran Cement Co.; Shomal Cement; Mazandaran Textile; Melli Agrochemical; First Persian Equity Fund; BMIIC Intel. General Trading March 3, 2009
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi, head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (key corporate arm of the IRGC) February 10, 2010 (see also October 21, 2007)
Entities sanctioned on June 16, 2010
- Post Bank of Iran
- IRGC Air Force
- IRGC Missile Command
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anbiya IRGC construction affiliate)
- Mohammad Ali Jafari—IRGC Commander-in-Chief since September 2007
- Mohammad Reza Naqdi—Head of the IRGC’s Basij militia force that suppresses dissent (since October 2009)
- Ahmad Vahedi—Defense Minister
- javedan Mehr Toos, Javad Karimi Sabet (procurement brokers or atomic energy managers)
- Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (controlled by the Aircraft Industries Org that manages Iran’s missile programs)
- Five front companies for IRISL: Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co.; Safiran Payam Darya; and Hong Kong-based Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics.

Also identified on June 16 were 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated IRISL ships.

Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran for purposes of the ban on U.S. trade with Iran.

Entities sanctioned on November 30, 2010
- Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat
- Pearl Energy Services, SA
- Ali Afzali (high official of First East Export Bank)
- IRISL front companies: Ashtead Shipping, Bynfleet Shipping, Cobham Shipping, Dorking Shipping, Effingham Shipping, Farnham Shipping, Gomshall Shipping, and Horsham Shipping (all located in the Isle of Man).
- IRISL and affiliate officials: Mohammad Hosein Dajmar, Gholamhossein Golpavar, Hassan Jalil Zadeh, and Mohammad Haji Pajand.

Entities sanctioned on December 21, 2010:
- Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC
- Ansar Bank (for providing financial services to the IRGC)
- Mehr Bank (same justification as above)
- Moallem Insurance Company (for providing marine insurance to IRISL, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)

**Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qods Force</td>
<td>October 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian supported terrorist groups)</td>
<td>October 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda Operatives in Iran: Saad bin Laden; Mustafa Hamid; Muhammad Rab’a al-Bahtiyi; Ali Saleh Husain</td>
<td>January 16, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi</td>
<td>August 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and its director Hesam Khoshnevis, for supporting Lebanese Hizballah</td>
<td>August 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Non-Proliferation Act and other U.S. Proliferation Laws (Executive Order 12938)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch, and its director Ali Zuraik, for providing support to Hizballah</td>
<td>August 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razi Musavi, a Syrian based Iranian official allegedly providing support to Hizballah</td>
<td>August 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hizballah)</td>
<td>December 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Mendeleiev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute</td>
<td>January 8, 1999 (E.O. 12938). Both removed on May 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)</td>
<td>July 4, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery shells to Iran.</td>
<td>September 17, 2003 (also designated under Executive Order 12938), removed May 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 entities sanctioned including companies from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan.</td>
<td>April 7, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad), Russia, Spain, and Ukraine.</td>
<td>September 29, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, mostly from China, for alleged supplying of Iran’s missile program. Many, such as North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp, have been sanctioned several times previously. Newly sanctioned entities included North Korea’s Paeksan Associated Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma Enterprise Co.</td>
<td>December 2004 and January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 entities, including those from China (Norinco yet again), India (two chemical companies), and Austria. Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of India (see September 29, 2004) were ended, presumably because of information exonerating him.</td>
<td>December 26, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 entities. Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms (Rosobornexport and aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban entity (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology).</td>
<td>August 4, 2006 (see below for Rosobornexport removal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 entities. Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); Zibo Chemical, China National Aerotechnology, and China National Electrical (China). Korean Mining and Industrial Development (North Korea) for WMD or advanced weapons sales to Iran (and Syria).</td>
<td>January 2007 (see below for Tula and Rosoboronexport removal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. Among the new entities sanctioned for assisting Iran were Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia Company (Singapore); Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); and Arif Durrani (Pakistani national).</td>
<td>April 23, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 entities: China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC, Korea Mining Development Corp. (North Korea); Korea Taesong Trading Co.</td>
<td>October 23, 2008. Rosobornexport removed May 21, 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

(NK); Yolin/Yullin Tech, Inc. (South Korea); Rosoboronexport (Russia state arms export agency); Sudan Master Technology; Sudan Technical Center Co; Army Supply Bureau (Syria); R and M International FZCO (UAE); Venezuelan Military Industries Co. (CAVIM);

Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438

Ahmad Forouzandeh. Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite militia fighters
January 9, 2008

Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. Iran based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq.
January 9, 2008

Isma’il al-Lami (Abu Dura). Shiite militia leader, breakaway from Sadr Mahdi Army, alleged to have committed mass kidnapings and planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians
January 9, 2008

Mishan al-Jabouri. Financier of Sunni insurgents, owner of pro-insurgent Al-Zawra television, now banned
January 9, 2008

Al Zawra Television Station
January 9, 2008

Khata’ib Hezbollah (pro-Iranian Mahdi splinter group)
July 2, 2009

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
July 2, 2009

Iranians Sanctioned Under September 29, 2010, Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers

1. IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari
All sanctioned on September 29, 2010

2. Minister of Interior at time of June 2009 elections Sadeq Mahsouli

3. Minister of Intelligence at time of elections Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei

4. Tehran Prosecutor General at time of elections Saeed Mortazavi

5. Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi

6. Former Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar

7. Deputy National Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan

8. Basij (security militia) Commander at time of elections Hossein Taeb

Sanctioned on February 23, 2011

10. Basij forces commander (since October 2009) Mohammad Reza Naqdi (was head of Basij intelligence during post 2009 election crackdown)

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