Iran Sanctions

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Summary

There appears to be a growing international consensus to adopt progressively strict economic sanctions against Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. Measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to slow Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and curb its support for militant groups. The U.S. view—shared by major allies—is that sanctions should target the development of Iran’s energy sector that provides about 80% of government revenues, and try to isolate Iran, particularly its Revolutionary Guard Corps, from the international financial system. U.S. efforts to curb international energy investment in Iran’s energy sector began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), a U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that conduct certain business with Iran’s energy sector. ISA represented a U.S. effort, which is now broadening, to persuade foreign firms to choose between the Iranian market and the much larger U.S. and other developed markets. In the 111th Congress, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) expanded ISA significantly to try to restrict Iran’s ability to make or import gasoline, for which Iran depends heavily on imports. CISADA also adds a broad range of other measures further restricting the already limited amount of U.S. trade with Iran and restricting some high technology trade with countries that allow WMD-useful technology to reach Iran.

CISADA’s enactment followed the June 9, 2010, adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes a ban on sales of heavy weapons to Iran and sanctions many additional Iranian entities affiliated with its Revolutionary Guard, but does not mandate sanctions on Iran’s energy or broad financial sector. European Union sanctions, imposed July 27, 2010, align the EU with the U.S. position, to a large extent, by prohibiting EU involvement in Iran’s energy sector and restricting trade financing and banking relationships with Iran, among other measures. National measures announced by Japan and South Korea in early September 2010—both are large buyers of Iranian energy—impose restrictions similar to those of the EU. Even India, perceived as highly hesitant to antagonize Iran, has begun to impose sanctions on Iran.

Because so many major economic powers have imposed sanctions on Iran, the sanctions are, by all accounts, having a growing effect on Iran’s economy. The sanctions are reinforcing the effects of Iran’s economic mismanagement and key bottlenecks. Among other indicators, there has been a stream of announcements by major international firms during 2010 that they are exiting the Iranian market. Iran’s oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.9 million barrels per day, from over 4.1 million barrels per day several years ago, although Iran now has small natural gas exports that it did not have before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Sales to Iran of gasoline have fallen dramatically since CISADA was enacted. U.S. officials say that the cumulative effect of sanctions could harm Iran’s economy to the point where domestic pressure compels Iranian leaders to accept a nuclear compromise - the key strategic objective of the sanctions. However, there is a consensus that sanctions have not, to date, caused such an Iranian policy shift. Possibly in an effort to accomplish the separate objective of promoting the cause of the domestic opposition in Iran, the Obama Administration and Congress are increasingly emphasizing measures that would sanction Iranian officials who are human rights abusers, facilitate the democracy movement’s access to information, and express outright U.S. support for the opposition. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Overview

The Obama Administration’s policy approach toward Iran has contrasted with the Bush Administration’s by attempting to couple the imposition of sanctions to a consistent, direct U.S. effort to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue. That approach was not initially altered because of the Iranian dispute over its June 12, 2009, elections. However, with subsequent negotiations yielding no firm Iranian agreement to compromise, since early 2010 the Administration has focused on achieving the imposition of additional U.N., U.S., and allied country sanctions whose cumulative effect would be to compel it to accept a nuclear bargain.

U.N. sanctions on Iran (the latest of which are imposed by Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010) are a relatively recent (post-2006) development. U.S. sanctions, on the other hand, have been a major feature of U.S. Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Many of the U.S. sanctions overlap each other as well as the several U.N. sanctions now in place. The Obama Administration and Congress—including in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)—have also begun to also alter some U.S. laws and regulations to help Iran’s domestic opposition that has seethed since the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran. On September 29, 2010, as provided by CISADA, President Obama signed an executive order that imposed U.S. sanctions on eight named Iranian officials—mostly Revolutionary Guard, other security, and judicial officials—determined to have committed serious human rights abuses in Iran. President Obama renewed for another year the U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran (Executive Order 12959) in March 2010.

As noted, the focus of Iran-related legislation in the 111th Congress has been to expand the provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) to apply to sales to Iran of gasoline and related equipment and services. For at least 10 years after it was enacted, ISA had caused differences of opinion between the United States and its European allies because it mandates U.S. imposition of sanctions on foreign firms. Successive Administrations have sought to ensure that the congressional sanctions initiative does not hamper cooperation with key international partners whose support is needed to adopt stricter international sanctions. This concern was incorporated, to a large extent, in CISADA. An indication that U.S. allies have aligned with the U.S. position on sanctioning Iran, the European Union, on July 27, 2010, adopted sanctions against Iran, targeting its energy and financial sector. Japan and South Korea followed suit with similar sanctions in September 2010.

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) is one among many U.S. sanctions in place against Iran. Since its first enactment, it has attracted substantial attention because it authorizes penalties against foreign firms, many of which are incorporated in countries that are U.S. allies. Congress and the Clinton Administration saw ISA as a potential mechanism to compel U.S. allies to join the United States in enacting trade sanctions against Iran. American firms are restricted from trading with or investing in Iran under separate U.S. executive measures, as discussed below. As noted, a law enacted in the 111th Congress (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) amended ISA to try to curtail additional types of activity, such as selling gasoline and gasoline production-related equipment and services to Iran, and to restrict international banking relationships with Iran (among many provisions).
Legislative History and Provisions

Originally called the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), ISA was enacted to try to deny Iran the resources to further its nuclear program and to support terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran’s petroleum sector generates about 20% of Iran’s GDP, and 80% of its government revenue. Iran’s oil sector is as old as the petroleum industry itself, and Iran’s onshore oil fields and oil industry infrastructure are far past peak production and in need of substantial investment. Its large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded only by Russia) were virtually undeveloped when ISA was first enacted. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third-largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada.

The opportunity for the United States to try to harm Iran’s energy sector came in November 1995, when Iran opened the sector to foreign investment. To accommodate its insistence on retaining control of its national resources, Iran used a “buy-back” investment program in which foreign firms gradually recoup their investments as oil and gas is discovered and then produced. With input from the Administration, on September 8, 1995, Senator Alfonse D’Amato introduced the “Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act” to sanction foreign firms’ exports to Iran of energy technology. A revised version instead sanctioning investment in Iran’s energy sector passed the Senate on December 18, 1995 (voice vote). On December 20, 1995, the Senate passed a version applying the provisions to Libya, which was refusing to yield for trial the two intelligence agents suspected in the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103. The House passed H.R. 3107, on June 19, 1996 (415-0), and then concurred on a Senate version adopted on July 16, 1996 (unanimous consent). The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was signed on August 5, 1996 (P.L. 104-172).

Key "Triggers"

ISA consists of a number of “triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions. When triggered, ISA provides a number of different sanctions that the President could impose that would harm a foreign firm’s business opportunities in the United States. ISA does not, and probably could not practically, compel any foreign government to take action against one of its firms.

The pre-2010 version of ISA requires the President to sanction companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector, or sell

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1 The definition of “investment” in ISA (Section 14 (9)) includes not only equity and royalty arrangements (including additions to existing investment, as added by P.L. 107-24) but any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran. As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures.

2 Under Section 4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. However, P.L. 111-195 explicit sets the threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and sanctionable activity included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).

3 The definition of energy sector had included oil and natural gas, but now, as a consequence of the enactment of P.L. 111-195, also includes liquified natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG.
to Iran weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology or “destabilizing numbers and types” of advanced conventional weapons.\(^4\)

ISA primarily targets foreign firms, because American firms are already prohibited from investing in Iran under the 1995 trade and investment ban discussed earlier. As shown in the table below, P.L. 111-195 added new triggers: selling to Iran (over specified threshold amounts) refined petroleum (gasoline, aviation fuel, and other fuels included in the definitions); and equipment or services for Iran to expand its own ability to produce refined petroleum. (Fuel oil, a petroleum by-product which is reportedly being sold to Iran by exporters in the Kurdish region of Iraq, is not included in the definition of refined petroleum.)

**Requirement and Time Frame to Investigate Violations**

In the original version of ISA, there was no time frame for the Administration to determine that a firm has violated ISA’s provisions. Some might argue that the amendments of P.L. 111-195 still do not set a binding determination deadline, although the parameters are narrowed significantly. Earlier, P.L. 109-293, the “Iran Freedom Support Act” (signed September 30, 2006) amended ISA by calling for, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination (there is no time limit in the original law). Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs.

In restricting the Administration’s ability to choose not to act on information about potential violations, P.L. 111-195 makes mandatory that the Administration begin an investigation of potential ISA violations when there is credible information about a potential violation. P.L. 111-195 also makes mandatory the 180 day time limit for a determination (with the exception that the mandatory investigations and time limit go into effect one year after enactment, with respect to gasoline related sales to Iran.)

Earlier versions of legislation (H.R. 282, S. 333) that ultimately became P.L. 109-293 contained ISA amendment proposals that were viewed by the Bush Administration as too inflexible and restrictive, and potentially harmful to U.S. relations with its allies. These provisions included setting a mandatory 90-day time limit for the Administration to determine whether an investment is a violation; cutting U.S. foreign assistance to countries whose companies violate ISA; and applying the U.S.-Iran trade ban to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.

**Available Sanctions Under ISA**

Once a firm is determined to be a violator, the original version of ISA required the imposition of two of a menu of six sanctions on that firm. CISADA added three new possible sanctions and requires the imposition of at least three out of the nine against violators. The available sanctions against the sanctioned entity that the President can select from (Section 6) include:

1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity;

\(^4\) This latter “trigger” was added by P.L. 109-293.
2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity;
3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity;
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction);
5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity;
6. restriction on imports from the violating entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701);
7. prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity;
8. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution;
9. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, or trading any U.S.-based property.

New Mandatory Sanction Imposed by CISADA: Prohibition on Contracts With the U.S. Government

P.L. 111-195 adds a provision to incent companies not to violate ISA. It requires companies, as a condition of obtaining a U.S. government contract, to certify to the relevant U.S. government agency, that the firm is not violating ISA, as amended. A contract may be terminated—and further penalties imposed—if it is determined that the company’s certification of compliance was false. CISADA requires a revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (within 90 days of CISADA enactment on July 1, 2010) to reflect this requirement. This requirement has been imposed in regulations, according to observers. (H.R. 6296, introduced September 29, 2010, would authorize state and local governments to similarly ban such contracts.)

Waiver and Termination Authority

The President has had the authority under ISA to waive sanctions if he certifies that doing so is important to the U.S. national interest (Section 9(c)). CISADA changed the 9(c) waiver standard to “necessary” to the national interest. Under the original version of ISA, there was also waiver authority (Section 4c) if the parent country of the violating firm joined a sanctions regime against Iran, but this waiver provision was changed by P.L. 109-293 to allow for a waiver determination based on U.S. vital national security interests. The Section 4(c) waiver was altered by CISADA to provide for a six month (extendable) waiver if doing so is vital to the national interest and if the parent country of the violating entity is “closely cooperating” with U.S. efforts against Iran's WWMD and advanced conventional weapons program. The criteria of “closely cooperating” are defined in the conference report, with primary focus on implementing all U.N. sanctions against Iran. However, it is not clear why a Section 4 waiver would be used as opposed to a Section 9 waiver, although it could be argued that using a Section 4 waiver would support U.S. diplomacy with the parent country of the offending entity.

ISA (Section 5(f)) also contains several exceptions such that the President is not required to impose sanctions that prevent procurement of defense articles and services under existing contracts, in cases where a firm is the sole source supplier of a particular defense article or
service. The President also is not required to prevent procurement or importation of essential spare parts or component parts.

In the 110th Congress, several bills contained provisions that would have further amended ISA, but they were not adopted. H.R. 1400, which passed the House on September 25, 2007 (397-16), would have removed the Administration’s ability to waive ISA sanctions under Section 9(c), national interest grounds, but it would not have imposed on the Administration a time limit to determine whether a project is sanctionable.

**Special Rule Exempting Firms That Pull Out of Iran**

CISADA also provides a means—a so-called “special rule”—for firms to avoid any possibility of U.S. sanctions by pledging to verifiably end their business with Iran and to forgo any sanctionable business with Iran in the future. Under the special rule, the Administration is not required to make a determination of sanctionability against a firm that makes such pledges. The special rule was invoked on September 30, 2010 and again on November 17, 2010.

**Termination Requirements**

In its entirety, ISA application to Iran would terminate if Iran is determined by the Administration to have ceased its efforts to acquire WMD; is removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and no longer “poses a significant threat” to U.S. national security and U.S. allies. The amendments to ISA made by P.L. 111-195 would terminate if the first two of these criteria are met.

**ISA Sunset**

ISA was to sunset on August 5, 2001, in a climate of lessening tensions with Iran (and Libya). During 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration had eased the trade ban on Iran somewhat to try to engage the relatively moderate Iranian President Mohammad Khatemi. However, some maintained that Iran would view its expiration as a concession, and renewal legislation was enacted (P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001). This law required an Administration report on ISA’s effectivenes within 24 to 30 months of enactment; that report was submitted to Congress in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be repealed. ISA was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2011 (as provided by P.L. 109-293). The sunset is now December 31, 2016, as provided for in the CISADA, P.L. 111-195).

**Interpretations and Implementation**

Traditionally reticent to impose economic sanctions, the European Union opposed ISA, when it was first enacted, as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and filed a formal complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO). In April 1997, the United States and the EU agreed to avoid a trade confrontation over ISA and a separate Cuba sanctions law (P.L. 104-114). The

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5 This latter termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293. This law also removed Libya from the act, although application to Libya effectively terminated when the President determined on April 23, 2004, that Libya had fulfilled the requirements of all U.N. resolutions on Pan Am 103.
agreement involved the dropping of the WTO complaint and the May 18, 1998, decision by the Clinton Administration to waive ISA sanctions (“national interest”—Section 9c—waiver) on the first project determined to be in violation. That project was a $2 billion contract, signed in September 1997, for Total SA of France and its partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia, to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25+ phase South Pars gas field. The EU, for its part, pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Then-Secretary of State Albright, in a statement, indicated that similar future such projects by EU firms in Iran would not be sanctioned, provided overall EU cooperation against Iranian terrorism and proliferation continued.7 (The EU sanctions against Iran, announced July 27, 2010, might render this understanding moot because they ban EU investment in and supplies of equipment and services to Iran’s energy sector.)

September 30, 2010, and Subsequent ISA Sanctions Determinations

Since the Total/Petronas/Gazprom project in 1998, no projects were determined as violations of ISA until a State Department announcement of September 30, 2010.8 Prior to the passage of CISADA, several members of Congress questioned why no penalties had been imposed for violations of ISA. State Department reports to Congress on ISA, required every six months, have routinely stated that U.S. diplomats raise U.S. policy concerns about Iran with investing companies and their parent countries. However, these reports have not specifically stated which foreign companies, if any, were being investigated for ISA violations. No publication of such deals has been placed in the Federal Register (requirement of Section 5e of ISA).

In 2008, in an effort to address the congressional criticism, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns testified on July 9, 2008 (House Foreign Affairs Committee), that the Statoil project (listed in Table 2) is under review for ISA sanctions. Statoil is incorporated in Norway, which is not an EU member and which would therefore not fall under the 1998 U.S.-EU agreement discussed above.

Possibly in response to the pending CISADA legislation, and to an October 2009 letter signed by 50 members of Congress referencing the CRS table below, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 28, 2009, that the Obama Administration would review investments in Iran for violations of ISA. Feltman testified that the preliminary review would be completed within 45 days (by December 11, 2009) to determine which projects, if any, require further investigation. Feltman testified that some announced projects were for political purposes and did not result in actual investment.

On February 25, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the State Department’s preliminary review was completed in early February and that some of the cases reviewed “deserve[] more consideration” and were undergoing additional scrutiny. The preliminary review, according to the testimony, was conducted, in part, through State Department officials’ contacts with their counterpart officials abroad and corporation…

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6 Dollar figures for investments in Iran represent public estimates of the amounts investing firms are expected to spend over the life of a project, which might in some cases be several decades.

7 Text of announcement of waiver decision by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, containing expectation of similar waivers in the future. http://www.parstimes.com/law/albright_southpars.html.

8 Much of this section is derived from a meeting between the CRS author and officials of the State Department’s Economics Bureau, which is tasked with the referenced review of investment projects. November 24, 2009.
officials. The additional investigations of problematic investments would involve the intelligence community, according to Secretary Clinton. State Department officials told CRS in November 2009 that any projects that the State Department plan was to complete the additional investigation and determine violations within 180 days of the completion of the preliminary review. (The 180-day time frame is, according to the Department officials, consistent with the Iran Freedom Support Act amendments to ISA discussed above.) That would mean that a final determination of sanctionability would be due in early August 2010 (180 days from “early February). On June 22, 2010, Assistant Secretary of State William Burns testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there are “less than 10” cases in which it appears there may have been violations of ISA, and that Secretary of State Clinton is consulting with “other agencies” about what actions are appropriate, as preparation for a sanctionability determination.

Several determinations of sanctionability were made on September 30, 2010. That day, a Swiss-based oil trading company—Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO)—was sanctioned under ISA. The three penalties selected were a ban on Ex-Im Bank credits; a denial of dual use export licensing to the firm; and a denial of bank loans exceeding $10 million. The mandatory ban on receiving U.S. government contracts applies as well. That same day, following a months-long Administration review discussed later, four major energy sector investing companies were deemed eligible to avoid sanctions, under the ISA “special rule,” by pledging to end their business in Iran. They are

- Total of France,
- Statoil of Norway,
- ENI of Italy, and
- Royal Dutch Shell of Britain and the Netherlands.
- Inpex of Japan was exempted from sanctions under the special rule on November 17, 2010, according to a State Department announcement. The firm announced on October 15, 2010, that it is shedding its stake in the Azadegan development project shown in the table.

There remains some difference of opinion on the Administration invocation of the special rule, as arose during a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 1, 2010. At the hearing, Undersecretary Burns stated that companies exempted under the special rule had pledged to end their existing investments in Iran “in the very near future.” Some members of Congress questioned the imprecision of that time frame and others question the process for determining whether a firm is adhering to its pledge to pursue no future business in Iran’s energy sector.

As shown in Table 2 below, several additional foreign investment agreements have been agreed with Iran since the 1998 Total consortium waiver, although some have stalled, not reached final agreement, or may not have resulted in actual production. Some of the firms listed as investors are apparently still under Administration scrutiny, and the Administration states that determinations will be made within 180 days (by April 1, 2011). However, the Administration did not say which of the reported investments may still be under investigation.

**Non-Application to Crude Oil or Natural Gas Purchases**

Purchases of oil or natural gas from Iran are generally considered not to constitute violations of ISA, because ISA sanctions *investment* in Iran’s energy sector and (following enactment of P.L.
sales to Iran of gasoline or gasoline-related services or equipment. Some of the deals listed in the chart later in this report involve combinations of investment and purchase. Nor does ISA sanction sales to Iran of equipment that Iran could use to explore or extract its own oil or gas resources, unless such sales are structured as investments, under the definition of that term provided in ISA. For example, selling Iran an oil or gas drill rig or motors or other gear that Iran will use to drill for oil or gas would not appear to be sanctionable. On the other hand, because of CISADA, sales of more advanced equipment, which are sometimes structured to provide ongoing profits or royalties to fund the equipment, could potentially be sanctionable. In addition, as a result of enactment of P.L. 111-195, sanctionable activity includes sales of equipment to Iran to enhance or expand its oil refineries, or equipment with which Iran could import gasoline (such as tankers), and of equipment that Iran could use to construct an energy pipeline. (On September 29, 2010, Representative Sherman introduced H.R. 6296 which, in Section 202, would amend ISA to make sanctionable “long term agreements” to buy oil from Iran—agreements that would involve large, up-front payments to Iran for purchases of oil over a long period of time.)

Several significant examples of major purchases of Iran oil and gas resources have occurred in recent years. In March 2008, Switzerland’s EGL utility agreed to buy 194 trillion cubic feet per year of Iranian gas for 25 years, through a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to be built by 2010, a deal valued at over $15 billion. The United States criticized the deal as sending the “wrong message” to Iran. However, as testified by Under Secretary of State Burns on July 9, 2008, the deal appears to involve only purchase of Iranian gas, not exploration, and would likely not be considered an ISA violation. In August 2008, Germany’s Steiner-Prematechnik-Gastec Co. agreed to apply its method of turning gas into liquid fuel at three Iranian plants.

Official credit guarantee agencies are not considered sanctionable entities under ISA. In the 110th Congress, several bills—including S. 970, S. 3227, S. 3445, H.R. 957 (passed the House on July 31, 2007), and H.R. 7112 (which passed the House on September 26, 2008)—would have expanded the definition of sanctionable entities to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes, and to financial institutions and insurers generally. Some versions of CISADA would have made these entities sanctionable but these provisions were not included in the final law, probably out of concern for alienating U.S. allies in Europe.
**Major Energy Buyers From Iran (2009)**

*amounts in millions of U.S. dollars*

*(includes mineral fuels, crude oil, natural gas, distillates, and the like)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>309.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>372.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>182.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>964.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>214.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>21,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5,420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>843.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>127.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>174.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted by CRS, Susan Chesser, from the World Trade Atlas.

**Application to Energy Pipelines**

As noted earlier, ISA’s definition of sanctionable “investment”—which specifies investment in Iran’s petroleum resources, defined as petroleum and natural gas—has been interpreted by successive administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. That interpretation was reinforced by the amendments to ISA in P.L. 111-195, which include in the definition of petroleum resources “products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied natural gas.” The Clinton and Bush Administrations used the threat of ISA sanctions to deter oil routes involving Iran and thereby successfully promoted an alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan). The route became operational in 2005.

Only a few significant pipelines involving Iran have been constructed in recent years—a line built in 1997 to carry natural gas from Iran to Turkey. Each country constructed the pipeline on its side.
of their border. At the time the project was under construction, State Department testimony stated that Turkey would be importing gas originating in Turkmenistan, not Iran, under a swap arrangement. That was one reason given for why the State Department did not determine that the project was sanctionable under ISA. However, many believe the decision not to sanction the pipeline was because the line was viewed as crucial to Turkey, a key U.S. ally. That explanation was reinforced when direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001, and no determination of sanctionability has been made. In May 2009, Iran and Armenia inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by Gazprom of Russia. No determination of sanctionability has been announced.

As shown in Table 2, in July 2007, a preliminary agreement was reached to build a second Iran-Turkey pipeline, through which Iranian gas would also flow to Europe. That agreement was not finalized during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008 because of Turkish commercial concerns, but the deal reportedly remains under discussion. On February 23, 2009, Iranian newspapers said Iran had formed a joint venture with a Turkish firm to export 35 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Europe; 50% of the venture would be owned by the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC).

Iran and Kuwait have held talks on the construction of a 350-mile pipeline that would bring Iranian gas to Kuwait. The two sides have apparently reached agreement on volumes (8.5 million cubic meters of gas would go to Kuwait each day) but not on price.9 There are also discussions reported between Iran and Iraq on constructing pipelines to facilitate oil and gas swaps between the two, but no firm movement on these projects is evident.

**Iran-India Pipeline**

Another pending pipeline project would carry Iranian gas, by pipeline, to Pakistan. India had been a part of the $7 billion project, which would take about three years to complete, but India was reported in June 2010 to be largely out of the project. India did not sign a memorandum between Iran and Pakistan finalizing the deal on June 12, 2010. India reportedly has been concerned about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be officially transferred to India, pricing of the gas, tariffs, and the source in Iran of the gas to be sold.

During the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Rice on several occasions “expressed U.S. concern” about the pipeline deal or called it “unacceptable.” Possibly contributing to India’s hesitancy to move forward, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the Administration Special Representative on Pakistan and Afghanistan, during 2010 trips to Pakistan, raised the possibility that the project could be sanctioned if it is undertaken, citing enactment of CISADA. Other steps taken by India in late 2010 to prevent some banking transactions with Iran, discussed later, could suggest that India is now cautious about any expansion of energy or other commercial relations with Iran. Previously, the threat of imposition of U.S. sanctions had not dissuaded Indian firms from taking some equity stakes in various Iranian energy projects, as shown in the table below.

India may envision an alternative to the pipeline project, as a means of tapping into Iran’s vast gas resources. During high-level economic talks in early July 2010, Iranian and Indian officials reportedly raised the issue of constructing an underwater natural gas pipeline, which would avoid

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going through Pakistani territory. However, such a route would presumably be much more expensive to construct than would be an overland route.

**European Gas Pipeline Routes**

Iran also is attempting to position itself as a gas exporter to Europe. A potential project involving Iran is the Nabucco pipeline project, which would transport Iranian gas to western Europe. Iran, Turkey, and Austria reportedly have negotiated on that project. The Bush Administration did not support Iran’s participation in the project, and the Obama Administration apparently takes the same view, even though the project might make Europe less dependent on Russian gas supplies. Iran’s Energy Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari said on April 2, 2009, that Iran is considering negotiating a gas export route—the “Persian Pipeline”—that would send gas to Europe via Iraq, Syria, and the Mediterranean Sea.

**Application to Iranian Firms or the Revolutionary Guard**

Although ISA is widely understood to apply to firms around the world that reach an investment agreement with Iran, the provisions could also be applied to Iranian firms and entities subordinate to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is supervised by the Oil Ministry. The firm that was sanctioned, Naftiran Interrade Company (NICO), is one such entity; it is a subsidiary of NIOC. However, such entities, including Naftiran, do not do business in the United States and would not likely be harmed by any of the penalties that could be imposed under ISA. Some of the other major components of NIOC are:

- The Iranian Offshore Oil Company;
- The National Iranian Gas Export Co.;
- National Iranian Tanker Company; and
- Petroleum Engineering and Development Co.

Actual construction and work is largely done through a series of contractors. Some of them, such as Khatam ol-Anbia and Oriental Kish, have been identified by the U.S. government as controlled by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and have been sanctioned under various executive orders, discussed below. The relationship of other Iranian contractors to the Guard, if any, is unclear. Some of the Iranian contractor firms include Pasargad Oil Co., Zagros Petrochem. Co, Sazeh Consultants, Qeshm Energy, Sadid Industrial Group, and others.

A provision of H.R. 6296, introduced September 29, 2010, would extend ISA sanctionability to any energy project conducted with NIOC, anywhere in the world.

**Application to Liquefied Natural Gas**

The original version of ISA did not apply to the development of liquefied natural gas. Iran has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. However, CISADA, specifically includes LNG in the definition of petroleum resources and therefore makes investment in LNG (or supply of LNG tankers or pipelines) sanctionable.
Enhancements to ISA Under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, H.R. 2194/P.L. 111-195)

ISA, as initially constituted, had limited applications to Iran’s gasoline dependency. Selling Iran equipment with which it can build or expand its refineries using its own construction capabilities did not appear to constitute “investment” under the previous definition of ISA. However, taking responsibility for constructing oil refineries or petrochemical plants in Iran has always constituted sanctionable projects under ISA because ISA’s definition of investment includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran.” (Table 2 provides some information on openly announced contracts to upgrade or refurbish Iranian oil refineries.)

It is not clear whether or not Iranian investments in oil refineries in several other countries, such as Iranian investment to help build five oil refineries in Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and in Syria, reported in June 2007, would have constituted “investment” under ISA. However, a provision of H.R. 6296, introduced September 29, 2010, would make sanctionable any joint project with NIOC, anywhere in the world.

Rationale and Passage of CISADA—Reducing Gasoline Sales to Iran

Many in the 111th Congress took exception to the fact that selling or shipping gasoline to Iran did not previously constitute sanctionable activity under ISA. Prior to CISADA enactment, Iran was dependent on gasoline imports to meet about 40% of its gasoline needs. Even before enactment of CISADA, Iran had been trying to reduce that dependence by announcing plans to build or expand, possibly with foreign investment, at least eight refineries. There have been a relatively limited group of major gasoline suppliers to Iran, and many in Congress believed that trying to stop such sells could put economic pressure on Iran’s leaders. The ideas that became the core of CISADA were introduced as legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2880 would have made sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources a violation of ISA. In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2880 would have made sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources a violation of ISA.

In the 111th Congress, a few initiatives were adopted prior to CSIDA. Using U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with products from firms that sell over $1 million worth of gasoline to Iran is prevented by the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriation (H.R. 3183, P.L. 111-85, signed October 28, 2009). A provision of the FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) would deny Ex-Im Bank credits to any firm that sells gasoline to Iran, provides equipment to Iran that it can use to expand its oil refinery capabilities, or performs gasoline production projects in Iran. The Senate version of an FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) would prohibit Defense Department contracts for companies that sell gasoline to Iran or otherwise violate ISA; this provision would seem to be redundant with a provision of CSIDA, which is now law.

In the past, some threats to sanction foreign gasoline sellers to Iran have deterred sales to Iran. The Reliance Industries Ltd. of India decision to cease new sales of refined gasoline to Iran (as of December 31, 2008), mentioned above, came after several members of Congress urged the Ex-Im Bank of the United States to suspend assistance to Reliance, on the grounds that it was assisting Iran’s economy with the gas sales. The Ex-Im Bank, in August 2008, had extended a total of $900 million in financing guarantees to Reliance to help it expand.

In April 2009, several bills were introduced—H.R. 2194, S. 908, H.R. 1208, and H.R. 1985—that would amend ISA to make sanctionable efforts by foreign firms to supply refined gasoline to Iran
or to supply equipment to Iran that could be used by Iran to expand or construct oil refineries. H.R. 2194 and S. 908 were both titled the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009 (IRPSA). H.R. 2194 passed the House on December 15, 2009, by a vote of 412-12, with four others voting “present” and six others not voting.

A bill in the Senate, the “Dodd-Shelby Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act,” (S. 2799), was reported to the full Senate by the Senate Banking Committee on November 19, 2009, and passed the Senate, by voice vote, on January 28, 2010. It was adopted by the Senate under unanimous consent as a substitute amendment to H.R. 2194 on March 11, 2010, setting up conference action on the two versions of H.R. 2194. The Senate bill contained very similar provisions of the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, but, as discussed in Table 1 below, added provisions affecting U.S.-Iran trade and other issues.

A public meeting of the House-Senate conference, chaired by Representative Berman and Senator Dodd, was held on April 28, 2010. Obama Administration officials were said to be concerned by some provisions of H.R. 2194 because of the legislation’s potential to weaken allied unity on Iran. The Administration sought successfully to persuade members to delay passage of until a new U.N. sanctions resolution was adopted—for fear that some P5+1 countries might refuse to support the U.N. resolution if there is a chance their firms would be sanctioned by a new U.S. law. The U.N. Resolution was adopted on June 9, 2010. A conference report on H.R. 2194 was agreed on June 22, 2010, and was submitted on June 23, 2010. On June 24, 2010, the Senate passed it 99-0, and the House passed it 408-8, with one voting “present.” President Obama welcomed the passage and signed it into law on July 1, 2010.

As widely predicted, and as shown in the table below, the final version contained many of the extensive provisions of the Senate version, and some of the efforts to compel sanctions represented in the House version. The Administration reportedly insisted that any agreed bill automatically exempt from sanctions firms of countries that are cooperating against the Iranian nuclear program. That concern was not directly met in the final version, although, as noted, the final law allows for waivers, delayed mandatory investigations of violations, and for the “special rule” exempting from sanctions companies that promise to end their business in Iran. As was widely predicted, the conference report contains provisions to sanction Iranian human rights abusers, including denial of visas for their travel to the United States and freezing of their assets.

Those who supported CISADA said it would strengthen President Obama’s ability to obtain an agreement with Iran that might impose limitations on its nuclear program. It was argued that Iran’s dependence on gasoline imports could, at the very least, cause Iran’s government to have to spend more for such imports. Others, however, believed the Iranian government would have numerous ways to circumvent its effects, including rationing, reducing gasoline subsidies in an effort to reduce gasoline consumption; or offering premium prices to obscure gasoline suppliers.

**Effect on Iran’s Gasoline Supplies**

In March 2010, well before the passage of CSIDA on June 24, 2010, several gas suppliers to Iran, anticipating this legislation, announced that they had stopped or would stop supplying gasoline to Iran. Others have ceased since the enactment of CISADA and some observers say that gasoline

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deliveries to Iran have fallen from about 3.5 million barrels per day before CISADA to about 900,000 barrels per day in November 2010. As noted in a New York Times report of March 7, 2010, and a Government Accountability Office study released September 3, 2010, some firms that have supplied Iran have received U.S. credit guarantees or contracts. However, it is clear that most of the major gasoline suppliers have ceased dealing with Iran, as of some point in 2010.

The main suppliers to Iran over the past few years, and the GAO-reported status of their sales to Iran are listed below (with the caveat that some reports say that partners or affiliates of these firms may still sell to Iran in cases where the corporate headquarters have announced a halt):

- Vitol of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in early 2010);
- Trafigura of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran in November 2009);
- Glencore of Switzerland (notified GAO it stopped selling in September 2009);
- Total of France (notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2010);
- Reliance Industries of India (notified GAO it stopped sales to Iran in May 2009);
- Petronas of Malaysia (said on April 15, 2010, it had stopped sales to Iran);
- Lukoil of Russia (reportedly to have ended sales to Iran in April 2010, although some reports continue that Lukoil affiliates are supplying Iran);
- Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands (notified GAO it stopped sales in October 2009);
- Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum Group told U.S. officials it is no longer selling gasoline to Iran, as of September 2010;
- Tupras of Turkey (notified GAO it stopped selling to Iran as of enactment of CISADA on July 1, 2010);
- British Petroleum of United Kingdom and Shell (are no longer selling aviation fuel to Iran Air, according to U.S. State Department officials on September 30, 2010);
- Munich Re, Allianz, Hannover Re (Germany) were providing insurance and reinsurance for gasoline shipments to Iran. However, they reportedly have exited the market for insuring gasoline shipments for Iran.
- Lloyd’s (Britain). The major insurer had been the main company insuring Iranian gas (and other) shipping, but reportedly has ended that business as of July 2010.

clauses in their contracts that enable ship owners to refuse to deliver gasoline to Iran;

- In addition to BP, various aviation gasoline suppliers at various airports in Europe reportedly have suspended some refueling of Iran Air passenger aircraft after enactment of CISADA. That reportedly has prompted Iran to threaten not to refuel aircraft in Tehran belonging to some major European carriers. OMV of Austria says it is continuing to refuel Iran Air in Vienna.

- The State Department reported on September 30, 2010, that Hong Kong company NYK Line Ltd. had ended shipping business with Iran (on any goods, not just gasoline).

**Firms Believed to Still Be Supplying Iran**

- Zhuhai Zhenrong, Unipec, and China Oil of China are said by GAO to still be selling to Iran and have not denied continuing sales to the GAO;

- Petroleos de Venezuela reportedly reached a September 2009 deal to supply Iran with gasoline and is said to still be supplying Iran, although some reports say stopping that activity may be under consideration);

- Emirates National Oil Company of UAE was reported by GAO to still be selling to Iran. Some observers say two other UAE firms—Golden Crown and Royal Oyster Group, may still be selling gasoline to Iran. Another UAE firm, Dragon Oil, has note renewed a deal with Iran, which expired in July 2010, to swap oil with Iran via Turkmentistan.)

- Hin Leong Trading of Singapore (reported by GAO to still be selling gasoline to Iran).

- Some refiners in Bahrain reportedly may still be selling gasoline to Iran.
Table 1. Comparison of Major Versions of H.R. 2194/P.L. 111-195

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Goals and Overview:</strong> Seeks to expand the authorities of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA, P.L. 104-172) to deter sales by foreign companies of gasoline to Iran.</td>
<td><strong>Broader goals than House:</strong> sanctions sales of gasoline to Iran similar to House version of H.R. 2194, but also would affect several other U.S. sanctions against Iran already in place, including revoking some exemptions to the U.S. ban on imports from Iran.</td>
<td>Generally closer to the Senate version, but adds new provisions (not in either version) sanctioning Iranians determined to be involved in human rights abuses and prohibiting transactions with foreign banks that conduct business with Revolutionary Guard and U.N.-sanctioned Iranian entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statement of U.S. Policy on Sanctioning Iran’s Central Bank (Bank Markazi):</strong> Section 2(c) and 3(a) state that it shall be U.S. policy to fully enforce ISA to encourage foreign governments: - to cease investing in Iran’s energy sector. - to sanction Iran’s Central Bank and other financial institutions that do business with the Iranian Central Bank (or any Iranian bank involved in proliferation or support of terrorist activities). Section 108 urges the President to use existing U.S. authorities to impose U.S. sanctions against the Iranian Central Bank or other Iranian banks engaged in proliferation or support of terrorist groups. Such authorities could include Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), which authorizes designation of foreign banks as “of primary money laundering concern” and thereby cut off their relations with U.S. banks.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 104 (see below) contains sense of Congress urging U.S. sanctions against Iranian Central Bank and would prohibit U.S. bank dealings with any financial institution that helps the Central Bank facilitate circumvention of U.N. resolutions on Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extension of ISA to Sales of Gasoline:</strong> Section 3(a) would amend ISA to make sanctionable: - the sale to Iran of equipment or services (of over $200,000 in value, or $500,000 combined sales in one year) that would enable Iran to maintain or expand its domestic production of refined petroleum. - or, the sale to Iran of refined petroleum products or ships, vehicles, or insurance or reinsurance to provide such gasoline to Iran (same dollar values as sale of equipment). Section 102(a) contains similar provisions regarding both gasoline sales and sales of equipment and services for Iran to expand its own refinery capacity. However, sets the aggregate one-year sale value at $1 million—double the level of the House bill.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 102(a) contains provisions amending ISA to include sales of gasoline and refining services and equipment as sanctionable (similar to both versions). Sets dollar value “trigger” at $1 million transaction, or $5 million aggregate value (equipment or gasoline sales) in a one year period. Specifies that what is sanctionable includes helping Iran develop its liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. Products whose sales is sanctionable include LNG tankers and products to build pipelines used to transport oil or LNG. Includes aviation fuel in definition of refined petroleum. Formally reduces investment threshold to $20 million to trigger sanctionability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Expansion of ISA Sanctions:

Section 3(b) would mandate certain sanctions (not currently authorized by ISA) on sellers of the equipment, gasoline, or services described in Section 3(a) to include:

- prohibition of any transactions in foreign exchange with sanctioned entity;
- prohibition of credit or payments to the sanctioned entity;
- and, prohibition on any transactions involving U.S.-based property of the sanctioned entity.

(These sanctions would be imposed in addition to the required two out of six sanctions currently specified in ISA.)

### U.S. Government Enforcement Mechanism:

Section 3(b) also requires the heads of U.S. Government agencies to ensure that their agencies contract with firms that certify to the U.S. agency that they are not selling any of the equipment, products, or services to Iran (gasoline and related equipment and services) specified in Section 3(a).

The section contains certain penalties, such as prohibition on future bids for U.S. government contracts, to be imposed on any firm that makes a false certification about such activity.

### Final Law and Implementation Status

Section 102(b) amends ISA to add three sanctions to the existing menu of six sanctions in ISA and requires the President to impose 3 out of the 9 specified sanctions on entities determined to be violators.

(As it previously existed, ISA required the imposition of two out of six sanctions of the menu.)

Section 102(b) amends ISA by adding a provision similar to the House version: requiring, within 90 days of enactment (by October 1, 2010) new Federal Acquisition Regulations that mandate that firms to certify that they are not in violating of ISA as a condition of receiving a U.S. government contract, and providing for penalties for any falsification.

The Civilian Agency Acquisition Council issued the needed regulations (interim ruling) on September 29, 2010. Paperwork that firms must sign making that certification now included as part of their contract signature package.
## Iran Sanctions

### Additional Sanctions Against Suppliers of Nuclear, Missile, or Advanced Conventional Weapons Technology to Iran:

Section 3(c) provides an additional ISA sanction to be imposed on any country whose entity(ies) violate ISA by providing nuclear weapons-related technology or missile technology to Iran.

The sanction to be imposed on such country is a ban on any nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and a prohibition on U.S. sales to that country of nuclear technology in accordance with such an agreement.

The sanction can be waived if the President certifies to Congress that the country in question is taking effective actions against its violating entities.

### Alterations to Waiver and Implementation Provisions:

Section 3(d)(1) imposes a requirement (rather than an non-binding exhortation in the existing law) that the Administration “immediately” initiate an investigation of any potentially sanctionable activity under ISA.

Section 3(d)(2) would require the President to certify that a waiver of penalties on violating entities described above is “vital to the national security interest of the United States.” rather than, as currently stipulated in ISA, is “important to the national interest of the United States.”

### House Version | Senate Version | Final Law and Implementation Status
---|---|---
**Additional Sanctions Against Suppliers of Nuclear, Missile, or Advanced Conventional Weapons Technology to Iran:** | No equivalent, although, as noted below, the Senate bill does contain several proliferation-related provisions. | Section 102(a)(2) amends ISA by adding a prohibition on licensing of nuclear materials, facilities, or technology to any country which is the parent country of an entity determined to be sanctioned under ISA for providing WMD technology to Iran.

Waiver is provided on vital national security interest grounds.

**Alterations to Waiver and Implementation Provisions:** | No similar provisions | Implementation and waiver provisions closer to House version. Section 102(g) amends ISA to make mandatory the beginning of an investigation of potentially sanctionable activity, and makes mandatory a decision on sanctionability within 180 days of the beginning of such an investigation. (Previously, 180 day period was non-binding.)

Section 102(c) sets 9(c) waiver standard as “necessary to the national interest”

Section 102(g) also alters existing 4(c) ISA waiver to delay sanctions on firms of countries that are “closely cooperating” with U.S. efforts against Iran’s WMD programs. (This is not an automatic “carve out” for cooperating countries.)

Section 102(g)(3) adds to ISA a “special rule” that no investigation of a potential violation need be started if a firm has ended or pledged to end its violating activity in/with Iran.

“Special rule” invoked twice, as discussed above.
### Required Reports:

Section 3(e) would amend ISA's current Administration reporting requirements to also include an assessment of Iran's support for militant movements and to acquire weapons of mass destruction technology.

A new reporting requirement would be created (every six months) on firms providing Iran gasoline and related equipment and services specified above, as well as the names and dates of such activity, and any contracts such entities have with U.S. Government agencies.

The required report is to include information on persons the President determines is affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), as well as persons providing material support to the IRGC or conducting financial transactions with the IRGC or its affiliates.

Also required is an Administration report, within one year of enactment, on trade between Iran and countries in the G-20.

Section 107 contains a provision similar to the new reporting requirement of the House bill with regard to firms that sold gasoline and related equipment and services to Iran, and invested in Iran's energy sector.

The Senate bill does not require reporting on the IRGC that is stipulated in the House bill, or the report on Iran-G-20 trade.

However, the Senate bill (Section 109) expresses the sense of Congress that the United States “continue to target” the IRGC for supporting terrorism, its role in proliferation, and its oppressive activities against the people of Iran.

### Expansion of ISA Definitions:

Section 3(f) would expand the definitions of investing entities, or persons, contained in ISA, to include:

- export credit agencies. (Such a provision is widely considered controversial because export credit agencies are arms of their governments, and therefore sanctioning such agencies is considered a sanction against a government.)

Similar provision contained in Section 102(d).

Does not include export credit agencies as a sanctionable entity under ISA (as amended). (However, a report is required on export credit agency activity, as discussed above.)

Does include LNG as petroleum resources.
### Iran Sanctions

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<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Termination Provisions:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Section 3(g) would terminate the bill's sanctions against persons who are sanctioned, under the act, for sales of WMD-related technology, if the President certifies that Iran has ceased activities to acquire a nuclear device and has ceased enrichment of uranium and other nuclear activities.</td>
<td>Title IV would terminate the act's provisions 30 days after the President certifies that Iran has:&lt;br&gt;- ceased support for international terrorism and qualifies for removal from the U.S. &quot;terrorism list&quot;&lt;br&gt;- and, has ceased the pursuit and development of WMD and ballistic missile technology.</td>
<td>Same as Senate version, which means that the amendments to ISA in this law terminate if the President certifies that Iran has ceased WMD development, and has qualified for removal from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the pre-existing version of ISA would continue to apply until the President also certifies that Iran poses no significant threat to U.S. national security, interests, or allies.</td>
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| **ISA Sunset:**<br>Section 3(h) would extend all provisions of ISA until December 31, 2016. It is currently scheduled to "sunset" on December 31, 2011, as amended by the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). | No similar provision. | Sunset provision same as House version ISA to sunset December 31, 2016. |

### Additional Provisions That Are Not Amendments to ISA

**Modification to U.S. Ban on Trade With and Investment in Iran:**

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<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
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<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 103(b)(1) would ban all imports of Iranian origin from the United States, with the exception of informational material. Currently, modifications to the U.S. trade ban with Iran (Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995) that became effective in 2000 permit imports of Iranian luxury goods, such as carpets, caviar, nuts, and dried fruits.&lt;br&gt;- Section 103(b)(2) generally reiterates/codifies current provisions of U.S. trade ban related to U.S. exports to Iran. Provision would prohibit exports to Iran of all goods except food and medical devices, informational material, articles used for humanitarian assistance to Iran, or goods needed to ensure safe operation of civilian aircraft.</td>
<td>Same as Senate version. However, contains a new section that the existing U.S. ban (by Executive order) on most exports to Iran not include the exportation of services for Internet communications. Provision also states that the ban on most exports should not include goods or services needed to help non-governmental organizations support democracy in Iran. Both provisions designed to support opposition protesters linked to Iran's &quot;Green movement.&quot; <strong>Implementation:</strong> In July 2010, Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a statement that, effective September 29, 2010, the general license for imports of Iranian luxury goods will be eliminated (no such imports allowed). This went into effect that day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Version</td>
<td>Senate Version</td>
<td>Final Law and Implementation Status</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Freezing of Assets/Travel Restriction on Revolutionary Guard and Related Entities and Persons:</strong></td>
<td>Section 103(b)(3) mandates the President to freeze the assets of Iranian diplomats, IRGC, or other Iranian official personnel deemed a threat to U.S. national security under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Provision would require freezing of assets of families and associates of persons so designated. Section 109 calls for a ban on travel of IRGC and affiliated persons.</td>
<td>Similar to Senate version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Application of U.S. Trade Ban to Subsidiaries:</strong></td>
<td>Section 104 would apply the provisions of the U.S. trade ban with Iran (Executive Order 12959) to subsidiaries of U.S. firms if the subsidiary is established or maintained for the purpose of avoiding the U.S. ban on trade with Iran. The definition of subsidiary, under the provision, is any entity that is more than 50% owned or is directed by a U.S. person or firm.</td>
<td>No provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory Sanctions on Financial Institutions that Help Iran’s Sanctioned Entities:</strong></td>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Contains new section (104) that requires the Treasury Department to develop regulations (within 90 days of enactment) to prohibit U.S. financial transactions with any foreign financial institution that:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td></td>
<td>- facilitates efforts by the Revolutionary Guard to acquire WMD or fund terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- facilitate the activities of any person sanctioned under U.N. resolutions on Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- facilitates the efforts by Iran’s Central Bank to support the Guard’s WMD acquisition efforts or support any U.N.-sanctioned entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation: Treasury Dept. regulations implementing the provision issued August 16, 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sanctions on Iranian Human Rights Abusers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 105 requires, within 90 days, a report listing Iranian officials (or affiliates) determined responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses since the June 12, 2009 Iranian election. Those listed are ineligible for a U.S. visa, their U.S. property is to be blocked, and transactions with those listed are prohibited. On September 29, 2010, President Obama issued Executive Order 13553 providing for these sanctions. Eight Iranians sanctioned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sanctioning Certain Information Technology Sales to Iran:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 105 prohibits U.S. executive agencies from contracting with firms that export sensitive technology to Iran. “Sensitive technology” is defined as hardware, software, telecommunications equipment, or other technology that restricts the free flow of information in Iran or which monitor or restrict “speech” of the people of Iran.</td>
<td>Section 106 of the conference report is similar to Senate version. The contracting restriction is to be imposed “pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe.” The contracting regulations issued September 29, 2010, “partially” implement this requirement, with further regulations to be issued.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Treasury Department Authorization to prevent misuse of the U.S. financial system by Iran or other countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 106(b) authorizes $64.611 million for FY2010 (and “such sums as may be necessary” for FY2011 and 2012) for the Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The funds are authorized to ensure that countries such as Iran are not misusing the international financial system for illicit purposes. Iran is not mentioned specifically. $104.26 million is authorized by the section for FY2010 for the Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.</td>
<td>Section 109 authorizes $102 million for FY2011 and “sums as may be necessary” for FY2012 and 2013 to the Treasury Department Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Another $100 million is authorized for FY2011 for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and $113 million for FY2011 for the Bureau of Industry and Security for the Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hezbollah:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Version</th>
<th>Senate Version</th>
<th>Final Law and Implementation Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No specific provision, although, as noted above, the House bill does expand ISA reporting requirements to include Iran’s activities to support terrorist movements. Lebanese Hezbollah is named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department.</td>
<td>Section 110 contains a sense of Congress that the President impose the full range of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) on Hezbollah, and that the President renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon (as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701).</td>
<td>Section 113 similar to Senate version.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divestment:</th>
<th>Title II of the Senate bill (Section 203) prevents criminal, civil, or administrative action against any investment firm or officer or adviser based on its decision to divest from securities that:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No provisions</td>
<td>- have investments or operations in Sudan described in the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- or, engage in investments in Iran that would be considered sanctionable by the Senate bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevention of Transshipment, Reexportation, or Diversion of Sensitive Items to Iran:</th>
<th>Section 302 requires a report by the Director of National Intelligence that identifies all countries considered a concern to allow transshipment or diversion of WMD-related technology to Iran (technically: “items subject to the provision of the Export Administration Regulations”).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No provision</td>
<td>Section 303 requires the Secretary of Commerce to designate a country as a “Destination of Possible Diversion Concern” if such country is considered to have inadequate export controls or is unwilling to prevent the diversion of U.S. technology to Iran. The provision stipulates government-to-government discussions are to take place to improve that country’s export control systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If such efforts did not lead to improvement, the section would mandate designation of that country as a “Destination of Diversion Concern” and would set up a strict licensing requirement for U.S. exports of sensitive technologies to that country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Similar to Senate version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final Law and Implementation</td>
<td>Similar to Senate version, but does not provide for prior negotiations before designating a country as a “Destination of Possible Diversion Concern.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>List of countries that are believed to be allowing diversion of specified goods or technology to Iran to be named in a report provided within 180 days of enactment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>Doroud (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>Balal (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>Soroush and Nowruz (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2000</td>
<td>Anaran bloc (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>Phase 4 and 5, South Pars (gas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction of submersible drilling rig for Iranian partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Darkhovin (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Masjed-e-Soleyman (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2002</td>
<td>Phase 9 + 10, South Pars (gas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td><strong>Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Petroleum Economist, March 1, 2006.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Exempted from sanctions on 9/30 because Statoil pledged to exit Iran market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td><strong>Azadegan (oil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Japan Mulls Azadegan Options.” APS Review Oil Market Trends, November 27, 2006.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td><strong>Tuscan Block</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Iran-Petrobras Operations.” APS Review Gas Market Trends, April 6, 2009; “Brazil’s Petrobras Sees Few Prospects for Iran Oil,” (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0317110720090703">http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0317110720090703</a>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td><strong>Yadavaran (oil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Iran, China’s Sinopec Ink Yadavaran Oilfield Development Contract.” Payvand’s Iran News, December 9, 2009.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td><strong>Saveh bloc (oil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td><strong>Garmserb bloc (oil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deal finalized in June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td><strong>Arak Refinery expansion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(GAO report; Fimco FZE Machinery Website; <a href="http://www.fimco.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=70&amp;Itemid=78">http://www.fimco.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=70&amp;Itemid=78</a>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2006</td>
<td><strong>Khorramabad block (oil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td>LNG Tanks at Tombak Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak, 30 miles north of Assaluyeh Port.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(May not constitute “investment” as defined in pre-2010 version of ISA, because that definition did not specify LNG as “petroleum resource” of Iran.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>Esfahan refinery upgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(“Daelim, Others to Upgrade Iran’s Esfahan Refinery.” Chemical News and Intelligence, March 19, 2007.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Golshan and Ferdows onshore and offshore gas fields and LNG plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Contract modified but reaffirmed December 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(GAO report; Oil Daily, January 14, 2008.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (unspec.)</td>
<td><strong>Jofeir Field</strong> (oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><strong>Dayer Bloc</strong> (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td><strong>Lavan field</strong> (offshore natural gas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td><strong>Danan Field</strong> (on-shore oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(“PVEP Wins Bid to Develop Danan Field.” Iran Press TV, March 11, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td><strong>Moghан 2</strong> (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAO report cited below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td><strong>Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td><strong>“North Azadegan”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas Sweetening Plant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRS conversation with Embassy of S. Korea in Washington, D.C, July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contract signed but then abrogated by S. Korean firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2009</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Italy, South Korea To Develop South Pars Phase 12.&quot; Press TV (Iran), November 3, 2009, <a href="http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308">http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308</a>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td><strong>South Pars: Phase 11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drilling to Begin in March 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Totals: $41 billion investment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other Pending/Preliminary Deals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas).</strong> Includes gas purchases (December 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(<a href="http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/19/print20070519_376139.html">http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/19/print20070519_376139.html</a>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 13, 14—South Pars (gas);</strong> (Feb. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Dept. said on September 30, 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol have ended negotiations with Iran and will not pursue this project any further</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 22, 23, 24—South Pars (gas), incl. transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and on to Europe and building three power plants in Iran. Initialed July 2007; not finalized to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Iran’s Kish gas field</strong> (April 2008) Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—part 1.</strong> Incl. LNG terminal construction and Farzad-B natural gas bloc (March 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China-led consortium; project originally subscribed in May 2007 by OMV (Austria); possibly taken over by Indian firms (ONGC, Oil India Ltd., Hinduja, Petronet)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Pars gas field (September 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Petroles de Venezuela S.A.; 10% stake in venture</td>
<td>$760 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abadan refinery</td>
<td>Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf coast (August 2009)</td>
<td>Sinopec up to $6 billion if new refinery is built</td>
<td>up to $6 billion if new refinery is built</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** As noted in table, a wide variety of other press announcements and sources, CRS conversations with officials of the State Department Bureau of Economics (November 2009), CRS conversations with officials of embassies of the parent government of some of the listed companies (2005-2009). Some reported deals come from a March 2010 GAO report, “Firms Reported in Open Sources as Having Commercial Activity in Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors.” GAO-10-515R Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10515r.pdf. The GAO report lists 41 firms with “commercial activity in Iran’s energy sector; several of the listed agreements do not appear to constitute “investment,” as defined in ISA.

**Note:** CRS has neither the authority nor the means to determine which of these projects, if any, might constitute a violation of the Iran Sanctions Act. CRS has no way to confirm the precise status of any of the announced investments, and some investments may have been resold to other firms or terms altered since agreement. In virtually all cases, such investments and contracts represent private agreements between Iran and its instruments and the investing firms, and firms are not necessarily required to confirm or publicly release the terms of their arrangements with Iran. Reported $20 million+ investments in oil and gas fields, refinery upgrades, and major project leadership are included in this table. Responsibility for a project to develop Iran’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment With Iran

ISA was enacted, in part, because U.S. allies refused to adopt a ban on trade with and investment in Iran. Such a U.S. ban was imposed on May 6, 1995, when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959. This followed an earlier March 1995 executive order barring U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector. The trade and investment ban was intended to blunt criticism that U.S. trade with Iran made U.S. appeals for multilateral containment of Iran less credible. Each March since 1995 (and most recently on March 10, 2010), the U.S. Administration has renewed a declaration of a state of emergency that triggered the investment ban. The operation of the trade regulations is stipulated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITR’s). As noted above, in accordance with CISADA, the strict ban on imports from Iran was restored on September 29, 2010; the ban on exports to Iran was altered only slightly by CISADA.

Some modifications to the trade ban since 1999 account for the trade between the United States and Iran which was about $350 million worth of goods for all of 2009 ($281 million in exports to Iran, and $67 million in imports from Iran). That is about half the value of the bilateral trade in 2008.

The following conditions and modifications, as administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department, apply:

- Some goods related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft may be licensed for export to Iran (Section 560.528 of Title 31, C.F.R.). As recently as September 2006, the George W. Bush Administration, in the interests of safe operations of civilian aircraft, permitted a sale by General Electric of Airbus engine spare parts to be installed on several Iran Air passenger aircraft (by European airline contractors). (A provision of H.R. 6296 would prevent these sales to Iran.)

- U.S. firms may not negotiate with Iran or to trade Iranian oil overseas, but U.S. companies may apply for licenses to conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran. A Mobil Corporation application to do so was denied in April 1999.

- According to the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR’s), the ban does not apply to personal communications (phone calls, e-mails), or to humanitarian donations. U.S. non-government organizations (NGOs) require a specific license to operate in Iran, and some NGOs say the licensing requirements are too onerous to make work in Iran practical.

- Since April 1999, commercial sales of food and medical products to Iran have been allowed, on a case-by-case basis and subject to OFAC licensing. According to OFAC in April 2007, licenses for exports of medicines to treat HIV and leukemia are routinely expedited for sale to Iran, and license applications are

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18 The executive order was issued under the authority of: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. An August 1997 amendment to the trade ban (Executive Order 13059) prevented U.S. companies from knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran.
viewed favorably for business school exchanges, earthquake safety seminars, plant and animal conservation, and medical training in Iran.

- OFAC generally declines to discuss export licenses approved, and a press account on December 24, 2010, paints a picture of broad export approvals to Iran of such condiments as ice cream sprinkles, chewing gum, food additives, hot sauces, body-building supplements, and other goods that appear to have uses other than those that are purely humanitarian or nutritive. U.S. exporters widely mentioned include Mars Co. (candy manufacturer); Kraft Foods; Wrigley’s (gum); and McCormick and Co. (spices). Some goods were sold through a Revolutionary Guard-owned chains of stores in Iran called Qods; as well as a government owned Shahrvand store and a chain called Refah. OFAC officials indicated in the press accounts that such licenses were not in contradiction with U.S. law or policy, although there might have been less than full scrutiny of some Iranian end users and that such scrutiny might be increased in future licensing decisions.

- As far as financing of approved U.S. sales to Iran, private letters of credit can be used to finance approved transactions, but no U.S. government credit guarantees are available, and U.S. exporters are not permitted to deal directly with Iranian banks. The FY2001 agriculture appropriations law (P.L. 106-387) contained a provision banning the use of official credit guarantees for food and medical sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S. terrorism list, except Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit such credit guarantees. No U.S. Administration has authorized credit guarantees, to date. In December 2004, the trade ban was further modified to allow Americans to freely engage in ordinary publishing activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan).

- In April 2000, the trade ban was further eased to allow U.S. importation of Iranian nuts, dried fruits, carpets, and caviar. Financing was permitted for U.S. importers of these goods. The United States was the largest market for Iranian carpets before the 1979 revolution, but U.S. anti-dumping tariffs imposed on Iranian products in 1986 dampened of many Iranian products. As discussed above, CISADA ended approval of such imports as of October 1, 2010. Prior to the entry into force of this CISADA provision, the number one U.S. import from Iran was pomegranate juice concentrate. Iranian carpets were another popular import, despite a U.S. tariff of about 3%-6%. Imports of Iranian caviar carried a duty of about 15%.

**Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms**

The U.S. trade ban does not bar subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary has no operational relationship to the parent company. The March 7, 2010, *New York Times* article, cited above, discusses some subsidiaries of U.S. firms that have been active in Iran and which have received U.S. government contracts, grants, loans, or loan guarantees.

Among major foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms that have traded with Iran are the following:

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• U.S. energy equipment firms. Some subsidiaries of such firms may still be in the Iranian market, according to their “10-K” filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These include Natco Group, Overseas Shipholding Group, UOP (United Oil Products, a Honeywell subsidiary based in Britain), Itron, Fluor, Flowserve, Parker Drilling, Vantage Energy Services, Weatherford, and a few others. UOP reportedly sells refinery equipment to Iran; new such sales are now potentially sanctionable under ISA, as modified by CISADA.

• An Irish subsidiary of the Coca Cola company provides syrup for the U.S.-brand soft drink to an Iranian distributor, Khoshgovar. Local versions of both Coke and of Pepsi (with Iranian-made syrups) are also marketed in Iran by distributors who licensed the recipes for those soft drinks before the Islamic revolution and before the trade ban was imposed on Iran.

• Transammonia Corp., via a Swiss-based subsidiary, is said to be conducting business with Iran to help it export ammonia, a growth export for Iran.

Subsidiaries Exiting Iran

• Chemical manufacturer Huntsman announced in January 2010 its subsidiaries would halt sales to Iran.

• Halliburton. On January 11, 2005, Iran said it had contracted with U.S. company Halliburton, and an Iranian company, Oriental Kish, to drill for gas in Phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. Halliburton reportedly provided $30 million to $35 million worth of services per year through Oriental Kish, leaving unclear whether Halliburton would be considered in violation of the U.S. trade and investment ban or the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—because the deals involved a subsidiary of Halliburton (Cayman Islands-registered Halliburton Products and Service, Ltd., based in Dubai). On April 10, 2007, Halliburton announced that its subsidiaries were, as promised in January 2005, no longer operating in Iran.

• General Electric (GE). The firm announced in February 2005 that it would seek no new business in Iran, and it reportedly wound down preexisting contracts by July 2008. GE was selling Iran equipment and services for hydroelectric, oil and

20 Form 10-K Filed for fiscal year ended December 31, 2008.
24 “Exhibit to 10-K Filed February 25, 2009.” Officials of Fluor claim that their only dealings with Iran involve property in Iran owned by a Fluor subsidiary, which the subsidiary has been unable to dispose of. CRS conversation with Fluor, December 2009.
27 Form 10-K for Fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, claims firm directed its subsidiaries to cease new business in Iran and Cuba, Syria, and Sudan as of September 2007.
gas services, and medical diagnostic projects through Italian, Canadian, and French subsidiaries.

- Oilfield services firm Smith International said on March 1, 2010, it would stop sales to Iran by its subsidiaries.

- in March 2010, Ingersoll Rand, maker of air compressors and cooling systems, said it would no longer allow its subsidiaries to do business in Iran.\(^{29}\) On March 1, 2010, Caterpillar Corp. said it had altered its policies to prevent foreign subsidiaries from selling equipment to independent dealers that have been reselling the equipment to Iran.\(^{30}\)

- In April 2010, it was reported that foreign partners of several U.S. or other multinational accounting firms had cut their ties with Iran, including KPMG of the Netherlands, and local affiliates of U.S. firms PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst and Young.\(^{31}\)

In the 110th Congress, S. 970, S. 3227, S. 3445, and three House-passed bills (H.R. 1400, H.R. 7112, and H.R. 957)—would have applied sanctions to the parent companies of U.S. subsidiaries if those subsidiaries are directed by the parent company to trade with Iran. The Senate version of CISADA contained a similar provision, but it was taken out in conference action. (A provision of H.R. 6296 would apply this sanction.)

**Foreign Country Civilian Trade With Iran**

Neither the U.S. ban on trade and investment with Iran, nor U.N. sanctions, nor European Union sanctions on Iran, ban trade with Iran in all civilian goods. A very wide range of foreign firms still conduct trade with or have had a corporate presence with Iran, although, as discussed later, this level of interaction is changing because of the mounting global consensus to isolate Iran.

Some of the well-known firms that apparently continue to do business in/with Iran include: Alcatel-Lucent of France; Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ; BNP Paribas of France; Bosch of Germany; Canon of Japan; Fiat SPA of Italy; Ericsson of Sweden; ING Group of the Netherlands; Mercedes of Germany; Renault of France; Samsung of South Korea; Sony of Japan; Volkswagen of Germany; Volvo of Sweden; and numerous others. Some of the foreign firms that trade with Iran, such as Mitsui and Co. of Japan; Mitsui of Japan, ABB Ltd of Switzerland, Alstom of France, and Schneider Electric of France, are discussed in the March 7, 2010, *New York Times* article on foreign firms that do business with Iran and also receive U.S. contracts or financing. The *Times* article does not claim that these firms have violated any U.S. sanctions laws.

**Foreign Firms Exiting Iran**

In August 2010, Japan and South Korea announced that their automakers Toyota and Hyundai, respectively would conduct no new business with Iran. ABB made a similar announcement regarding its products in January 2010. Thyssen-Krupp, a German steelmaker, said on September

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23, 2010, it would end all business with Iran. Germany’s Daimler (Mercedes-Benz maker) said in April 2010 it would freeze planned exports to Iran of cars and trucks. Siemens of Germany was active in the Iran telecommunications infrastructure market, but announced in February 2010 that it would cease pursuing business in Iran.

In press articles and in the December 1, 2010 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing discussed above, the large oil services firm Schlumberger, which in incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles, has said it will wind down its business with Iran. However, press reports citing company documents say all contracts with Iran might not be terminated until at least 2013.32

**Iranian Investment in Foreign Firms**

Other questions have arisen over how U.S. sanctions might apply to business with foreign firms that Iran might acquire a full or partial interest in. Such firms include Daewoo Electronics of South Korea, where an Iranian firm—Entekhab Industrial Corp.—is a leading bidder to take over that firm. Another example is Adabank of Turkey, which reportedly might be sold to Iran.

**Treasury Department “Targeted Financial Measures”**

Various “targeted financial measures” have been undertaken by the Treasury Department, particularly the office of Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey (who has remained in the Obama Administration). Since 2006, strengthened by leverage provided in five U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Levey and other officials have been able to convince numerous foreign banks that dealing with Iran entails financial risk and furthers terrorism and proliferation. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has described Levey as having “led the design of a remarkably successful program”33 with regard to targeting Iran’s proliferation networks. Under Secretary Levey said on September 20, 2010, that “Today, Iran is effectively unable to access financial services from reputable banks and is increasingly unable to conduct major transactions in dollars or Euros.”34 The United States has also worked extensively with its partners in the multilateral Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to achieve a directive by that group in February 2010 that its members “protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks from Iran.”

Treasury’s designations of affiliates and ships belong to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) reportedly are harming Iran's ability to ship goods and raised the prices of goods to Iranian import-export dealers. Some ships have been impounded by various countries for non-payment of debts due on them.

In other accomplishments, Treasury and State Departments officials said in early 2010 that they had persuaded at least 80 banks not to provide financing for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Among those that have pulled out of Iran are UBS (Switzerland), HSBC (Britain), Germany’s Commerzbank A.G. and Deutsche Bank AG. U.S. financial diplomacy has reportedly convinced Kuwaiti banks to stop transactions with Iranian accounts,\(^{35}\) and some banks in Asia (primarily South Korea and Japan) and the rest of the Middle East have done the same.

The pullout by major banks predated CISADA which, as noted in the legislation table above, contains a provision sanctioning foreign banks that deal with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, its affiliates, or entities sanctioned by the United Nations. This continued a U.S. trend of attempting to target the Guard and its corporate arms and suppliers. The EU sanctions imposed July 27, 2010, appear to align the EU with the United States by designating numerous Guard entities as subject to asset freezes. The list of Guard entities sanctioned is in the table at the end of this report.

The July 27, 2010, EU sanctions, as well as sanctions imposed by Japan and South Korea, impose restrictions on banking relationships with Iran and generally prohibit the opening of any new branches of Iranian banks in these countries.

Prior to CISADA, some of these results have came about through U.S. pressure. In 2004, the Treasury Department fined UBS $100 million for the unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and other sanctioned countries, and in December 2005, the Treasury Department fined Dutch bank ABN Amro $80 million for failing to fully report the processing of financial transactions involving Iran’s Bank Melli (and another bank partially owned by Libya). In the biggest such instance, on December 16, 2009, the Treasury Department announced that Credit Suisse would pay a $536 million settlement to the United States for illicitly processing Iranian transactions with U.S. banks. Credit Suisse, according to the Treasury Department, saw business opportunity by picking up the transactions business from a competitor who had, in accordance with U.S. regulations discussed below, ceased processing dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Credit Suisse also pledged to cease doing business with Iran.

In earlier action intended to cut Iran off from the U.S. banking system, on September 6, 2006, the Treasury Department barred U.S. banks from handling any indirect transactions (“U-turn transactions, meaning transactions with non-Iranian foreign banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank) with Iran’s Bank Saderat (see above), which the Administration accuses of providing funds to Hezbollah.\(^{36}\) Bank Sepah is subject to asset freezes and transactions limitations as a result of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The Treasury Department extended that U-Turn restriction to all Iranian banks on November 6, 2008.

Thus far, the Treasury Department has not designated any bank as a “money laundering entity” for Iran-related transactions (under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act). Nor has Treasury imposed any specific sanctions against Bank Markazi (Central Bank) which, according to a February 25, 2008, Wall Street Journal story, is helping other Iranian banks circumvent the U.S. and U.N. banking pressure. Several European countries reportedly still oppose such a sanction as an extreme step with potential humanitarian consequences, for example by preventing Iran from


keeping its currency stable. S. 3445, a Senate bill in the 110th Congress, and a counterpart passed by the House on September 26, 2008 (H.R. 7112), called for this sanction. The Senate version of H.R. 2194 had a similar provision, which was included in conference action. Resolution 1929 references the need for vigilance in dealing with Iran’s Central Bank but does not mandate any new sanctions against it.

In enforcing U.S. sanctions, on December 17, 2008, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed a civil action seeking to seize the assets of the Assa Company, a UK-chartered entity. Assa allegedly was maintaining the interests of Bank Melli in an office building in New York City. An Iranian foundation, the Alavi Foundation, allegedly is an investor in the building.

**Terrorism List Designation-Related Sanctions**

Several U.S. sanctions are in effect as a result of Iran’s presence on the U.S. “terrorism list.” The list was established by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended), sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international terrorism. Iran was added to the list in January 1984, following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon (believed perpetrated by Hezbollah). Sanctions imposed as a consequence include a ban on U.S. foreign aid to Iran; restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran of dual use items; and requires the United States to vote against international loans to Iran.

- The terrorism list designation restricts sales of U.S. dual use items (Export Administration Act, as continued through presidential authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA, as implemented by executive orders), and, under other laws, bans direct U.S. financial assistance (Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, FAA, P.L. 87-195) and arms sales (Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 95-92, as amended), and requires the United States to vote to oppose multilateral lending to the designated countries (Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132). Waivers are provided under these laws, but successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the late 1980s ban direct assistance to Iran (loans, credits, insurance, Ex-Im Bank credits) without providing for a waiver.

- Section 307 of the FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations, and require proportionate cuts if these institutions work in Iran. No waiver is provided for.

- The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132) requires the President to withhold U.S. foreign assistance to any country that provides to a terrorism list country foreign assistance or arms. Waivers are provided.

U.S. sanctions laws do not bar disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of two earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997), and another $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June 22, 2002, earthquake. (The World Bank provided some earthquake related lending as well.) The United States provided $5.7 million in assistance (out of total governmental pledges of about $32 million, of which $17 million have been remitted) to the victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, which killed as many as 40,000 people and destroyed 90% of Bam’s buildings. The United States military flew in 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam. In the Bam case, there was also a temporary exemption made in
the regulations to allow for a general licensing (no need for a specific license) for donations to Iran of humanitarian goods by American citizens and organizations. Those exemptions were extended several times but expired in March 2004. When that expiration occurred, the policy reverted to a requirement for specific licensing (application to OFAC) and approval process for donations and operations in Iran of U.S.-based humanitarian NGO’s.

**Executive Order 13224**

The separate, but related, Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) authorizes the President to freeze the assets of and bar U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. This order, issued two weeks after the September 11 attacks, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, was intended to primarily target Al Qaeda-related entities. However, it has increasingly been applied to Iranian entities. Such Iran-related entities named and sanctioned under this order are in Table 5 at the end of this report, which also contains the names of Iranian entities sanctioned under other orders and under United Nations resolutions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program.

**Proliferation-Related Sanctions**

Iran is prevented from receiving advanced technology from the United States under relevant and Iran-specific anti-proliferation laws and by Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005). Some of these laws and executive measures seek to penalize foreign firms and countries that provide equipment to Iran’s WMD programs.

**Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act**

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484) imposes a number of sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons.” Sanctions imposed on violating entities include a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from that entity, and a two year ban on licensing U.S. exports to that entity. A discretionary sanction of a ban on imports to the United States from that entity is authorized.

If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are: a one year ban on U.S. assistance to that country; a one year requirement that the United States vote against international lending to it; a one year suspension of U.S. co-production agreements with the country; a one year suspension of technical exchanges with the country in military or dual use technology; and a one year ban on sales of U.S. arms to the country. The President is also authorized to deny the country most-favored-nation trade status; and to impose a ban on U.S. trade with the country.

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The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1603) also provides for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports to Iran (which would include computer software). A waiver to permit such exports, on a case-by-case basis, is provided for.

**Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act**

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), now called the Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act) authorizes sanctions on foreign persons (individuals or corporations, not countries or governments) that are determined by the Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. It bans U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space station unless the President can certify that the agency or entities under its control had not transferred any WMD or missile technology to Iran within the year prior. 38 (A Continuing Resolution for FY2009, which funded the U.S. government through March 2009, waived this law to allow NASA to continue to use Russian vehicles to access the International Space Station.)

**Executive Order 13382**

Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. The table at the end of this report lists Iran-related entities sanctioned under the Order.

**Foreign Aid Restrictions for Suppliers of Iran**

In addition, successive foreign aid appropriations punish the Russian Federation for assisting Iran by withholding 60% of any U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

**Implementation of Proliferation Sanctions**

Both the George W. Bush Administration and the Obama Administration have imposed sanctions for violations of the executive orders and laws discussed above. Iranian entities designated under these laws and orders are listed in Table 5, including the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated firms and entities.

Despite these U.S. and U.N. sanctions, Iran has used loopholes and other devices, such as front companies, to elude U.S. and international sanctions. Some of these efforts focus on countries perceived as having lax enforcement of export control laws, such as UAE and Malaysia. In some cases, Iran has been able, according to some reports, to obtain sophisticated technology even from

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38 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
U.S. firms. A further discussion of the effect of the U.S. and international sanctions on Iran’s WMD programs is provided later.

U.S. Efforts to Promote Divestment

A growing trend not only in Congress but in several states is to require or call for or require divestment of shares of firms that have invested in Iran’s energy sector (at the same levels considered sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act). The concept of these sanctions is to express the view of Western and other democracies that Iran is an outcast internationally.

Legislation in the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400, did not require divestment, but would have required a presidential report on firms that have invested in Iran’s energy sector. Another bill, H.R. 1357, required government pension funds to divest of shares in firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments in Iran’s energy sector and bar government and private pension funds from future investments in such firms. Two other bills, H.R. 2347 (passed by the House on July 31, 2007) and S. 1430, would protect mutual fund and other investment companies from shareholder action for any losses that would occur from divesting in firms that have investing in Iran’s energy sector.

In the 111th Congress, H.R. 1327 (Iran Sanctions Enabling Act), a bill similar to H.R. 2347 of the 110th Congress, was reported by the Financial Services Committee on April 28, 2009. It passed the House on October 14, 2009, by a vote of 414-6. A similar bill, S. 1065, was introduced in the Senate. Provisions along these lines was contained in CISADA (P.L. 111-195)—in particular providing a “safe harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector (as defined by ISA, as amended by CISADA).

U.S. Sanctions and Other Efforts Intended to Support Iran’s Opposition

A major trend in the 111th Congress, after the Iran election dispute, has been efforts to promote the prospects for the domestic opposition in Iran. Proposals to target the Revolutionary Guard for sanctions, discussed throughout, represent one facet of the trend toward measures that undermine the legitimacy of Iran’s regime and express support for the growing domestic opposition in Iran. The Revolutionary Guard is involved in Iran’s WMD programs but it is also the key instrument through which the regime is trying to suppress the pro-democracy protest. Several measures to support the opposition’s ability to communicate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor or censor Internet communications, and to identify and sanction Iranian human rights abusers were included in CISADA (P.L. 111-195).


40 For information on the steps taken by individual states, see National Conference of State Legislatures. State Divestment Legislation.
Expanding Internet and Communications Freedoms

Some members have focused on expanding Internet freedom in Iran or preventing the Iranian government from using the Internet to identify opponents. Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the “VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act contains several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify (in a report to be submitted 180 days after enactment, or April 25, 2009) companies that are selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor the internet usage of Iranians. The VOICE Act also authorizes funds to document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 12, 2009 presidential election. Another provision of P.L. 111-84 (Section 1241) required an Administration report, not later than January 31, 2010, on U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Iran, and the effect of those sanctions on Iran.

In the 111th Congress, S. 1475 and H.R. 3284, the “Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act,” would authorize the President to ban U.S. government contracts with foreign companies that sell technology that Iran could use to monitor or control Iranian usage of the internet. This provision, and another which exempts from the U.S. export ban on Iran equipment to help Iranians communicate and use the Internet, was incorporated into CISADA (P.L. 111-195). The provisions were directed, in part, against firms, including a joint venture between Nokia (Finland) and Siemens (Germany), reportedly sold Internet monitoring and censorship technology to Iran in 2008. Perhaps to avoid further embarrassment, Siemens announced on January 27, 2010, that it would stop signing new business deals in Iran as of mid-2010.

Also in line with this trend, on March 8, 2010, OFAC amended the Iran Transactions Regulations that implement the U.S.-Iran trade ban to provide for a general license for providing to Iranians free mass market software in order to facilitate internet communications. The ruling appears to incorporate the major features of a legislative proposal, H.R. 4301, the “Iran Digital Empowerment Act.” The OFAC determination required a waiver of the provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1606 waiver provision) discussed above.

Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses and Promote the Opposition

Another part of this theme of attempting to help Iran’s opposition has been legislation to sanction regime officials involved in suppressing the domestic opposition in Iran. Senator John McCain proposed to offer amendments to S. 2799 (the Senate version of what became H.R. 2194) to focus on banning travel and freezing assets of those Iranians determined to be human rights abusers. These provisions were included in the conference report on CISADA (H.R. 2194, P.L. 111-195). The provisions were similar to those of Senator McCain’s earlier stand alone bill, S. 3022, the “Iran Human Rights Sanctions Act.” Companion measures in the House were H.R. 4647 and H.R. 4649, which differed only slightly with each other.

On September 29, 2010, the Administration implemented the CISADA provision when President Obama signed an executive order providing for the CISADA sanctions against Iranians determined to be responsible for or complicit in post-2009 Iran election human rights abuses.

Along with the Order, an initial group of eight Iranian officials were penalized, including Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, and several other officials who were in key security or judicial positions at the time of the June 2009 election and aftermath.

Another bill, introduced by Senator Cornyn and Senator Brownback, (S. 3008) the “Iran Democratic Transition Act,” calls for a forthright declaration that it is the policy of the United States to support efforts by the Iranian people to remove the regime from power. It calls for the use of U.S. broadcasting and humanitarian funds to help democratic organizations in Iran.

It is possible that measures such as this might be revisited in the 112th Congress. Some members who supported legislation such as this in the past have been named to committee chairmanships and other prominent positions. One example is incoming House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen who, in statements in December 2010, said the Administration and Congress should do more to openly support the Iranian opposition Green movement.

Blocked Iranian Property and Assets

Iranian leaders continue to assert that the United States is holding Iranian assets, and that this is an impediment to improved relations. A U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal at the Hague continues to arbitrate cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. Major cases yet to be decided center on hundreds of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases between the United States and the Shah’s regime, which Iran claims it paid for but were unfulfilled. About $400 million in proceeds from the resale of that equipment was placed in a DOD FMS account, and about $22 million in Iranian diplomatic property remains blocked, although U.S. funds have been disbursed—credited against the DOD FMS account—to pay judgments against Iran for past acts of terrorism against Americans. Other disputes include the mistaken U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States, in accordance with an ICJ judgment, paid Iran $61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248 Iranians killed. The United States has not compensated Iran for the airplane itself. As it has in past similar cases, the Bush Administration opposed a terrorism lawsuit against Iran by victims of the U.S. Embassy Tehran seizure on the grounds of diplomatic obligation.43

Comparative Analysis: Relationships of U.S. to International and Multilateral Sanctions

The U.S. sanctions discussed in this report are more comprehensive than those imposed, to date, by the United Nations Security Council or by individual foreign countries or groups of countries, such as the European Union. However, there is increasing convergence among all these varying sets of sanctions.

U.N. Sanctions

As part of a multilateral process of attempting to convince Iran to choose the path of negotiations or face further penalty, during 2006-2008, three U.N. Security Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions primarily on Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. While pressing for sanctions, the multilateral group negotiation with Iran (“P5+1:” the Security Council permanent members, plus Germany) at the same time offered Iran incentives to suspend uranium enrichment; the last meeting between Iran and the P5+1 to discuss these issues was in July 2008. The negotiations made little progress, and then entered a hiatus for the U.S. presidential election, the establishment of the Obama Administration, and then the Iranian presidential election. However, after many months of negotiations, Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9, 2010, by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil), with one abstention (Lebanon). (Iranian entities and persons sanctioned by the United Nations are included in Table 5.)

The main points of Resolution 1929 are:44

- It adds several firms affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard firms to the list of sanctioned entities.
- It makes mandatory a ban on travel for Iranian persons named in it and in previous resolutions—including those Iranians for whom there was a non-binding travel ban in previous resolutions.
- It gives countries the authorization to inspect any shipments—and to dispose of its cargo—if the shipments are suspected to carry contraband items. However, inspections on the high seas are subject to concurrence by the country that owns that ship. This provision is modeled after a similar provision imposed on North Korea, which did cause that country to reverse some of its shipments.
- It prohibits countries from allowing Iran to invest in uranium mining and related nuclear technologies, or nuclear-capable ballistic missile technology.
- It bans sales to Iran of most categories of heavy arms to Iran and requests restraint in sales of light arms, but does not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms.”
- It requires countries to insist that their companies refrain from doing business with Iran if there is reason to believe that such business could further Iran’s WMD programs.
- It requests, but does not mandate, that countries prohibit Iranian banks to open in their countries, or for their banks to open in Iran, if doing so could contribute to Iran’s WMD activities.
- The resolution authorizes the establishment of a “panel of experts,” which the Obama Administration says will be chaired by arms control official Robert Einhorn, to assess the effect of the resolution and previous Iran resolutions and suggest ways of more effective implementation.

• The resolution did not make mandatory some measures discussed in press reports on the negotiations, including barring any foreign investment in Iranian bond offerings; banning insurance for transport contracts for shipments involving Iran; banning international investment in Iran’s energy sector; banning the provision of trade credits to Iran, or banning all financial dealings with Iranian banks.

**Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, and to refrain from any development of ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable (1929)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibit transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran, except for use in light-water reactors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibit Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibit Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeze the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calls for “vigilance” (a non-binding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing and financial interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sanctions Committee, composed of the fifteen members of the Security Council, monitors Implementation of all Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A “panel of experts” is empowered by 1929 to make recommendations for improved enforcement.</td>
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**Other Foreign Country Sanctions**

U.S. allies have supported the Obama Administration’s sanctions toward Iran, in part because the approach is perceived as not purely punitive, and in part because concerns about Iran’s nuclear advancement have increased. U.S. and European/allied approaches have been gradually converging since 2002, when the nuclear issue came to the fore, but as of 2010, an unprecedented degree of global consensus appears to be emerging on how to deal with Iran.
European Union and Others

In its July 27, 2010, sanctions measures, the product of consensus among the EU states, the EU countries imposed sanctions on Iran that exceed those mandated in Security Council resolutions. Norway is not an EU member but has announced it will adopt the EU sanctions package. A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions against Iran is contained in the chart below, although noting that there are differing legal bases and authorities for these sanctions. A U.S. President cannot mandate a foreign company take any particular action; however, the U.S. government can penalize or reward foreign firms who take action that supports U.S. objectives. U.N. Security Council resolutions are considered binding on U.N. Member states. The EU clarified in late October 2010, that its sanctions against Iran do not ban importation of Iranian oil and gas, nor do they ban exports of gasoline to Iran. However, as discussed, EU companies that do sell gasoline to Iran might open themselves to U.S. penalties under ISA, as amended by CISADA. There is also the potential for the EU sanctions to force the closure of a BP-NIOC joint venture in the Rhum gas field, 200 miles off the coast of Scotland. Doing so would likely be up to BP to decide, judging whether continuing the venture could open BP to ISA sanctions, although ISA is generally viewed as applying to oil and gas fields in Iranian territory.

Concurrent with the EU announcement of major sanctions on July 27, not only Norway but also Canada and Australia announced similar, although less sweeping, Iran sanctions. This was followed by a series of high-level U.S. visits to numerous countries to try to persuade them to align their policies with those of the United States and the EU. Countries visited included China, which is to be a particular focus because of its energy relations with Iran, UAE, Japan, South Korea, Lebanon, Bahrain, Brazil, and Ecuador.

Japan and South Korea.

In early September 2010, Japan and then South Korea announced Iran sanctions similar to those of the EU. Both countries adopted measures limiting trade financing for Iran, limiting new banking relations with Iran, sanctioning numerous named Iranian entities, and restricting new projects in Iran’s energy sector. The sanctions adopted by both were far more extensive than was expected by U.S. officials.

India/Asian Clearing Union

India has generally been considered friendly toward Iran and unlikely to impose any national sanctions on that country. Therefore, many experts were surprised when India’s central bank, in late December 2010, announced that it would no longer use a regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran. The Asian Clearing Union, based in Tehran, was set up in the 1970s by the United Nations to ease commerce among Asian nations. There have been allegations in recent years that Iran might be using the Clearing Union to handle transactions so as to avoid limitations imposed by European and other banks. The Indian move, however, complicated India’s purchases of about 350,000-400,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil, and Indian officials said there would be negotiations with Iran to find an alternate mechanism to clear Indian payments for that oil and other Iranian goods. Still, the Indian move appeared to signal that India was, at least in part, joining U.S./European-led efforts to shut Iran out of the international financial system.
Contrast With Previous Periods

The emerging consensus on Iran sanctions differs from early periods when there was far more disagreement. Reflecting the traditional European preference for providing incentives rather than enacting economic punishments, during 2002-2005, there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA). Such an agreement would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries. However, negotiations were discontinued after the election of Ahmadinejad in June 2005, at which time Iran’s position on its nuclear program hardened. Similarly, there is insufficient international support to grant Iran membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) until there is progress on the nuclear issue. Iran first attempted to apply to join the WTO in July 1996. On 22 occasions after that, representatives of the Clinton and then the George W. Bush Administration blocked Iran from applying (applications must be by consensus of the 148 members). As discussed above, as part of an effort to assist the EU-3 nuclear talks with Iran, at a WTO meeting in May 2005, no opposition to Iran’s application was registered, and Iran formally began accession talks.

Earlier, during the 1990s, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, and the EU and Japan refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The European dialogue with Iran was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but resumed in May 1998 during Khatemi’s presidency. In the 1990s, European and Japanese creditors—over U.S. objections—rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt. These countries (governments and private creditors) rescheduled the debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. In July 2002, Iran tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution, selling $500 million in bonds to European banks. (A provision of H.R. 6296 would make sanctionable under ISA the purchase of Iranian sovereign debt).

World Bank Loans

The July 28, 2010, EU measures appear to narrow substantially the prior differences between the EU and the United States over international lending to Iran. As noted above, the United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote against international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international lending. In 1993 the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the amount of those loans. The legislation contributed to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. (A provision of H.R. 6296—Title VII—would cut off U.S. contributions to the World Bank, International Finance Corp., and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Corp. if the World Bank approves a new Country Assistance Strategy for Iran or makes a loan to Iran. A Senate companion, S. 4008, does not have this provision.)

45 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
During 1999-2005, Iran’s moderating image had led the World Bank to consider new loans over U.S. opposition. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.

### Table 4. Points of Comparison Between U.S., U.N., and EU Sanctions Against Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Observation:</strong> Most sweeping sanctions on Iran of virtually any country in the world</td>
<td>Increasingly sweeping, but still intended to primarily target Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs. No mandatory sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>EU abides by all U.N. sanctions on Iran, but new package of Iran sanctions announced July 27, 2010, more closely aligns EU sanctions with those of the U.S. than ever before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on U.S. Trade with and Investment in Iran:</strong> Executive order 12959 bans (with limited exceptions) U.S. firms from exporting to Iran, importing from Iran, or investing in Iran. There is an exemption for sales to Iran of food and medical products, but no trade financing or financing guarantees are permitted.</td>
<td>U.N. sanctions do not ban civilian trade with Iran or general civilian sector investment in Iran. Nor do U.N. sanctions mandate restrictions on provision of trade financing or financing guarantees by national export credit guarantee agencies.</td>
<td>Japan and South Korean sanctions (September 2010) similar to EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions on Foreign Firms that Do Business With Iran’s Energy Sector:</strong> The Iran Sanctions Act, P.L. 104-172 (as amended most recently by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195) mandates specified sanctions on foreign firms that invest threshold amounts in Iran’s Energy Sector or that sell certain threshold amounts of refined petroleum or refinery related equipment or services to Iran. No U.N. equivalent exists. However, preambular language in Resolution 1929 “not[es] the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.” This wording is interpreted by most observers as providing U.N. support for countries who want to ban their companies from investing in Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>July 27, 2010, EU sanctions prohibit EU companies from financing energy sector projects in Iran (a de-facto ban on energy sector investment) and ban sales to Iran of equipment or services for its energy sector, including projects outside Iran. No ban on buying oil or gas from Iran or selling gasoline to Iran. Japan and South Korean measures ban new energy projects in Iran and call for restraint on ongoing projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>EU measures of July 27, 2010, ban grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran. Also prohibit financing of enterprises involved in Iran’s energy sector.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Foreign Assistance:</strong></td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent</td>
<td><strong>Japan and South Korea measures did not specifically ban aid or lending to Iran.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—other than purely humanitarian aid—is banned under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. That section bans U.S. assistance to countries on the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Iran has been on this “terrorism list” since January 1984. Iran is also routinely denied direct U.S. foreign aid under the annual foreign operations appropriations acts (most recently in Section 7007 of division H of P.L. 111-8).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1929 (operative paragraph 8) bans all U.N. member states from selling or supplying to Iran major weapons systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships, and most missile systems, or related spare parts or advisory services for such weapons systems.</td>
<td>EU sanctions include a comprehensive ban on sale to Iran of all types of military equipment, not just major combat systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Iran is on the “terrorism list,” it is ineligible for U.S. arms exports pursuant to Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 95-92). The International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR Part 126.1) also cite the President’s authority to control arms exports, and to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions as a justification to ban arms exports and imports.</td>
<td>The U.N. Resolutions on Iran, cumulatively, ban the export of almost all dual-use items to Iran.</td>
<td>No similar Japan and South Korean measures announced, but neither has exported arms to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restriction on Exports to Iran of “Dual Use Items”:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72) and Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, there is a denial of license applications to sell Iran goods that could have military applications.</td>
<td>Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 7) requests, but does not mandate, that countries and international financial institutions refrain from making grants or loans to Iran, except for development and humanitarian purposes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions Against International Lending to Iran:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118), U.S. representatives to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are required to vote against loans to Iran by those institutions.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The July 27, 2010, measures prohibit EU members from providing grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran, including through international financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No specific similar Japan or South Korea measures announced.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>Implementation by EU (July 27, 2010) and Some Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Technology to Iran:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph 12) imposes a worldwide freeze on the assets and property of Iranian entities named in an Annex to the Resolution. Each subsequent Resolution has expanded the list of Iranian entities subject to these sanctions.</td>
<td>The EU measures imposed July 27, 2010, commit the EU to freezing the assets of entities named in the U.N. resolutions, as well as numerous other named Iranian entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several laws and regulations, including the Iran-Syria North Korea Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 104-484) and Executive Order 13382 provide for sanctions against entities, Iranian or otherwise, that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs (asset freezing, ban on transaction with the entity).</td>
<td>No direct equivalent</td>
<td>No direct equivalent, but EU measures taken July 27, 2010, include some IRGC Qods Force and related persons and entities as subject to a freeze on EU-based assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Transactions With Terrorism Supporting Entities:</strong></td>
<td>The U.N. Resolutions against Iran are intended primarily to slow or halt Iran’s nuclear and other WMD programs. However, Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 5) bans Iran from exporting any arms—a provision widely interpreted as trying to reduce Iran’s material support to groups such as Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, Shiite militias in Iraq, and insurgents in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>The EU sanctions announced July 27, 2010, contains an Annex of named Iranians subject to a ban on travel to the EU countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Order 13224 bans transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting international terrorism. Numerous entities, including some of Iranian origin, have been so designated.</td>
<td>No direct equivalent</td>
<td>Japan and South Korea announced bans on named Iranians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Travel Ban on Named Iranians:</strong></td>
<td>Resolution 1803 imposed a binding ban on international travel by several Iranians named in an Annex to the Resolution. Resolution 1929 extended that ban to additional Iranians, and forty Iranians are now subject to the ban. However, the Iranians subject to the travel ban are so subjected because of their involvement in Iran’s WMD programs, not because of involvement in human rights abuses.</td>
<td>The EU measures announced July 27, 2010, bans Iran Air Cargo from access to EU airports. The measures also freeze the EU-based assets of IRISL and its affiliates. Insurance and re-insurance for Iranian firms is banned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) provides for a prohibition on travel to the U.S., blocking of U.S.-based property, and ban on transactions with Iranians determined to be involved in serious human rights abuses against Iranians since the June 12, 2009 presidential election there.</td>
<td>Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any ships in national or international waters—if there is an indication that the shipments include goods whose export to Iran is banned.</td>
<td>Japan and South Korean measures take similar actions against IRISL and Iran Air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Executive Order 13382, the U.S. Treasury Dept. has named Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and several affiliated entities as entities whose U.S.-based property is to be frozen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effects of U.S., U.N., and Other Country Sanctions

The effectiveness of U.S. and international sanctions on Iran is often difficult to measure, but U.S. officials appear increasingly convinced that the sanctions are compounding the mismanagement and other structural inadequacies of Iran’s economy as well as slowing down the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. The economic difficulties are widening splits in Iran’s leadership and could cause its leaders to reconsider major foreign policy decisions. This is evident not only from anecdotal and measurable indicators, but also from some statements from Iranian officials. For example, in September 2010, a senior leader, Ali Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, criticized Ahmadinejad for dismissing the effect of the burgeoning sanctions on Iran’s economy. In late September, the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, fell by about 15% when the UAE, a major financial hub for Iran, began restricting transactions with Iranian banks sanctioned by U.N. resolutions and by the United States. On December 13, 2010, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fired Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki for failing to prevent the imposition of the various sets of sanctions during summer 2010, although the move could have been motivated more by a desire to weaken Ahmadinejad’s political adversaries to whom Mottaki was linked.

Some of the effects of sanctions on Iran’s economy were discussed in the speech by Treasury Under Secretary Levey on September 20, 2010, referenced above. He also, in that speech, noted the effect of Iranian mismanagement on Iran’s economic difficulty, separate from sanctions. For example, Iran’s banks have a high percentage (20%) of loans that are non-performing because of practices of lending to well connected Iranians rather than judging them on their creditworthiness.

U.S. officials stress, in late 2010, that the sanctions are only beginning to apply pressure on Iran’s economy. At various conferences, some Administration officials have urged to allow time for the existing sanctions to work, rather than to turn immediately to additional sanctions. In the 111th Congress, some legislative proposals for additional sanctions are discussed above, for example as contained in H.R. 6296. Some provisions of this or other legislation might be introduced the 112th Congress, according to observers.

In addition, at an Iran-related conference on December 10, 2010, White House proliferation adviser Gary Samore said that new sanctions might be considered by the United States and partner countries. Most experts believe that the most effective sanction would be an embargo on the purchase of Iranian crude oil, although he did not indicate that such a step would be proposed or achieve consensus. With the United States and Europe seeking to boost economic growth, a further increase in oil prices—the likely result of such a move—would appear unlikely to attract broad support.

**Effect on Nuclear Development**

There is a consensus that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core strategic objective of causing a demonstrable shift in Iran’s commitment to its nuclear program. However, some observers see signs of movement. At a conference in Australia on November 8, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates, referring to ways to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, said that the “political, economic approach that we are taking is in fact having an impact in Iran.” In a statement in the UAE on January 10, 2011, Secretary of State Clinton said that “The sanctions are working…Their program, from our best estimate, has been slowed down.”

Some assess that one means for sanctions to affect the nuclear program is by contributing to a decision by Iran to a compromise that would limit Iran’s nuclear development. In September 2010, during Ahmadinejad’s visit to the U.N. General Assembly in New York, he and other Iranian officials said that Iran did want to restart talks on its nuclear program and on other issues of concern to Iran. On November 9, 2010, Iran’s Foreign Minister offered to resume talks but requesting they take place in Turkey, which is considered somewhat sympathetic to Iran’s

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arguments about its nuclear program. In late November 2010, Iran accepted new talks in Geneva. However, during two days of talks (December 6 and 7), Iran did not agree to curbs on its enrichment of uranium, the core U.S. demand. There was an agreement to have new talks, in Turkey, in the near future (possibly on/about January 24, 2011, according to observers).

A related issue is whether the cumulative sanctions have, in and of themselves, added bottlenecks to Iran’s nuclear efforts. Firm evidence is difficult to produce; however, the head of Iran’s civilian atomic energy agency said in July 2010 that international sanctions might “slow” Iran’s nuclear program, a comment similar to that of Secretary Clinton above. This could indicate that sanctions are preventing Iran from obtaining some of the materials or technology it needs to maintain its development of its nuclear program. In addition, sanctions could be contributing to unrest among the personnel involved in Iran’s program. In October 2010, Iran said it had arrested several “nuclear spies,” suggesting that some Iranians involved in the nuclear program may not be loyal to the government. A November 16, 2010 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that Iran’s program has encountered technical difficulties but that Iran continued to expand its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.48

**General Politico-Economic Effects**

What appears to be clear to observers is that numerous major international firms have become unwilling to risk their position in the U.S. market to do business with an increasingly isolated Iran. Several examples of major firms leaving Iran have been noted throughout this paper. Many experts believe that, over time, the efficiency and output of Iran’s economy will decline as foreign expertise departs and Iran invites in or makes purchases from less capable foreign companies.

There has been no broad uprising against the regime in 2010 triggered by the economic effects of sanctions on Iran. However, anecdotal reports suggest that many Iranians, particularly in the middle class, which has expanded under the Islamic regime, are blaming the regime for economic difficulties. There has been unrest among small and large merchants who are having trouble obtaining trade financing, insurance, and shipping availability, which is driving up their costs. A substantial portion of the Iranian economy depends on import-export activity, so the damage to that sector from international sanctions is expected to be considerable. However, precise estimates on how Iran’s Gross Domestic Product might be affected by sanctions, or the pullout of these firms, is not available.

The difficulties felt by the merchant community could have contributed to a July 2010 two week strike by major Tehran bazaar merchants, a stoppage that spread to other cities. The strike was ostensibly in protest of a government attempt to increase taxation on the merchants by 70%, but it is likely that the broader adverse business climate contributed to the bazaar stoppages. An agreement was eventually reached under which taxation only went up 15%. The merchant community could be a potential “swing constituency” if it sides with the young Green movement activists to mount a concerted challenge to the regime.

A larger issue, which may or may not be affected by sanctions, is the political effect, if any, of an Ahmadinejad plan to phase out state subsidies for such staples as gasoline and some foods over the next five years. After several delays, the program started on December 19, 2010, with a

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reduction in subsidies of gasoline and bread. The price of traditional bread immediately escalated to 40 cents, from 15 cents, when the program began. Gasoline prices now run on a tiered system in which a small increment is available at the subsidized price of about 30 cents per gallon, but amounts above that threshold are available only at a price of about $1.32 per gallon, way higher than the price before the program began. The lower and lower middle class is being compensated with direct cash payments of about $40 per month. To date, the regime has prevented major unrest by deploying security forces around Tehran and other major cities. However, some Iranian truckers simply stopped working on the grounds that their work is no longer profitable. Major unrest was feared among those in the middle class who might feel deprived by this new program—many of whom are also supportive of the Green movement that is opposed to the regime mainly on political grounds.

**Effect on the Energy Sector**

As noted throughout, the U.S. objective has been to target sanctions against Iran’s energy sector, considered the engine of Iran’s economy and source of most of its revenue. Depriving the regime of revenue, it is believed, will reduce its ability to enlist and maintain the loyalty of security personnel or to buy off key interest groups. There are clear indications that the sanctions—coupled with the overall sense that Iran is isolated from the international community—are causing substantial injury to this sector. Assistant Secretary Einhorn testified on July 29, 2010, that about $50 billion in investment in Iran’s energy sector had been deterred by sanctions and other forms of pressure. As noted above, several major European firms have either announced pullouts from some of their Iran projects, declined to make further investments, or resold their investments to other companies. The actions to deny Iran financing have, according to the International Monetary Fund, partly dried up financing for energy industry and other projects in Iran. Observers at key energy fields in Iran say there is little evidence of foreign investment activity and little new development activity sighted, including at the large South Pars gas field that Iran has focused on for at least 10 years.

There has been a concern that some of the investment void might be “backfilled,” at least partly, by Asian firms such as those from China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and countries in Eastern Europe. Russian firms are said to be in talks with Iran on new energy projects. However, many such deals are said to be in preliminary stages, and clear examples of “backfilling” are few, to date. Most of these companies are perceived as not being as technically capable as those that have withdrawn from Iran. In July 2010, after the enactment of Resolution 1929 and CISADA, the Revolutionary Guard’s main construction affiliate, Khatem ol-Anbiya, announced it had withdrawn from developing Phases 15 and 16 of South Pars—a project worth $2 billion. Khatem ol-Anbiya took over that project in 2006 when Norway’s Kvaerner pulled out of it. It is likely that the IRGC perceived its involvement as likely to scare away foreign participation in the work because U.S. and U.N. sanctions are targeting the IRGC and its corporate affiliates. It is highly unlikely that Iran will attract the $145 billion in new investment over the next 10 years that Iran’s deputy Oil Minister said in November 2008 that Iran needs.

Possibly as a result of the hesitancy of the most capable firms to stay in the Iranian market, Iran’s oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.8 million barrels per day (mbd) from about 4.1

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million barrels per day (mbd) in the mid-2000s, and is projected to fall to about 3.3 mbd by 2015.\footnote{http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704569204575328851816763476.html.} With Iran’s oil production appearing to slip gradually, some analyses, including by the National Academy of Sciences, say that Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.\footnote{Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. December 26, 2006.} Others maintain that Iran’s gas sector can more than compensate for declining oil exports, although it needs gas to reinject into its oil fields and remains a relatively minor gas exporter. It exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey. Some members of Congress believe that ISA would have been even more effective if successive administrations had imposed sanctions available in U.S. law, and have expressed frustration that the executive branch has not imposed ISA sanctions.

**Gasoline Availability and Importation**

Sanctions have clearly and dramatically reduced the amount of gasoline Iran is importing. Earlier in this report was discussion of announcements by many major gasoline suppliers and insurers that they had ended supplying or ensuring shipments to Iran. However, as of late 2010, Iranian officials have said they have largely coped with the reduction in gasoline imports. Some expect Iran that the reduction in gasoline subsidies discussed above will reduce demand, and contribute to Iran’s strategy to cope with the reduction in gasoline sales. Even before the subsidy reduction, there had not been gasoline shortages or gasoline rationing, although some Iranian oppositionists have reported otherwise. Iran has coped by converting at least two petrochemical plants to gasoline production, through a generally inferior process that initially produces benzene. The gasoline produced reportedly has led to a large increase in air pollution in Tehran, which was expected. Iran also says it has accelerated renovations and other improvements to existing gasoline refineries, allocating $2.2 billion for that purpose.

Building new refining capacity appears to be Iran’s long term effort to reduce its vulnerability to gasoline supply reductions. Iran’s deputy oil minister said in July 2010 Iran would try to invest $46 billion to upgrade its nine refineries and build seven new ones, a far larger amount than Iran had previously allocated to oil refining capacity.
### Entities Named for Sanctions Under Resolution 1737

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEIO) Mesbah Energy Company (Arak supplier)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalaye Electric (Natanz supplier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pars Trash Company (centrifuge program) Farayand Technique (centrifuge program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Industries Organization (DIO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th of Tir (DIO subordinate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)—missile program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)—missile program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fajr Industrial Group (missile program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behman Asgarpour (Arak manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehsan Monajemi (Natanz construction manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jafar Mohammadi (Adviser to AEIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Hosein Salimi (Commander, IRGC Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawood Agha Jani (Natanz official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Hajinia Leilabadi (director of Mesbah Energy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri (Malak Ashtar University of Defence Technology rector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Yahid Dastjerdi (head of Aerospace Industries Org., AIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi (Commander in Chief, IRGC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (controls 7th of Tir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parchin Chemical Industries (branch of DIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaj Nuclear Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novin Energy Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Missile Industry Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ya Mahdi Industries Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavoshyar Company (subsidiary of AEIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sho'a Aviation (produces IRGC light aircraft for asymmetric warfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Sepah (funds AIO and subordinate entities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qods Aeronautics Industries (produces UAV's, para-gliders for IRGC asymmetric warfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pars Aviation Services Company (maintains IRGC Air Force equipment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr (IRGC officer serving as deputy Interior Minister)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander)
Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (senior defense scientist)
Mohasen Fakrizadeh-Mahabai (defense scientist)
Seyed Jaber Safdari (Natanz manager)
Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industrial Group)
Ahmad Derakshandeh (head of Bank Sepah)
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (IRGC ground forces commander)
Amir Rahimi (head of Esfahan nuclear facilities)
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (head of SBIG)
Naser Maleki (head of SHIG)
Brig. Gen. Morteza Reza'i (Deputy commander-in-chief, IRGC)
Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan (chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander)

**Entities Added by Resolution 1803**

Thirteen Iranians named in Annex 1 to Resolution 1803; all reputedly involved in various aspects of nuclear program. Bans travel for five named Iranians.

Electro Sanam Co.
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (centrifuge production)
Barzaganin Tejaral Tavanmad Saccal
Jabber Ibn Hayan
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. (Makes batteries for Iranian military and missile systems)
Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front co.)
Industrial Factories of Precision
Joza Industrial Co.
Pshgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries
Tamas Co. (involved in uranium enrichment)
Safety Equipment Procurement (AIO front, involved in missiles)

**Entities Added by Resolution 1929**

Over 40 entities added; makes mandatory a previously non-binding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions. Adds one individual banned for travel – AEIO head Javad Rahiqi

Amin Industrial Complex
Armament Industries Group
Defense Technology and Science Research Center (owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense)……..
Doostan International Company
Farasakht Industries
First East Export Bank, PLC (only bank added by 1929)
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
M. Babaie Industries
Malek Ashtar University (subordinate of Defense Technology and Science Research Center, above)
Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (sells Iranian made arms to customers worldwide)
Mizan Machinery Manufacturing
Modern Industries Technique Company
Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (research component of the AEIO)
Pejman Industrial Services Corp.
Sabalan Company
Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company
Shahid Karrazi Industries
Shahid Sattari Industries
Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (acts on behalf of the DIO)
Special Industries Group (another subordinate of DIO)
Tiz Pars (cover name for SHIG)
Yazd Metallurgy Industries
The following are Revolutionary Guard affiliated firms, several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction affiliate:
Fater Institute
Garaghe Sazendegi Ghaem
Gorb Karbala
Gorb Nooh
Hara Company
Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
Khatam ol-Anbiya
Makin
Omran Sahel
Oriental Oil Kish
Rah Sahel
Rahab Engineering Institute
Sahel Consultant Engineers
Sepanir
Sepasad Engineering Company
The following are entities owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL):
Irano Hind Shipping Company
IRISL Benelux
South Shipping Line Iran

Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382
(many designations coincident with designations under U.N. resolutions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran)</td>
<td>June 2005, September 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran)  June 2005, February 2009
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran  June 2005
Novin Energy Company (Iran)  January 2006
Mesbah Energy Company (Iran)  January 2006
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran)  July 2006
Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)  July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran)  January 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran)  March 2007
Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program)  June 2007
Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program)  June 2007
Fajr Industries Group (Iran, missile program)  June 2007
Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (Iran, missile prog.)  June 2007
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran)  September 2007
Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea)  September 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  October 21, 2007
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics  October 21, 2007
Bank Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by Guard; Bank Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC (U.K.))  October 21, 2007
Bank Kargoshaee  October 21, 2007
Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based in Afghanistan  October 21, 2007
Bank Mellat (provides banking services to Iran’s nuclear sector); Mellat Bank SB CJSC (Armenia). Reportedly has $1.4 billion in assets in UAE  October 21, 2007
Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.)  October 21, 2007
Khatam ol Anbiya Gharargah Sazendegi Nooh (main IRGC construction and contracting arm, with $7 billion in oil, gas deals)  October 21, 2007
Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil exploration firm)  October 21, 2007
Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh (synonymous with Khatam ol Anbiya)  October 21, 2007
Sepasad Engineering Company (Guard construction affiliate)  October 21, 2007
Omran Sahel (Guard construction affiliate)  October 21, 2007
Sahel Consultant Engineering (Guard construction affiliate)  October 21, 2007
Hara Company  October 21, 2007
Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem  October 21, 2007
Bahmanyar Mortezab Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see above under Resolution 1737)  October 21, 2007
Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (AIO head, Iran missile program)  October 21, 2007
Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO, see under Resolution 1737)  October 21, 2007
Morteza Reza'i (deputy commander, IRGC) See also Resolution 1747. October 21, 2007
Mohammad Hejazi (Basiq commander). Also, Resolution 1747. October 21, 2007
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander). Resolution 1747. October 21, 2007
Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli). March 12, 2008
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief). July 8, 2008
Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior Defense Ministry scientist). July 8, 2008
Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz enrichment site). July 8, 2008
Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industries, involved in missile program). July 8, 2008
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (heads Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group). July 8, 2008
Naser Malik (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group). July 8, 2008
Tamas Company (involved in uranium enrichment). July 8, 2008
7th of Tir (involved in developing centrifuge technology). July 8, 2008
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (partner of 7th of Tir). July 8, 2008
Parchin Chemical Industries (deals in chemicals used in ballistic missile programs). July 8, 2008
Karaj Nuclear Research Center. August 12, 2008
Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC). August 12, 2008
Safety Equipment Procurement Company. August 12, 2008
Joza Industrial Company (front company for Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, SHIG). August 12, 2008
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8; Kazar; Irinvestship; Shipping Computer Services; Iran o Misr Shipping; Iran o Hind; IRISL Marine Services; Isratal Shipping; South Shipping; IRISL Multimodal; Oasis; IRISL Europe; IRISL Benelux; IRISL China; Asia Marine Network; CISCO Shipping; and IRISL Malta. September 10, 2008
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, including Armament Industries Group; Farasakht Industries; Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co.; Iran Communications Industries; Iran Electronics Industries; and Shiraz Electronics Industries. September 17, 2008
Export Development Bank of Iran. Provides financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. October 22, 2008
Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli involved in managing property in New York City on behalf of Iran). December 17, 2008
11 Entities Tied to Bank Melli: Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); Bank Melli Printing and Publishing; Melli Investment Holding; Mehr Cayman Ltd.; Cement Investment and Development; Mazandaran Cement Co.; Shomali Cement; Mazandaran Textile; Melli Agrochemical; First Persian Equity Fund; BMIIC Intel. General Trading. March 3, 2009
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi, head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (key corporate arm of the IRGC). February 10, 2010 (see also October 21, 2007)
Iran Sanctions

Fater Engineering Institute (linked to Khatem ol-Anbiya) February 10, 2010
Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute (linked to Khatem ol-Anbiya) February 10, 2010
Makin Institute (linked to Khatem ol-Anbiya) February 10, 2010
Rahab Institute (linked to Khatem on-Anbiya) February 10, 2010

Entities sanctioned on June 16, 2010
- Post Bank of Iran
- IRGC Air Force
- IRGC Missile Command
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anibya IRGC construction affiliate)
- Mohammad Ali Jafari – IRGC Commander-in-Chief since September 2007
- Mohammad Reza Naqdi – Head of the IRGC’s Basij militia force that suppresses dissent (since October 2009)
- Ahmad Vahedi – Defense Minister
- javedan Mehr Toos, Javad Karimi Sabet (procurement brokers or atomic energy managers)
- Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (controlled by the Aircraft Industries Org that manages Iran’s missile programs)
- Five front companies for IRISL: Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co.; Safiran Payam Darya; and Hong Kong-based Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics.

Also identified on June 16 were 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated IRISL ships.

Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran for purposes of the ban on U.S. trade with Iran.

Entities sanctioned on November 30, 2010
- Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat
- Pearl Energy Services, SA
- Ali Afzali (high official of First East Export Bank)
- IRISL front companies: Ashtead Shipping, Byfleet Shipping, Cobham Shipping, Dorking Shipping, Effingham Shipping, Farnham Shipping, Gomshall Shipping, and Horsham Shipping (all located in the Isle of Man).
- IRISL and affiliate officials: Mohammad Hosein Dajmar, Gholamhossein Golpavar, Hassan Jalil Zadeh, and Mohammad Haji Pajand.

Entities sanctioned on December 21, 2010:
- Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC
- Ansar Bank (for providing financial services to the IRGC)
- Mehr Bank (same justification as above)

- Moallem Insurance Company (for providing marine insurance to IRISL, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)

**Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)**

Qods Force October 21, 2007
Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian supported terrorist groups) October 21, 2007
Al Qaeda Operatives in Iran: Saad bin Laden; Mustafa Hamid; Muhammad Rab’a al-Bahtiyti; Alis Saleh Husain January 16, 2009
Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi August 3, 2010
Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and its director Hesam Khoshnevis, for supporting Lebanese Hizbollah August 3, 2010

Congressional Research Service 58
Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch, and its director Ali Zuraik, for providing support to Hizballah

Razi Musavi, a Syrian based Iranian official allegedly providing support to Hizballah

Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hizballah)

**Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Non-Proliferation Act and other U.S. Proliferation Laws (Executive Order 12938)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Sanction Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute</td>
<td>January 8, 1999 (E.O. 12938). Both removed on May 21, 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)</td>
<td>July 4, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery shells to Iran.</td>
<td>September 17, 2003 (also designated under Executive Order 12938), removed May 21, 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 entities sanctioned including companies from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan.</td>
<td>April 7, 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad), Russia, Spain, and Ukraine.</td>
<td>September 29, 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, mostly from China, for alleged supplying of Iran’s missile program. Many, such as North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp., have been sanctioned several times previously. Newly sanctioned entities included North Korea’s Paeksan Associated Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma Enterprise Co.</td>
<td>December 2004 and January 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 entities, including those from China (Norinco yet again), India (two chemical companies), and Austria. Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of India (see September 29, 2004) were ended, presumably because of information exonerating him.</td>
<td>December 26, 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 entities. Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms (Rosobornexport and aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban entity (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology).</td>
<td>August 4, 2006 (see below for Rosobornexport removal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 entities. Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); Zibo Chemical, China National Aerotechnology, and China National Electrical (China). Korean Mining and Industrial Development (North Korea) for WMD or advanced weapons sales to Iran (and Syria).</td>
<td>January 2007 (see below for Tula and Rosobornexport removal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. Among the new entities sanctioned for assisting Iran were Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia Company (Singapore); Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); and Arif Durrani (Pakistani national).</td>
<td>April 23, 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 entities: China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC; Korea Mining Development Corp. (North Korea); Korea Taesong Trading Co.</td>
<td>October 23, 2008. Rosobornexport removed May 21, 2010.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

(NK); Yolin/Yullin Tech, Inc. (South Korea); Rosoboronexport (Russia state arms export agency); Sudan Master Technology; Sudan Technical Center Co; Army Supply Bureau (Syria); R and M International FZCO (UAE); Venezuelan Military Industries Co. (CAVIM);

Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438

Ahmad Forouzandeh, Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite militia fighters

January 9, 2008

Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, Iran based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq.

January 9, 2008

Isma'il al-Lami (Abu Dura), Shiite militia leader, breakaway from Sadr Mahdi Army, alleged to have committed mass kidnapings and planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians

January 9, 2008

Mishan al-Jabburi, Financier of Sunni insurgents, owner of pro-insurgent Al-Zawra television, now banned

January 9, 2008

Al Zawra Television Station

January 9, 2008

Khata'ib Hezbollah (pro-Iranian Mahdi splinter group)

July 2, 2009

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis

July 2, 2009

Iranians Sanctioned Under September 29, 2010, Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers

1. IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari

All sanctioned on September 29, 2010

2. Minister of Interior at time of June 2009 elections Sadeq Mahsouli

3. Minister of Intelligence at time of elections Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei

4. Tehran Prosecutor General at time of elections Saeed Mortazavi

5. Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi

6. Former Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar

7. Deputy National Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan

8. Basij (security militia) Commander at time of elections Hossein Taeb

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612